Poverty causes inequality in SA – not the reverse. As the Income Inequality Study reveals – but has great difficulty in acknowledging (StatsSA 2019)

Brian Kantor and Loane Sharp

Kantor is Professor Emeritus in Economics UCT and Head of Research Institute Investec Wealth and Investment. Sharp is Director at Prophet Analytics

The most important question in economics – why some countries remain poor while others grow rich – has been definitively answered. According to the United Nations, between 1990 and 2015 the poverty rate in the developing world dropped from 47% to 14%. More than a billion people escaped poverty over the period.

The unequivocal cause of declining poverty has been strong and sustained economic growth. According to the International Monetary Fund, economic growth in developing countries has averaged 4.9% per annum since 1990. At this rate, with population growth in developing countries now 1.2% per annum and steadily falling, real income per person will more than double over the next 20 years. Poverty, in other words, will be substantially eliminated within a generation.

The primary question having been answered, economists have increasingly directed their attention to a secondary question – why some people within a country remain (relatively, sometimes absolutely) poor while others do much better earning and spending their incomes. It is right and good to prefer that the benefits of economic growth be distributed widely rather than narrowly. But in highly competitive markets, this may not be possible – especially in labour markets, where incomes are driven up by competition between employers, held down by competition between workers for work and ultimately settle at a mutually agreed value for the expected productivity of the employee that differs widely according to skill experience and ability. Yet growth, even when unevenly distributed, generates revenues for government that can be used to provide the most vulnerable with extra spending power and valuable benefits in kind (education housing and medical care) that will add to their income generating capacity and mobility.

In contrast to the global experience, SA’s poverty rate has been stubbornly high and recently rising. According to Statistics SA, 55% of the population is defined as poor, living on less than R11,904 per annum. (current rands) Over the period that real per capita income growth in developing countries averaged 3.7% per annum, SA per capita income growth averaged a mere 0.7% per annum.

While poverty remains high, Statistics SA’s latest inequality report, authored by the Southern African Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) at the University of Cape Town, despite its summary view that income distribution in SA is largely and unhappily as unequal as it has been since 1993, shows in fact, that inequality has declined. In 2006, the top 10% of income earners enjoyed 12.5 times the income of the bottom 40%. By 2015, this Palma inequality ratio had declined to 10.2 – significant progress over a short period of time. In 2006, the top 10% incurred 8.6 times the spending of the bottom 40%. By 2015, the ratio had fallen to 7.9 times – also significant progress over a short period of time.

This seems counterintuitive: how can poverty increase and inequality decline? As we explain below, the middle class, not the poor, have been the primary beneficiaries of government policies. We pretend to care for the poor but often act otherwise, no doubt because it makes political sense. Many of the economic policy interventions of the SA authorities would not pass the Rawlsian test.  That is would the intended policy  be helpful to the economic interests of the least well off 20% of the population?

The distribution of spending is significantly more equal than the distribution of income, thanks to taxes, welfare spending, government services and saving (i.e. spending foregone) largely undertaken by the top 10% of income earners. They who are responsible for almost all the wealth accumulated in SA, and without whom the economy would perform even less well and be even more dependent on foreign capital.

The inequality report rightly concludes that lack of economic growth and lack of job creation are the main causes of poverty and inequality. Unfortunately, the report contains much psychosocial nonsense. An example: “High levels of inequality mean that large segments of a society may be excluded from economic opportunities [since] people who receive the best opportunities are the ones who are the richest, and these are not necessarily the same as the ones who are the most talented or who would make the best use of such opportunities.” In other words, rich people cause poverty. Surely it is poverty not inequality that denies opportunity.

To give another example: “Adding a couple of thousand rand to the monthly pocketbooks of the poor could elevate them above the poverty line and set them on a better life trajectory […] but it doesn’t immediately result in greater equality between the outcomes of certain groups” (emphasis added). In other words, eliminating poverty is unacceptable because, in doing so, white people might get better off.

The global economic experience indicates that the self-interest and creative drive of a tiny group of people – a small number of extremely successful business owners and their high-skilled employees – have sharply reduced poverty and will soon eliminate it altogether. They are the crucial agents of economic growth. Respecting their achievements, tolerating their high incomes and protecting their gains becomes the essential social contract. Redistributing these exceptional gains through progressive income tax and well-directed government spending is a further part of the social contract. Successful economies manage to grow and redistribute – in that order.

It hardly seems worth the effort to conduct a comprehensive survey of inequality in SA every few years when the results are so self-evident as to be nearly worthless. The economy hasn’t grown, unemployment has risen and therefore poverty and inequality remain significant problems. No surprise in that. We should like to know, instead, how economic growth and job creation might be achieved or, indeed, is being frustrated.

We know, of course, what causes economic growth and the attendant benefits of investment, employment, innovation, competition and taxes: business profitability. We know what causes job creation and the attendant benefits of economic mobility, childcare, healthcare, retirement savings and workplace safety: economic growth and the profitable employment of labour.

On the economic growth front, it is therefore alarming that SA companies’ return on assets (gross operating surplus / gross fixed capital stock), having peaked at 17.9% in 2004, will this year likely drop below 10% for the first time in 30 years. If business profitability does not recover, economic growth cannot. Analysis of the financial statements of listed companies reveals a similar decline in the return on capital.

On the employment front, it is alarming that, whereas in the 25 years prior to 1994 an additional 1% of economic growth was associated with a 1.3% increase in employment, since 1994 an additional 1% of economic growth was associated with a 0.2% increase in employment. Even if economic growth occurs, job creation cannot occur if the link between economic growth and employment has been severed.

The causes of economic growth and job creation, and therefore the solutions to poverty and inequality, are well understood. Growth will follow business liberalisation, and jobs will follow labour market liberalisation. Yet the report unfathomably frames these as complex and intractable problems. It surely does help to promote an endless agenda for the favoured consultariat and their flow of proposals to tinker further with the economy.

The report usefully observes that inequality in SA is overwhelmingly related to labour market inequalities: inequality between those who have jobs and those who don’t; inequality between public sector and private sector employees; and, within the private sector, inequality between skilled and unskilled employees.

The labour market is clearly central: incomes from work account for three-quarters of all incomes earned and about two-thirds of overall inequality comes from inequality in earnings. Inequality and poverty and the inability of the economy to grow faster are largely attributable to the failure of the economy to provide more employment.

There are serious problems with the survey methodology that is the basis for the report. Some of the problems are true of all surveys. For instance, people are notoriously cagey about their true income and spending patterns, especially when an individual, completing the survey on behalf of others in the household, may fail to disclose the true picture to other individuals in the household, let alone government enumerators. Other problems are specific to this survey. For example, households are asked to report the spending they actually incurred rather than the value of the goods and services received. Heavily subsidised government school fees are a small fraction of the total cost of education, yet only the minimal out-of-pocket fee is reported as expenditure with no adjustment for the full value of the benefit. Likewise subsidies related to healthcare, housing, electricity, water, sanitation and many other government services are not reflected as de facto benefits at their costs of supply, and the costs of administering government programmes are nowhere accounted for in the estimates of expenditure.

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As seen in Figure 4.1.4, income from the labour market is the main source of income, increasing from 73.5% in 2006 to 81.3% in 2009 ( after a brief period of strong GDP growth) before declining to 71.0% in 2011 and then remaining constant between 2011 and 2015. The proportion of social grants to overall household income has slightly fluctuated over the years: the proportion decreased from 6.0% in 2006 to 5.4% in 2015. The share of in-kind income gradually rose from 1.2% in 2006 to 2.4% in 2011 before dropping to 1.7% in 2015. Meanwhile, the share of remittances to overall income fluctuated over the years and reached its highest proportion in 2009 contributing 1.2% to overall income. Figures 4.1.5 and 4.1.6 show the distribution of labour market income and social grants, respectively, by income-decile. From these figures, we observe growing dependence on social grants and declining reliance on labour market income in the bottom deciles. By contrast, in the top deciles there was a much greater reliance on labour market income and less reliance on social grants. Therefore, social grants to some extent contributed to the improvement in income inequality.



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Unfortunately, the report does not attempt to explain why these differences exist and persist. Except by extensive reference to race. Do richer SA whites (and the rich of other races) harm or serve the economic interest of SA?  Should the objective of economic policy be to retain their valuable services- or to do better without them in the interest of equality? One suspects that many of those who interest themselves in issues of inequality in SA and many others with influence over economic policy find it very difficult to give an unequivocal response to this question. In other words the economic growth that could lift the 33 million poor South Africans out of poverty would be unacceptable because a few white South African might benefit disproportionately from the process.

The truth is that the government has aggravated rather than alleviated inequality. Incomes of high-skilled people have been boosted by immigration restrictions and emigration. Incomes of low-skilled people have been diminished by uncontrolled immigration of low-skilled people from neighbouring countries. Social grants have raised the reservation wage of low-skilled people discouraging their participation in the labour force, particularly in the rural areas. Government education is so poor that a staggering proportion of enrolees drop out of school, eliminating what chances they might have had of finding work. Extensive protections against especially performance-related dismissals have reduced productivity and raised the risk of employing people who prove not worth their hire.

Given all the obstructions to hiring and firing labour – and all the unintended consequences of poverty relief in influencing the willingness to supply labour – it should be no surprise that the distribution of income in SA is what it is. It is well explained by the political interest in “good jobs” rather than in total employment – especially in the highly indulged public sector – and the support for unions and labour regulations that protect those with jobs at the expense of those seeking work. Slow growth in the number of people employed and the inability of the poor to find work should not be regarded as unintended. It is the predictable outcome of policy choices made by the SA government.

Two other important forces on the income distribution should be recognised. Firstly, the expenditure of households headed by men is significantly higher than spending by households headed by women. In 2015 the average expenditure of the households headed by men was twice as high as of those headed by women. (38180/18406) A very similar ratio (2.1) prevailed in 2006 (27058/12965) (2015 prices). This suggests that female-headed households have only one person working whereas male-headed households have two people working with very similar average incomes per worker. It appears that the important gender gap is related to the presence or absence of a working male in the household.

Secondly, average urban incomes are much higher than rural incomes. The urban/rural divide is even more dramatic. In 2015, on average, urban households spent R40,290 in 2015 and rural households R11,658 – a ratio of 3.5 times. In 2006, this ratio was very similar, 3.7. These expenditure gaps are attributable more to employment opportunities than wage differences. Of the total population, 65.3% are urban and 34.7% rural.

The policy implications of these facts of SA economic life seem obvious: more households headed by men, and more of them established in the urban areas. Social assistance and free housing and utilities that do not distinguish between urban and rural areas makes overcoming poverty through employment ever more difficult, because it encourages rural settlement and unemployment especially now that a national minimum wage is the rule.

In 2006, the top 10% spent 57.2% of all expenditure or 8.6 times that of the bottom 40% with a mere 6.6% share. By 2015, this ratio had declined from 8.6 to 7.9 – less inequality. Yet the share of the bottom 40% remained at 6.6%.  In 2006, the middle 50% had a 36.2% share of all expenditure. By 2015, the expenditure share of the top 10% was down to 52.6%, and that of the middle 50% up to 40.8%, of all spending. Thus, a decline in the ratio (top 10%/middle 50%) from 1.81 to 1.32 times, while the ratio of the spending of the middle 50% to that of the poorest 40% rose from 5.5 times to a less equal 6.2 times. The large gains in the share of expenditure have been realised by the 7th, 8th and 9th deciles whose combined share improved by a full four percentage points.

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The redistribution of spending power in SA has been to middle-income earners – not the poor. Perhaps especially to the new members of the upper middle class who are employed by government and its enterprises and institutions. If the economy is to grow faster and incomes and spending power are to be more equally spread, the interests of the poor and the rich will have to predominate in policy settings, much more than they have done to date.

Sources:

All charts and statistics are sourced from this study: Statistics South Africa (2019), Inequality Trends in South Africa  A multidimensional diagnostic of inequality, Risenga Maluleke, Statistician-General, Report No. 03-10-19

 

Some lessons from share market history

Shorter version published in Business Day, Friday 15th November

The market value of any business will surely  be determined by its economic performance. The most commonly applied and highly accessible proxy for performance are the earnings reported by its accountants and auditors. Cash dividends paid might be a superior indicator given how the definition of bottom line earnings has changed over time. Cash flows may be better still but are less readily available.

Robert Shiller provides 148 years and 1776 months of US stock market data. US S&P Index values, index earnings and dividends per share have followed a very similar path. The correlation between monthly prices, earnings and dividends, all up nearly 20,000 times since 1871, is close to one. [1]

Share Prices, Earnings and Dividends per Share (1871=100) Log Scale

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Source; Shiller Data, Investec Wealth and Investment

 

The P/E ratio for the S&P has averaged 15.76 over the long period with a low of 5 in 1917 and a high of 124 after earnings had collapsed in May 2009 while the Index held up to a degree. And dividends held up much better than earnings.

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Source; Shiller Data, Investec Wealth and Investment

 

If we run a regression equation relating the Index to earnings or dividends per share the residual of these equations (that what is not explained by the model) has a strong tendency to trend to zero- given enough time. Or in other words the price-earnings ratios have tended to revert to their long-term average of 15.8  over time but with variable lags.

The higher the P/E multiple the faster earnings must be expected to grow when they to make up for the low initial yield E/P and vice versa. Expected earnings drive current market prices. Surprisingly higher or lower revealed earnings will tend to move prices in the opposite direction. Earnings may catch up with prices or prices follow earnings. The move to any long-term equilibrium can come from either  direction, with advantage or disadvantage to shareholders.

Therefore be warned. Knowing that a PE ratio is above or below a long term average is not going to make you rich or poor speculating in the share market. The correlation of starting PE and returns realized over the next twelve months is close to zero.

The starting PE appears to become more helpful as a guide to investors when returns realized over an extended period are compared to it.  High starting PE’s are associated with generally lower returns and vice versa over three or five year subsequent windows. When we relate starting PE’s 36 or 60 periods before with returns realized three or five years afterwards over the entire period we do get a statistically supportive result. Choosing the right entry point to the market and waiting patiently for the outcomes would have been generally helpful to investors.

Examining the relationship between prices and earnings in the US does reveal some extreme cases. In the late forties and late seventies the market would have appeared as very cheap. But these were not good times for the US. The US was fighting and possibly losing a war in Korea. In the mid and late seventies the US was subject to stagflation- rapidly rising prices and slow growth. Also very un-promising times for shareholders.

However normality returned to the great advantage of those who did not share the prevailing pessimism and stayed in the market.  Between 1950 and 1953 the S&P PE crept up from seven to eleven times helping the total returns on the Index to average 22% p.a. In early 1978 the P/E was 8 times. Over the next three years the S&P delivered over 11% p.a on average as the US got its inflation under control.

By contrast in early 2000 at the height of IT optimism the S&P was trading at an extreme 33 times. Over the subsequent three years the S&P delivered negative twelve returns of -8.7% p.a. The IT bubble was only apparent after the event when expected earnings proved highly elusive.

S&P earnings collapsed during the GFC of 2008-09. From about $80 per index share in 2006 to less than $7 in early 2009. This sent the P/E multiple to 124 even as the Index fell sharply to a value of 757 by March 2009.  According to earnings the S&P was greatly overvalued. According to dividends that held up much better through the crisis, the market appeared as deeply undervalued. The dividend buy signal proved the right one as the economy recovered (unexpectedly) with lots of (unexpected) help from the Fed and the Treasury. The S&P Index since those dark days has that provided returns that have compounded on average at of over 13% p.a.

What is very different about the share market today in the US are the extraordinarily low interest rates- both long and short rates – that have surely helped drive the market higher as competition for shares from the money and bond markets fell away. What may appear as a demanding PE of about 22 times becomes much more understandable given abnormally low interest rates. Is this the permanently new normal for interest rates. Or will interest rates mean revert? And what is normal? Only time will tell.

[1] http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm

The US and the JSE since the Global Financial Crisis – a tale of success and relative failure.

A shorter version was published in Business Day on 1. november.

It is ten years since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). R100 invested on October 2009 in the 500 companies that make up the most important equity index, the New York S&P 500 Index, would now be worth as R680, with dividends reinvested in the index. This is the result of extraordinarily good 12 month returns over the ten years that averaged  over 18% p.a. in ZAR and 13.4% p.a in USD.

Most other equity markets have not performed anything like as well. R100 invested in the JSE All Share Index or in the MSCI EM, again with dividends reinvested, would now be worth about R276. This is equivalent to an average annual return of about 12% from the JSE over the ten years.

Ten years ago the SA bond market could have guaranteed the rand investor 9% p.a for ten years. Realized equity returns of 12% p.a therefore did not fully reward investors running equity market risks – assuming a required equity risk premium of 4% per annum.

The strong outperformance of the S&P 500 began in 2013 and has continued strongly since. It reflects very different fundamentals. The S&P 500 delivered growth in index earnings per share in USD of 11.7% p.a. over the ten years.  By contrast the JSE delivered growth in index dollar earnings per share of only 1.46% p.a and 5.5% p.a in rands, over the ten years. Barely ahead of inflation.

 

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Source; Bloomberg Investec Wealth and Investec Wealth and Investment

Back in September 2009, US Treasury Bonds offered a guaranteed 3.4% p.a for ten years. A good yield by the standards of today. This meant, at that especially fraught time, investors would have required an average return of about 7.5% p.a. to justify a full weight in equities, assuming the same required extra equity risk premium of 4% p.a. Actual realized returns on the S&P therefore exceeded required returns by about a very substantial 6% p.a.

Time has proved that the risks of financial failure in the US were greatly exaggerated. The lower entry price for bearing equity risk ten years ago, reflected by Index values of the time, proved unusually attractive.

Dividends per JSE Index share by contrast with earnings have grown from the equivalent of R100 in 2009 to R324 in September 2019 while earnings per share have no more than doubled. The ratio of the JSE index to its dividends was 41 times in 2009- it is now only 27 times. The ratio of the Index to its trailing earnings per share was 16 times in 2009 – and is the same 16 times today. There has been no derating or rerating for the JSE. See figure below

 

The JSE over the past ten years. Values, earnings and dividends (2009=100) Price to earnings and dividend ratios.

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Source; Bloomberg Investec Wealth and Investec Wealth and Investment

The equivalent required risk adjusted return of the highly diversified S&P 500 Index today is a mere 5.8% p.a. on average. With long RSA bond yields now offering close to 9% p.a. the required risk adjusted return from the average company listed on the JSE is now at least 13% p.a.

It has become increasingly difficult given slow growth and low inflation for a SA based company to add value for shareholders by earning returns on its capital expenditure  of over 14% p.a.  . And SA business has responded accordingly by saving and investing less and paying out dividends at a much faster rate. This is not good news for business or the economy. JSE listed companies would be much more valuable if they could justify investing more and paying out less- as US companies have done.

They need encouragement from faster growth in their revenues and earnings and lower interest rates. Lower short-term interest rates are in the power of the Reserve Bank and if reduced could help stimulate extra spending by households. SA business and its share market also need the encouragement of lower required long-term returns. That is from the lower long-term interest rates that would come with less inflation expected. Less inflation expected (and consequently lower interest rates) means a growing belief that SA will not fall into a debt trap and print money to escape it- that could be highly inflationary. So far and after the MTBPS last week not obviously so good. The jury remains very much out on the ability of the SA government to manage its debts successfully and the cost of capital for SA business has become even still more elevated.

The dangers of a divided world of inflation expectations

Developed and emerging markets have very different expectations of inflation. The monetary authorities should think carefully about the consequences of austerity

The developed world is much agitated by very low interest rates. Rates are so low that it is hard to imagine them declining further, so emasculating monetary policy.

Interest rates reflect a relative abundance of global savings. Hence inflation (prices rise when demands exceed available supplies) is confidently expected to remain at these very low rates. Interest rates accordingly offer compensation for expected inflation. The US bond market only offers an extra 1.56% annually for bearing inflation risks over the next 10 years (see figure below).

The US Treasury bond market (10 year yields) f1

 

Deflation or generally falling prices, have rather become a threat to economic stability. When prices are expected to fall and interest rates offer no reward to lenders, cash (literally hoarding notes and coin) may be a desirable option. If prices are to be lower in six months than they are today, it may make sense for firms and households to postpone spending, including on hiring labour. Hence even less spent and more saved, compounding the slow growth issue.

An economy-wide unwillingness to demand more stuff is not a normal state of economic affairs. If demand is lacking, resources – land, labour and capital – become idle. In these unwelcome circumstances a government and its central bank can always stimulate more spending, including its own, without any real cost to taxpayers or economic trade-offs. More demand means no less supplied – therefore no output or income will be lost and more will be forthcoming, should demand catch up with potential supply.

Most simply, spending can be encouraged without limit by handing out money or jettisoning cash from the proverbial helicopter. For a government to be able to borrow for 30 years at very low interest rates is as inexpensive a funding method as printing money.

One can confidently expect unorthodox experiments in stimulating demand – should the developed economies continue to grow very slowly – and interest rates and inflation to remain at very low levels until growth and inflation picks up. Cutting taxes and funding a temporarily enlarged fiscal deficit with money or loans is another (better) option.

Quantitative easing (QE), the process whereby central banks create money to buy government bonds on a very large scale, mostly from banks, was highly unorthodox when first introduced to overcome the Global Financial Crisis of 2009. QE prevented the banks from running out of cash and defaulting on their deposit liabilities, thus preventing the destruction of the payments system that banks provide. But the banks, when selling bonds to their central banks, mostly substituted deposits at the central bank for previously held Treasury Bills and bonds. Bond holdings went down while deposits held by banks with  the central bank went up by similar amounts.

The banks did not (much) turn their extra cash into loans. It would have been more of a stimulus to spending had the central banks purchased assets from the customers of banks (retirement funds and their like) rather than the banks. Had they done more of this, the deposits of the banks as well as the cash of the banks would have increased immediately. The growth in bank credit and bank deposit liabilities has remained very modest, especially in Europe, though the recent pick-up in growth in bank loans is noteworthy. Hence the persistently slow growth in spending in Europe.

Growth in bank loans in the US and Europe

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Source: Thomson-Reuters, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis and Investec Wealth & Investment

 

While the developed world struggles with low interest rates and subdued inflation and expectations of inflation, the world of emerging markets present very differently. Interest rates remain persistently high, with elevated expectations of inflation (and exchange rate weakness) to come. Accordingly, interest rates, after adjusting for realised inflation, remain at high levels as do inflation protected interest rates.

South African financial markets have continued to perform very much in line with other emerging financial markets. The JSE All Share Index gained about 2.6% in US dollar terms in 2019 (to 11 October) while the MSCI Emerging Market Index was up by 4.7% – both distinct underperformers when compared to the S&P 500, which was up by over 18% over the same period. The rand and emerging market currency basket had both lost about the same 2% against the US dollar over the same period (see figures below).

The USD/ZAR and the USD/emerging market currency exchange rates in 2019

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Source: Bloomberg and Investec Wealth & Investment

 

The JSE and the emerging market equity benchmark in US dollars

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Source: Bloomberg and Investec Wealth & Investment

 

On the interest rate front, emerging market local currency bond yields remain elevated – above 6% per annum on average for 10 year bonds. While the average emerging market bond yield has edged lower in 2019, SA bond yields have moved higher this year (see figure below). The market in SA bonds is factoring in more rather inflation and a still weaker USD/ZAR exchange rate. Unlike in the developed world, the cost of capital, that is the required rates of real return to justify expenditure on additional plant and equipment, remains elevated in SA. This means a continued discouragement to such expenditure and is negative for the growth outlook.

 

SA and emerging market bond yields (10 year)

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Source: Thomson-Reuters, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis and Investec Wealth & Investment

 

Capital remains very expensive for SA borrowers and growth rates remain subdued.

Interest rates and spreads in the SA bond market

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Source: Bloomberg and Investec Wealth & Investment

 

A combination of more inflation expected with less inflation realised, because demand has been so subdued, has been toxic medicine for the SA economy. As in the developed world, the slack in the SA economy calls for stimulation from lower interest rates. And, unlike the developed there is ample scope for traditional monetary policy – in the form of rate cuts.

The inflation expected of the SA economy reflects the well-understood dangers of a debt trap and that the SA economy will print sometime in the future print money to escape its consequences. Yet fighting these expectations, which have nothing to do with monetary policy, with austere monetary policy makes no sense at all. Rather it means more economic slack, less growth, a larger fiscal deficit and enhanced inflationary expectations. Eliminating slack with lower short-term interest rates would do the opposite.

 

Earning profits, not acting like governments, remains the central task of business

One of my pleasures is to listen in conference to the accounts of great business enterprises, as told by their CEO’s and CFO’s. They seldom fail to impress with their grasp of the essentials of business success in a complex world. One that always contains the threat of competition from close rivals and even more dangerous the disruption of their business models and their relationship with customers from quarters previously unknown.  They are in it for the long run – not the approval  of the stock market over the next few months. Short termism does not make for business success.

They sense the growing opportunity data collection and analysis offers to produce distribute and market their goods and services more efficiently. To scale the advantages of their intellectual property and culture, they must have global reach that inevitably includes managing successfully in China, with all its opportunities challenges and trade-offs. They are well aware of meeting the demands society and its governments may make on them for them to be able operate legitimately. They know they have to play by rules over which may have little influence.

And one senses from them a new urgency about a more  disciplined approach to the management of shareholders capital. Business success and the performance of managers is increasingly measured by (internal) returns on capital employed, properly calibrated, that adds value for investors by exceeding the returns they could expect from the capital market with similar risks.

The business corporation is the key agency of a modern economy. The success of the developed world in raising output and incomes – improving consistently the standard of living is surely  attributable in large part to the design that accords so much responsibility to businesses large and small. The improvement in the average standard of living, and of those of the least advantaged of the bottom quartile of the income distribution (helped by tax payer provided welfare benefits) in what we define as the developed world has been at a historically unprecedented rate over the last 70 years or so. While the rate of economic improvement may have slowed down in the past twenty or ten years it sustains an impressive clip. Over the past 20 years GDP per capita in constant purchasing power parity terms in the largest seven economies (G7) as calculated by the IMF has grown by a compound average 2.8% p.a. Over the past 10 years this growth rate has slowed only marginally to an average of 2.7% p.a.  A rate rapid enough to double average per capita incomes every 26 years or so.

 

One might have thought that the proven capabilities and potential of the modern business enterprise would enjoy wide appreciation and respect. That is for its ability to deliver a growing abundance of goods and services that their customers choose, many of which thanks to innovations and inventions sponsored and nurtured by business that were unavailable or inconceivable to earlier generations. In so doing to provide well rewarded employment opportunities to so many and to provide a good return to their providers of capital – both debt and share capital. A large majority of whom, directly and indirectly, are not rich plutocrats but are the many millions of beneficiaries of savings  plans, upon which they rely for a dignified retirement.

 

But this is not the case at all. Even for the commentators in the leading business publications who present a view of the modern economy and its dependence on the corporation as in deep crisis. A sense of  grave economic crisis that given the much improved state of the global economy and of the role corporations play in it that is very hard to share for the reasons advanced.

 

For example Martin Wolf in an op-ed in the Financial Times (September 18 2019) Why rigged capitalism is damaging liberal democracy Economies are not delivering for most citizens because of weak competition, feeble productivity growth and tax loopholes

To quote Wolf’s conclusion on the reformed role of the corporation

“……They must, not least, consider their activities in the public arena. What are they doing to ensure better laws governing the structure of the corporation, a fair and effective tax system, a safety net for those afflicted by economic forces beyond their control, a healthy local and global environment and a democracy responsive to the wishes of a broad majority? We need a dynamic capitalist economy that gives everybody a justified belief that they can share in the benefits. What we increasingly seem to have instead is an unstable rentier capitalism, weakened competition, feeble productivity growth, high inequality and, not coincidentally, an increasingly degraded democracy. Fixing this is a challenge for us all, but especially for those who run the world’s most important businesses. The way our economic and political systems work must change, or they will perish.”

However much you might or might not share this view of the corporation, a state of being that is not at all apparent in the accounts of the threats and opportunities provided by business leaders- or in their actions as suggested earlier. Particularly when they are seen as rentiers given some guaranteed source of income provided by a conspiracy of protection against competitive threats. You might agree that he would have the leaders of the large modern corporation accept much greater responsibilities for the (apparently) failing human condition – responsibilities that are surely the essential purview of government. It is to ask corporations to achieve much more than they are at all capable of achieving to the satisfaction of society at large. It is to set them up for failure and to threaten the essential role given to them by society

The bad news- it takes a weak rand to keep South Africans at home. There is a better way to attract capital- human and financial

What inflation adds by way of higher prices, revenues or incomes, weaker exchange rates can be expected to reduce their value abroad. If the move in exchange rates was  equal to the difference in inflation rates between SA and its foreign trading partners, the different fields on which we work or play across the globe would be a level one.

Clearly economic life does not work that way. Our rands almost always have bought us more at home than they do abroad – when exchanged at the prevailing exchange rates. The difference between what our rands can buy at home or abroad can be calculated as the difference between the market rate of exchange and its purchasing power equivalent, as determined by the differences in inflation rates.

Since December 2010, when a US dollar cost R6.61, consumer prices in SA have increased on average by 58%. In the US average prices were up by a mere 16% over the same period. If the USD/ZAR had moved strictly in line with the changing ratio of consumer prices in the two economies (168/116 or 1.36) the dollar would have moved from 6.61 rands to 9 rands for a dollar in August 2019. (9/6.61 =136) A weaker exchange rate of 9 rands to the US dollar would have levelled the playing field. (see chart below)

2010 is a good starting point for such a calculation. The rand then was very close to its PPP equivalent were you to use 1995 as a starting point for the calculation. It was in 1995 that the rand became subject to largely unrestrained capital flows. Until then the (commercial) rand traded consistently close to its purchasing power value

The reality is that exchange rates are determined by forces that may have very little to do with actual price changes in the markets for goods and services. They move in response to global capital flows between economies that can dominate the flows of currency rather than to the flows of exports and imports that are price sensitive to a degree.

As a particular economy becomes more risky capital tends to flow away and exchange rates weaken and interest rates rise to balance supply and demand for the local currency. And if the shocks to the exchange rates are sustained, the inflation rate will respond as the prices paid for imported and exported goods in the local currency, increase or decrease- but with a time lag. This time lag determines the degree to which exchange rates diverge from PPP. The exchange rate leads and inflation follows – not the other way round – as theory might have had it. And convergence to purchasing power equivalent may take a long time.

Converting your SA wealth or incomes from rands into the equivalent purchasing power in the US at August month end would therefore have required the following adjustment. That is to reduce the 6.6 dollars received for R100 at market exchange rates by about 60%. This being the ratio 9/15.2 Having to pay only nine rand for a dollar would have been enough to net out the inflation impact. Rather than the R15.2 you actually had to give up for an extra dollar to spend in New York. (9/15.2*6.6 =3.9)

Thus any R100 of spending power in SA would have provided the equivalent of less than 4 dollars of roughly equivalent spending  power in the US. Or in other words what would be regarded as a substantial fortune of R100m in SA would have provided  a mere 4 million dollars of buying power in the US. Perhaps not enough to live well – or not nearly as well – as you could live in SA off your capital.

Consumer prices in SA and the USA and exchange rates (2010-2019)

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Source; IMF World Economic Outlook Data Base.  StatsSA, Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis and Investec Wealth and Investment

 

This purchasing power discount (((6.6-3.9))/6.6)*100= 40% at August month end) is a significant deterrent to the relocation of wealthy and skilled South Africans with only rands to support a life style in the developed world. Mobile younger South Africans, with a life of income earning and saving opportunities ahead of them, could undertake a similar calculation. That is multiply the prospective hard currency salaries they might be offered abroad, when measured in current exchange rates, by approximately 6/10’ths to account for their lesser purchasing power. Earning and saving rands at home (and perhaps investing abroad) might yield improved life-time consumption.

We should be relying more on better economic fundamentals than on an undervalued exchange rate to keep capital at home- especially our most valuable human capital. If South Africa would play the economic growth cards more effectively and reduce its risk premium it would retain and attract more capital on better terms.  The nominal rand could then again approach its PPP value and the cost of borrowing rands (and dollars) would come down with less inflation expected. SA Incomes after inflation could grow at a much faster rate – encouraging immigration rather than emigration of capital and skills.

A vicious cycle of slow growth and low investment can be replaced by a virtuous cycle, if the political will is there

We are well aware that slow economic growth depresses the growth in tax revenues. What is not widely recognised is the influence that tax rates and taxation have on economic growth. The burden of taxation on the SA economy, measured by the ratio of taxes collected to GDP, has been rising as GDP growth has slowed down, so adding to the forces that slow growth in incomes and taxes.

 

Trends in government revenue, expenditure and borrowing

 

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The GDP growth rate picked up in Q2 2019. But GDP is only up 1% on the year before while in current prices, it has increased by only 4.4%. That is slower nominal growth than at any time since the pre-inflationary 1960s, which is not at all helpful in reducing debt to GDP ratios (something of great concern to the credit rating agencies). This 4.4% growth is a mixture of the slow real growth and very low GDP inflation, now only about 3.5% a year.

Annual percentage growth in real and nominal GDP

 

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GDP and CPI inflation

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In the first four months of the SA fiscal year (2019-2020) personal income tax collected grew by an imposing 9.7% or an extra R14bn compared to the same period of the previous financial year. Higher revenues from individual taxpayers was the result of effectively higher income tax rates, so-called bracket creeps, on pre-tax incomes that rise with inflation.

Income tax collected from companies, however, stagnated, while very little extra revenue was collected from taxes on expenditure.  Lower disposable incomes resulted in less spending by households and the firms that supply them. The confidence of most households in their prospects for higher (after-tax) incomes in the future has been understandably impaired.

Treasury informs us that total tax revenue this fiscal year, despite higher income tax collected, is up by only 4.8%, compared to the same period a year ago, while government spending has grown up by 10.3%, or over R51bn. The much wider Budget deficit of R33bn (Spending of R156.6bn and revenue of R123.6bn) represents anything but fiscal austerity. It has added to total spending in the economy, up by a welcome over 3% in Q2 2019 – after inflation.

But deficits of this order of magnitude are not sustainable. Nor can they be closed by higher income and other tax rates that would continue to bear down on the growth prospects of the economy and the tax revenues it generates. A sharp slowdown in the growth of spending by government, combined with the sale of loss-making and cash-absorbing government enterprises is urgently called for if a debt trap is to be avoided. Given that the debts SA has issued are mostly repayable in rand, rands that we can print an infinite amount of, a trip to the IMF and the “Ts and Cs” they might impose on our profligacy is unlikely.

More likely is a trip to the printing press of the central bank rather than the capital markets to fund expenditure. Such inflationary prospects are fully reflected in the interest we have to pay to fund our deficits. These interest payments add significantly to government spending. The spread between what the SA government has to offer lenders and those offered by other sovereign borrowers has been widening.

The SA government now has to pay 8.7 percentage points a year more in rands than the average developed market borrower, ex the US (Germany and Japan included) and 7.6 percentage points a year more than the US has to offer for long-term loans. We also have to pay 3.1 percentage points a year more than the average emerging market borrower has to pay to borrow in their own currencies.

The difference between RSA interest rates and other sovereign borrowers. Ten-year bonds in local currencies

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When countries choose freedom, the economic outcomes are dramatically improved

It has proved very possible for average incomes and spending power to improve consistently over long periods of time. In the West economic progress has now been sustained for centuries. Over the past 70 years the improvement in global per capita incomes has been especially impressive as the process of economic growth has been extended more widely.

 

Download PDF with full article here: Kantor – When countries choose freedom

Déjà vu all over again – making sense of the recent rand weakness

The wise thing for the SA Reserve Bank to do is to leave the exchange rate to find its own level, while basing its interest rates decisions on the outlook for the domestic economy 

The famous phrase by Yogi Berra, “It’s déjà vu all over again,” does not quite do justice to the recent turmoil in the SA currency and debt markets. The hope for a weaker dollar and stronger rand, as well as the lower interest rates, inflation, and faster growth that comes with a stronger rand, has once more been dashed.

Trade wars and currency manipulation do less damage to the US economy than to others, simply because the US is less dependent on global trade and more dependent on the US consumer. Hence in times of trouble, capital flows towards the US, raises the exchange value of the US dollar and depresses bond yields. Emerging market exchange rates weaken more than most and emerging market bond yields rise. The rand generally falls more than most other emerging market currencies.

Funding government debt has become more expensive, even as the volume of debt to fund extraordinary spending on Eskom increases at a very rapid rate. Long-dated SA government-issued (RSA) debt now offers an extra 8% over US Treasury bonds and almost as much extra when compared to other developed market issuers (many of whom now borrow at negative interest rates). SA is now paying 3% more than the average emerging market on its debt (in their domestic currencies).

For the government, raising US dollars has also become more expensive. Raising five-year dollar-denominated debt now requires an extra 0.4 percentage points (40 basis points) more than it did in early July 2019. The cost of insuring RSA foreign-currency debt against default has risen similarly and more than it has for other emerging market borrowers.

Sovereign risk spreads for RSA and other US dollar-denominated debt
Source: Bloomberg, Investec Wealth & Investment

The rand moreover has performed particularly poorly when compared to other commodity and emerging market exchange rates. Since early July, the rand is about 6% down vs the US dollar, 3% down on the Chinese yuan and about 2% weaker vs the Aussie dollar and a basket of nine other emerging market currencies.

The USD/ZAR compared to the yuan and Aussie dollar (1 July = 1)
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Source Bloomberg, Investec Wealth & Investment
The USD/ZAR vs an equally weighted basket of nine emerging market exchange rates
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Source Bloomberg, Investec Wealth & Investment
The cost of buying dollars for forward delivery has thus also widened, as has the compensation for bearing inflation risk in the RSA bond market. Both spreads are now over 6% for 10-year contracts. The attempts by the Reserve Bank to reduce inflation expected, by containing inflation itself (now about 4.5%, an outcome achieved by depressing domestic spending), have accordingly failed.
The RSA bond market interest rate carry and inflation compensation. July- August 2019 (10 year yields)
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Source: Bloomberg, Investec Wealth & Investment

It should be recognised that the relative weakness in the rand and RSA bonds actually preceded the impact of the latest Trump tantrum. The Trump tariff threats came only at month-end. The earlier attacks of the Public Protector Mkhwebane on President Ramaphosa moved the market ahead of Trump.

What then can be done to mitigate this volatility and the damage it causes to the SA economy? The Reserve Bank cannot hope to anticipate exchange rate volatility with any degree of accuracy, or impose higher interest rates that offer no defense for the rand; they can only depress demand and growth further. The wise thing to do would be to leave the exchange rate to find its own level and accept higher inflation or the expectation of higher inflation that might follow (and which can easily reverse). The case for cutting or raising interest rates should be made only on the outlook for the domestic economy, which has not been improved by recent global events.

The Reserve Bank has called correctly for structural reform of the kind the President and his cabinet has responsibility for. It demands reforms so that SA can avoid the debt trap that Eskom has lead us into.  Any confident sense that SA can address its structural weaknesses will bring immediate reward, in the form of lower interest rates and lower expectations of inflation.

There is some consolation in recent events. The oil price in rands is no higher than it was. It would have been more comfortable had SA still been producing gold on something like the scale of previous years. A mining charter that revives the case for investing in SA mining, would be a confidence booster.

Brent oil rands per barrel
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Source: SA Reserve Bank, Bloomberg, Investec Wealth & Investment

Is Libra a bank by another name? Answers, important for a modern economy, are about to be found out.

Is the new block chained backed payments system (LIBRA) to be introduced by Facebook a pure and much lower cost payments system? Or a bank, or equivalently a money market fund, upon which transactions can be drawn conveniently for low or no fees.

The operating costs for a bank that provides a  payments facility are largely covered by the difference between the interest paid on deposits (perhaps zero) and the interest earned by the bank/payments provider making loans- of varying degrees of default risk.  Unlike a Visa that collects fees to cover its costs –and does not make loans.

The banks have cross-subsided the fees that might otherwise have to charge with the revenue earned from their lending activities. The profitability of banks depends in part on managing their cash reserves, keeping them as small as possible to meet demands for cash back. And  holding no more than prudent reserves of equity capital to cover non-performing loans. And provide shareholders with enough of a return to keep them in the banking business.

It is this leverage (banks holding fractional reserves of cash) that exposes the bank shareholders (and the broader economy that depends upon sound banks facilitating transactions) to the danger that non-performing loans may exceed the equity of the bank. However it is not only the deposits (liabilities of the banks and assets of depositors) that may be destroyed by the failure of a banking system. Of greater importance is that the payments system, can go down with the banks, with truly catastrophic effect for any modern, highly specialized economy that depends on its payments system.

Perfect safety for a payments system can only come with deposits fully backed by cash issued by the central bank with its power to create as much extra cash as the system might need. Block chain may well offer enormous savings in protecting the transactions they give effect to, against fraud. Savings that mean low enough fees that would cover the full costs and still provide a profitable return on capital. And avoid the dangers of leverage. SA banks lose as much as R800m a year to credit and debit card fraud. They likely spend even more on trying to prevent fraud.

Leaving banks to make the trade-off between risk and return, has worked well enough for most, but not all the time. The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 (GFC) demonstrated why it is very important to be able to deal with a banking crisis – should banks or more specifically-  the payments system delivered by banks, be threatened with failure. The solution to any run on the banking system is for the central bank to supply more than enough cash to the banking system to stop any run on the banks- as the GFC also proved.

Perhaps modern information technology will allow a 100 percent, central bank deposit backed (not private bank backed) fee collecting payment providers, to compete effectively with the deposit taking banks for our transaction balances. If so, deposit taking banks, supplying a bundled service of payments with the aid of leverage, may fade away to be replaced by other forms of financial intermediation. That is by other financial institutions that can provide essential credit and take on leverage profitably, but without accepting responsibility for effecting payments.

This new world (of fully backed transaction accounts) may be the next phase in the evolution of the modern financial system. One that would provide for the separation of the payments system from the dangers of leverage.  Wisdom would be to let a profit seeking, competitive financial system to evolve in response to the preferences of lenders and borrowers. And for regulators to stay out of the way so that a pure payments system could possibly evolve. However, if Libra is a bank- dressed up as a money market fund, carrying risks on its balance sheet, it should also be required to play by the same rules as its banking competitors. However these rules applied to vulnerable banks could be relaxed if the payments system were secure.

Dealing with the unpredictable rand–better judgment, not luck called for

The rand (USD/ZAR) has not been a one-way road. Yet SA portfolios are more likely to be adding dollars when they are expensive and not doing so when the rand has recovered.

The rand cost of a dollar doubled between January 2000 and January 2002 – but had recovered these losses by early 2005. The USD/ZAR weakened during the financial crisis, but by mid-2011 was back more or less where it was in early 2000. A period of consistent rand weakness followed between 2012 and 2016 and a dollar cost nearly R17 in early 2016. A sharp rand recovery then ensued and the USD/ZAR was back to R11.6 in early 2018. Further weakness occurred in 2018 and the rand has been trading between R15 and R14 since late 2018. Weaker but still well ahead of its exchange value in 2016. The rand in March 2019, had lost about 20% of its dollar value a year before. It has recovered strongly since and t on July 5th at R14.05, the rand was a mere 4% weaker Vs the USD than a year before

 

The USD/ZAR exchange rate; 2000-2019 (Daily Data)

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Source; Bloomberg, Investec Wealth and Investment

 

Two forces can explain the exchange value of the rand. The first the direction of all other emerging market currencies.  The USD/ZAR behaves consistently in line with other emerging market (EM) currencies. And they generally weaken against the USD when the dollar is strong, compared to its own developed market currency peers.

When the USD/ZAR weakens or strengthens against other EM currencies, it does so for reasons that are specific to South Africa. Such as the sacking of Finance Ministers Nene in December 2015 and Gordhan in March 2017. These decisions that made SA a riskier economy, can easily be identified by a higher ratio of the exchange value of the rand to that of an EM basket of currencies. The reappointment of Gordhan as Minister of Finance in late December 2015 improved the relative (EM) value of the ZAR by as much as 25% through the course of 2016.  His subsequent sacking in March 2017 brought 15% of relative rand underperformance. The early signs of Ramaphoria was worth some 15% of relative rand outperformance – and its subsequent waning can also be noticed in an increase in the  ratio ZAR/EM.

 

The rand compared to a basket of emerging market exchange rates (Daily Data)

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Source; Bloomberg, Investec Wealth and Investment

 

This ratio has remained very stable since late 2018- indicating that SA specific risks are largely unchanged recently. Emerging market credit spreads have also receded recently – as have the spreads on RSA dollar denominated debt. The cost of ensuring an RSA five-year dollar denominated bond against default has fallen recently to 1.62% p.a. from 2.2% earlier in the year. The USD/ZAR exchange rate -currently at R14 – is very close to its value as predicted by other EM exchange rates and the sovereign risk spread. It would appear to have as much chance of strengthening or weakening.

The exchange rate leads consumer prices because of its influence on the rand prices of imports and exports that influence all other prices in SA. A weak rand means more inflation and vice versa. And given the Reserve Bank’s devotion to inflation targets, the exchange rate therefore leads the direction of interest rates. Despite a renewed bout of dollar strength and rand weakness in 2018 import price inflation – about 6% p.a. in early 2019 -has remained subdued.

Import and Headline Inflation in South Africa (Quarterly Data)

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Source; SA Reserve Bank, Bloomberg, Investec Wealth and Investment

 

This has helped to subdue the impact of rand weakness against the US dollar that might have brought higher interest rates and even more depressed domestic spending. The dollar prices of the goods and services imported by South Africans has fallen by 20% since 2010 and by more than 10% since early 2018. This has been a lucky deflationary break for the SA economy.

 

SA Import Prices (2010=100)

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Source; SA Reserve Bank, Bloomberg, Investec Wealth and Investment

 

Given that the rand is driven by global and political forces largely beyond the influence of interest rates in SA, it would be wise for the Reserve Bank to ignore the exchange value of the rand and its consequences. And set interest rates to prevent domestic demand from adding to or reducing the pressure on prices that comes from the import supply side. The SA economy can do better than merely hope for a weak dollar.

Making the most of the investment holding company

Investment holding companies have long played a large role on the JSE. Two of the more important of them, Naspers and PSG, have provided spectacular returns for their shareholders in recent years. R100 invested in PSG in January 2010 with dividends reinvested in the stock has grown to R1435 by late June 2019. The same R100 invested in Naspers would have almost as well for its shareholders over the same period having increased its rand value by 14 times.

Not all holding companies are equal. A one-time darling of the JSE, Remgro has barely managed to keep pace with the JSE All Share index- R100 invested in Remgro or the JSE in 2010 would have grown to about the same R250.

Total returns; Naspers, PSG, Remgro and the JSE All Share Index (2010=100)

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Source; Bloomberg, Investec Wealth and Investment

The advantage enjoyed by the managers of an investment holding company is that the capital made available to them is permanent capital. It cannot be cashed in, as is the case with a mutual fund or unit trust, that may be obliged to redeem capital and may have to sell down their assets to do so.

It therefore can invest in potentially market return beating companies, companies that will return more than their opportunity costs of capital – if only in time. Its often significant shareholdings may give it a useful, active role in improving the performance of the operating companies it invests in.

While shareholders in a listed investment holding company cannot force any liquidation of assets, they can always sell their shares. At a price that would have to be attractively low enough to promise the buyer a return at least as good as is promised elsewhere in the market place – for a similar degree of risk.

This market-clearing price, multiplied by the number of shares issued will determine the market value of the holding company. And this market value, as in the case of Naspers (since 2014) and Remgro (continuously since 2010 )– has been well blow their Net Asset Value (NAV). That is the holding company is likely to be worth than the sum of its parts – were the parts unbundled to its shareholders. No doubt to the chagrin of its managers when their company is judged to be worth more- sometimes much more – dead than alive. And who may well have delivered market beating returns in the past.

The market and net asset value of the holding company will always have much in common. The market value of its listed assets and its net debt would be included in both- as would the value of its unlisted assets- though the market may judge them to be worth less than the director’s estimates included in NAV.

The market value will however be influenced by two other important forces, not reflected in its marked to market, balance sheet, its NAV. Included in market value, but not NAV, will be two unknowns -the expected implicit costs to shareholders of running the head office-  and the present value of its ongoing investment programme. Past performance may not be a good guide to expected performance as we are often reminded. The economic value expected to be added by the extra capital to be invested by the holding company may be presumed by the market place, to be insufficiently promising to compensate for the costs of running the head office. Hence reducing market value relative to NAV

The way for the managers of a holding company to close the value gap between NAV and Market Value is clear. That is to adopt a highly disciplined approach to acquisitions and investments. And be as disciplined in the rewards offered managers. A plan to list major unlisted assets to prove their value and to unbundle them when their investment case has been proved, will help add market value.  Market value adding – performance related pay – can also be well aligned with the interest of shareholders if made dependent on closing this gap between NAV and market value.

The Investment Holding Company. How to evaluate its performance and how to align the interest of its managers and shareholders

The importance of recognising economic profit or EVA

Owners of businesses could set their managers a straight-forward task. That is to earn a return on their capital they will deploy to exceed the returns shareholders could realistically expect from another firm in the same (risky) line of business. If the managers succeed in this way, that is realise an internal rate of return on the projects they undertake that exceed these required or break even returns, they will be generating an economic profit for their owners. They will have created what is now widely known as Economic Value Added (EVA) in proportion to the amount of capital they put to work. EVA=I*(r-c) where r is the measure of the internal rate of return, c is the required return or as it is sometimes described as the cost of capital and I is the quantum of capital invested.

Continue reading the full paper here: Applying EVA to the holding company

The restructuring of Naspers has been very well received by the market- place. What does the future hold for its shareholders?

The Naspers value gap (net asset value less market value) has narrowed significantly since the restructuring – which will see a Newco being listed in Amsterdam – was announced to the market. What does this mean for shareholders?

The proposed restructuring of Naspers, first mooted in March and now confirmed in a circular to shareholders on 29 May, has been favourably received by the market. The intention is to restructure Naspers into two linked companies: a Newco (to be named), with a primary listing in Amsterdam and a secondary listing on the JSE, and a new Naspers with its primary listing still in South Africa.

The Newco will hold the international assets of Naspers, including its 31% of Tencent, and will focus on global opportunities. The South African Naspers will have a 73% share of the Newco, will hold the local assets of Naspers and will also pursue investment opportunities – presumably mostly in South Africa.

Naspers shareholders in absolute terms were, at the start of June, about R120bn better off than they were three weeks previously, according to calculations by my colleague Thane Duff of Investec Wealth & Investment. The Naspers share price has outperformed that of Tencent recently.

To explain, the large gap between the net asset value (NAV) of Naspers  (the sum of its parts of which the holding in Tencent dwarfs all the others) and the market value of Naspers (now R1.462 trillion rand) has narrowed by as much as R120bn in recent weeks.

This value gap (NAV less market value – which we can describe as the difference in the value of Naspers were all its assets unbundled to shareholders and its value as an ongoing business) however, remains a considerable R386bn. The value of the Naspers holding in Tencent is currently worth 127% of the market value of Naspers – or as much as R1.85 trillion.

This value gap emerged only in 2015, with the appointment (coincidentally?) of Bob van Dijk as CEO. The value gap has been as much as R800 billion since then and is now close to its post-2015 low. Its further direction will be of crucial importance to shareholders and, one hopes, also the senior managers of Naspers who control its destiny through the high voting shares they own.

Figure 1: Naspers – NAV minus market value (R billion)

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The NAV and market value of Naspers have much in common. Common to both is the market value of the listed assets it owns (Tencent and MailRu being the most important). Also common is the value accorded to the unlisted assets of Naspers, though the value ascribed to these unlisted assets by the directors and included in the balance sheet may well be greater than the value accorded them by the market.

This could be one reason why NAV exceeds market value. What will not be recorded in the Naspers balance sheet or in NAV, but will affect the market value, is the expected cost of running the Naspers head office, as assumed by investors and potential investors. The more shareholders are expected to pay management for their services in the future – including the extra shares to be issued to managers that will dilute their share of the company – the less Naspers shares will be worth today.

A further force that can add to or subtract from the value of a company is the expected value to its shareholders of the business that the company is expected to undertake in the future. The more profitable the investment programme of a company is expected to be, the more value a company will offer its shareholders. Profit in the true economic senses means the difference between the internal rate of return on shareholder capital invested by the firm and its opportunity cost, that is, the returns its shareholders could expect from similarly risky investments made with its capital when invested outside the company. It is the economic, not the accounting profit earned after allowing for the cost of utilising equity as well as debt capital, that matters for the market value.

This cost of their capital for SA shareholders – or the required return on the capital they have entrusted to Naspers – is of the order of 14% a year. This 14% is equivalent to the returns currently available to wealth owners in the RSA bond market (about 9% a year for a 10-year bond) plus a premium, to compensate for the risks that these returns may not be met from the averagely risky SA company.

If Naspers were expected to achieve consistent returns of more than 14% on the large capital investments it makes every year, this programme could be expected to add to its market value. If the market expected otherwise, where the returns on the investments would fall short of their costs, then the investment programme would be expected to destroy the wealth of shareholders. And the more Naspers was expected to invest, the more value destruction would be reflected in its share price: that is, the larger the difference between NAV and market value would become.

We draw on the Credit-Suisse-Holt database for estimates of the recent investment activity of Naspers. The sums invested are large in absolute terms as may be seen in figure 2 below: they’re estimated as of the order of R200bn per annum in recent years. Holt also estimates a currently negative return on capital invested by Naspers – that is, a negative cash flow return on investment (CFROI). If the estimate of the scale of the Naspers is correct, then the investment programme is large enough to account for a large reduction in its market value accorded by a sceptical share market.

The recent sale by Naspers of 2% of its Tencent holding realised nearly US$10 billion. A large additional war chest it must be agreed, but not perhaps enough to result in as much value destruction of the order recently observed.

It suggests that shareholders also attach significant costs to them of the rewards expected to be awarded to managers – perhaps particularly in the form of share issues and options – that over time can consistently dilute their share of the company. If the number of shares issued as remuneration amounts every year to as much as 1% of the shares in issue, this becomes an expensive exercise for shareholders.

Figure 2: Naspers – gross investment

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Source: Holt and Investec Wealth & Investment

Will the future be much different for Naspers shareholders?

The critical issue for shareholders in the restructured Naspers remains as before. How successful – how economic value adding or destroying – will its investment programme become, and how generous will the company be to its managers?

There seems little likelihood of much change in behaviour of either kind that would cause investors to change their assumptions about Naspers. The managers are unlikely to become less ambitious in their search for game-changing investments of the kind it made in Tencent. But it will soon be doing so out of two highly interlocked companies.

The international investment activities will presumably be conducted out of Amsterdam. The South African company will also have an investment programme of its own, presumably in South African and African opportunities. One imagines, however, that the larger investments bets will be made internationally by the Amsterdam-listed company, given the much larger opportunity set. Dividends (largely from Tencent) that flow out of Amsterdam back to South Africa will presumably be influenced by the scale of this investment programme.

One anticipates that both companies will not easily convince investors that they are capable of undertaking enough value-adding investments to compensate for the cost of management. Therefore, the Naspers shares will be priced lower (to compensate for value destruction and head office costs) for an expected return in line with market averages. Given a lower than otherwise share price for both companies, both are likely to stand at a discount to NAV and should continue to offer a value gap of significance.

Yet the Amsterdam company will also be priced to offer a market-related return for a company listed in Amsterdam and, under the jurisdiction of the Netherlands, a developed economy. The owners of the 27% free float in the new Amsterdam company will accordingly attach a lower real discount rate to the expected benefits of their share of the company. They will be satisfied with lower expected nominal and real returns, because they will attach less risk to doing business with the government of the Netherlands than with the SA government.

The lower returns required of a company in the Netherlands will be equivalent to the yield on a Netherlands government bond (close to zero, even negative) plus the same 5% risk premium. This makes for a required nominal return of 5% rather than the 14% required of a South African-listed company, where inflation is expected to be much higher and the sovereign risk premium is higher.

The important difference in real expected returns (returns adjusted for expected inflation) is an expected average real 5% in the Netherlands (given no expected inflation, only a risk premium) and a real return in South Africa of about 3% higher (8% real return expected from the average South African company). This 8% real is the equivalent of the 14% nominal required return, less the 6% inflation rate expected in South Africa.

This lower real discount rate makes Naspers shares worth more in Amsterdam than they would be worth in South Africa (all else remaining unchanged) and also worth more for shareholders in Naspers South Africa with their Amsterdam investment.

But all else will not remain the same, including the market value of Tencent shares. This will still be the main force driving the value of the Naspers companies. What could change the game for shareholders – and help further lower the gap between NAV and market value – would be for the company to reward its managers on their ability to close this value gap. That surely would align the interest of managers and shareholders and therefore add value.

An interesting week- unfortunately- but will it lead to the right outcomes?

10th June 2019

It was one of those interesting weeks that optimistic South Africans could have done without. Early in the week we were informed that the economy did even worse than we had expected – going backwards at a 3.2% annual rate in Q1. The news immediately weakened the rand -not only against the USD –  the ZAR also lost about 5% to a peer group of other EM exchange rates. EM currencies generally ended the week stronger against a weaker USD that fell back against the Euro and other developed economy currencies as Fed interest rate cuts loomed.

The spread between declining US bond yields and rising RSA yields widened, indicating that the rand was now expected to weaken further at a 7% p.a average annual rate over the next ten years. Consistently with this rand weakness and all that it implies for the higher prices of imported goods in weaker rands, still more inflation to come was priced into the RSA bond market. Inflationary expectations, as measured by the spread between long dated vanilla RSA bonds and their inflation protected alternatives, widened to about 6.5% p.a for 10 year money. The debt trap that might follow slow growth, less tax revenue, wider deficits and printing money to get out of it – seemed a little closer than it was (See charts below)

 

Fig.1; The ZAR and the EM Basket (2019=100) Daily Data

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Source; Bloomberg and Investec Wealth and Investment

 

 

Fig.2; The USD/ZAR compared to the USD/EM currency basket. Daily Data (2019=1)

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Source; Bloomberg and Investec Wealth and Investment

 

Fig.3: Long dated RSA and USA Government Bond Yield and Risk Spread (RSA-USA 10 year yield) Daily Data 2019

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Source; Bloomberg and Investec Wealth and Investment

 

And then to compound the weakness in the ZAR and RSA’s markets the surviving Zuma factions in the ANC later in the week mounted a further diversionary attack on the independence of the Reserve Bank and its anti-inflationary zeal. Further rand weakness and higher interest rates followed.

There was however some consolation for investors on the JSE- including everyone with a SA pension plan. The global plays on the JSE – those companies with  major interests outside SA – acted as they could be expected to do given rand weakness absent emerging market weakness as was the case. They helped meaningfully to diversify SA specific risks (up over 5% in the week as did Resource companies that were up 6.5% – enough to lift the All Share Index by 3.3% by the week-end. (see below)

 

Fig. 4; Weekly Performance on the JSE (2nd– 7th June)

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Source; Bloomberg and Investec Wealth and Investment

 

One hopes the Reserve Bank was watching these developments very closely. That is slower growth is associated with more not less inflation expected. Not perhaps what you might find in the macro texts. And more important that the reverse is also likely to be true. That is faster growth will be associated with a stronger rand and so less inflation expected and lower bond yields and less spent paying interest. Even our good friends at Moody’s now expect and would appear to welcome a cut in the repo rate to boost growth. As does the money market that now expects short rates in SA to decline by 50 b.p. over the next twelve months.

The Reserve Bank would be well advised to do what is now expected of them and do what they can to stimulate faster growth in SA. Faster growth leading to less inflation expected and as likely, no more actual inflation, should be very welcome. And also help resist those with ulterior  motives when they attack the Bank.

The Reserve Bank attempts to control inflation and inflationary expectations that, in large measure, are beyond its influence. As recent events in the currency and bond markets surely confirm. Supply side shocks (the rand, the weather, the oil price, Eskom and expenditure taxes) dominate the direction of prices and all serve to inhibit disposable incomes and consumption spending. And inflation expected has a political course of its own that can add to upward pressure on prices.

Interest rates set by the Bank do influence the demand for goods and services. Demand has been consistently weak in South Africa for a number of years. Weak enough to counter to some degree the supply side pressures on the price level. But weak enough to inhibit any cyclical recovery. The trade off – less growth for marginally less inflation – has been much too severe for the economy. A more nuanced approach to interest rate settings and a more nuanced narrative to support it would better have served the economy and the Reserve Bank’s independence.

 

 

Bringing down interest rates – a task for the cabinet and for the SA Reserve Bank

 

The immediate challenge for the newly appointed SA cabinet is to do what it takes to stimulate faster growth in output incomes and employment over the next few years. And to instill a strongly held belief that they will succeed in doing so.

The benefits of any more optimistic belief that growth will accelerate would be immediate. The interest rate on longer dated RSA bonds would come down as the danger of a debt trap for SA receded. As it does with faster growth in tax and other revenues for the Republic.

Governments cannot formally default on the loans they issue in the local currency. But they may be tempted to pay down such debt by issuing more currency – should the interest burden on the debt become politically intolerable. Printing more money than economic actors are willing to hold, leads inevitably to more inflation as they get rid of their excess money holdings. Investors are very well aware of the process of inflation- led as it always is by governments unwilling to accept harsh economic realities.

Such inflationary dangers call for compensation for lenders in the form of higher interest rates. There is a lot of inflation priced into long term interest rates in SA that makes borrowing particularly burdensome for SA taxpayers. Very low interest rates of the kind now demanded of European and the Japanese governments, practically eliminates any possibility of a debt trap, even when the Debt to GDP ratios are more than double the ratio in SA, as they are. South Africa would look so much healthier were interest rates a lot lower.

The running yields provided to match supply and demand for RSA bonds provides a very clear and continuous measure of how well the government is rated by investors for its ability to avoid inflation- and stimulate growth. The difference between the yield on a vanilla RSA bond and an inflation protected bond of the same period to maturity indicates how much inflation is expected by investors. It is a risk that the owner of an inflation linked bond largely avoids. Hence the difference between the yield on a five year vanilla RSA bond (currently around 8% p.a) and the lower yield on an inflation protected bond  (currently 2.4% p.a) reveals that inflation in SA is expected to average 5.6% p.a. over the next five years and about 6.5% p.a. over the next ten years. Headline inflation is now significantly lower at 4.4% p.a.

Fig.1: RSA Bond yields and compensation for expected inflation (5 year bonds)

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Source; Thompson Reuters, Bloomberg and Investec Wealth and Investment.

Another important signal comes from the difference between RSA rand bond yields and those on US Treasury Bonds of the same maturity. This spread indicates how much the rand is expected to depreciate over the years. The difference between 10 year RSA yields and US 10 year Treasury bonds is of the order of 6.6% p.a. That is the rand is expected to depreciate against the US dollar at an average over 6% p.a. over the next ten years. This clearly implies much more inflation in SA compared to the US- hence a further reason for much higher interest rates.

 

Fig. 2; RSA and USA Treasury Bond Yields (10 Year) Daily Data 2019

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Source; Thompson Reuters, Bloomberg and Investec Wealth and Investment.

 

The very latest news from the RSA bond market has not been encouraging about the prospects for growth enhancing reforms. If anything these  interest rates spreads have widened rather than narrowed  – indicating more not less inflation expected and no more growth expected. Hopefully the selection of the cabinet members and better knowledge of their good intentions will raise expected growth and lower long-term interest rates.  Unfortunately SA has not benefitted from the global decline in government bond yields as have other emerging market borrowers.

 

Fig.3 Global Bond Yields. Movement in May 2019.

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The level of short-term interest rates will be set by the Reserve Bank. We can hope that the Bank will recognize that inflationary expectations are largely beyond their influence. More inflation expected can add upward pressure to prices as firms with price setting powers attempt to recover the higher costs of production they may expect. But such attempts to raise prices can be thwarted by an absence of demand for their goods and services.

Very weak demand for goods and services over which Reserve Bank’s interest rates have had a direct influence has contributed to very slow growth -and lower inflation. But without reducing inflation expected.

The Reserve Bank should recognize that lower inflation- achieved by deeply depressing spending and growth rates to counter more inflation expected- will not bring less inflation expected over the longer run. That is a task for the cabinet. The role for the Reserve Bank is to do what it can to stimulate more growth by lowering short term interest rates.

 

A post-script on debt management in SA

The SA Treasury has long adopted a policy to lengthen the maturity of RSA debt. The policy appears to have been reversed somewhat recently in response to the pressure on the budget placed by more debt funded at higher interest rates. We show the maturity structure of RSA debt issues in recent years below. We also show how debt service costs have risen as a share of tax revenues. [1]By international standards the duration of RSA debt is exceptionally high.

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Borrowing long has been more expensive for the RSA than borrowing short. The term structure of rand denominated bond yields has been consistently upward sloping since 2008. The average monthly difference in these yields has been 2% p.a. between 2010 and 2019. See the figure below that charts the difference between 10 year and 1 year RSA yields.

 

Fig.4: The slope of the RSA yield curve RSA 10 year – RSA 1 year bond yields

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The case the Treasury makes for extending maturities is to avoid the danger of so described roll over risk. The longer the maturity structure of the debt incurred, the less often has debt to be refinanced. Though surely the breadth and depth of the market for RSA bonds is surely enough protection against not being able to refinance debt when it comes due, or before it comes due.  As are the large cash reserves the Treasury keeps with the Reserve Bank. Paying so much more to borrow long rather than short seems a very expensive way to avoid the unknown danger that it may be difficult to place debt at some unknown point in time.

But there is more than roll over risk to be considered. The Treasury preference for borrowing long- when inflationary expectations are elevated (over six per cent per annum as they have been for much of the period since 2010) – indicates little confidence in the ability of monetary policy to meet its inflation target of between 3 and 6 per cent p.a.

Borrowing long – extending the maturity structure of national debt -adds to the temptation to inflate away the real value of debt incurred. Investors are surely aware of their vulnerability to the consequences of a debt trap- the danger that a country will print money to retire expensive debt that will then lead to inflation and much reduce the real value of their loans.

Such reliance on borrowing long that brings with it inflationary temptation must show up in higher long term interest rates – relative to shorter rates- to compensate for the extra risks incurred in lending long. Having to roll over short term debt at market related interest rates that will rise with inflation makes lenders less hostage to the danger of unexpectedly high inflation. It may even act to discipline government spending and borrowing because inflating away the debt burden is not an option. Accordingly it reduces the danger of inflation and by doing so may improve a credit rating. Borrowing long is an opportunity that a government treasury should best resist- as proof of its anti-inflationary credentials.

 

The employment effects of National Minimum Wages – the evidence will mount

Over the next few years we will learn much more about the sensitivity of employment in South Africa to large changes in the minimum wages employers are able to offer. What were 124 minimum wage determinations that varied from sector to sector and region to region has been replaced this year by a National Minimum Wage (NMW) of R3500 per month or the equivalent of R20 per hour.

The first evidence of the brave new world of a much improved NMW is now to hand with the Quarterly Labour Force Survey for the first quarter 2019 published by Stas SA. The survey provides no consolation at all for the proponents of the NMW. The number of potential workers increased by 149,000 in the latest quarter while the numbers employed declined by a further 237,000. The unemployment rate (narrowly defined to include only those actively seeking work) increased by 0.9% to 27.6% and when broadly defined to include discouraged workers, the unemployment rate has increased by a further 1% to 38%.

These regulated minimums were initially proposed by a panel of experts appointed to the task in 2016 by then Deputy -President Ramaphosa. The panel recommended the NMW to be set well above what many workers were earning. The poorest quintile of earners (some 16.3m souls) earned an average wage of a mere R1017 per month in 2016. Only 15.9% of these poorest South Africans were employed (mostly part time presumably) and their unemployment rate was 65.8%

Thus most poor South Africans are not employed – despite –rather because of low wages. Given social grants and the extended families it may make very little sense to seek or accept very low paid work- all regrettably that may be available to those without skills and strength. The newly prescribed NMW will not affect many of them – except perhaps to largely eliminate their opportunities to work part-time.

The next poorest 20% (12.9m of them) when employed had average wages of R1707 per month of whom 35.9% were employed and 37.9% unemployed. The somewhat better off third 20% (52% of a cohort of 9m who worked) earned on average only R2651 per month – with an unemployment rate of 21.7%
It is only when you enter the ranks of the remaining 40% of households defined as “non-poor” by the panel, is the average monthly wage of R4751 well ahead of the NMW of R3500. And the broad unemployment rate is a less mind blowing 14.1%. The top 20% of households (6.483m people) are reported to earn an average R13,458 per month and were fully employed with an unemployment rate of 4.8%.

It would seem that the benefits of a higher NMW would be mostly confined to those in quintile 3 (provided they keep their jobs – big if) And the damage in the form of fewer jobs and less part time work would be concentrated in the same group now earning well below the NMW, yet very much part of the labour market.

The panel admitted that they had very little knowledge of the impact on employment. They estimated job losses in a very wide range of 100,000 and 900,000 job losses. They promised to examine the evidence as it presented itself and adjust their recommendations accordingly. One might regard this cavalier approach as irresponsible social engineering.

For a better idea of just how sensitive employment can be to the cost of hiring workers, the panel might have studied the impact of the employment tax incentive – designed to lower the cost of employing young South Africans (under 28 years ) introduced in 2014. And now extended to all workers in the special economic zones. For the details about how very simply to claim the benefits, see SARS’ own resources here and here.
The 2019 Budget Review proudly pointed to how highly effective offering employers a subsidy of up to R1000 per worker has been for employment. In 2015-16, 31,000 employers (disproportionately employers with fewer than 50 workers) claimed the incentives for 1.1m workers with R4.3 billion of tax revenues sacrificed in 2017/18. That is a tax expenditure of a mere R275 per extra worker and over a million of them.

It is a case of the SA government taking away with the one hand- discouraging low wage employment- and then encouraging it with the other- providing significant wage subsidies to reduce the minimums actually paid by employers. Given the wishful thinking about the benefits of “decent jobs” political more than economic- while conveniently ignoring the costs to the many workers not employed- this sleight of hand – is regrettably as much as we should expect from economic policy.

What matters for shareholders is return on capital. Managers should be rewarded accordingly

The best managers can do for their shareholders is to realise returns that exceed the opportunity cost of the capital entrusted to them. That is to generate returns that exceed the returns their shareholders could realistically expect from alternative, equivalently risky investments.

This difference between the returns a firm is able to earn on its projects and the charge it needs to make for that capital, is widely known as Economic Value Added (EVA).

This economic profit margin is sometimes described as a moat that protects a truly profitable firm from its competitors. But more than intellectual property or valuable brands that keep out the competition and preserve pricing power, a truly valuable firm will have a long runway of opportunities to invest more in cost of capital beating investments. It is the margin between the internal rate of return of the company and the required risk adjusted return, multiplied by the volume of investment undertaken that makes for EVA and potentially more wealthy owners- not margin alone.

The task for managers is to maximise neither margin nor scale – but their combination – EVA. For investments today in SA in rands an averagely risky project, given long term RSA interest rates of about 9% p.a. would have to promise a return of more than 14% p.a on average to hope to be EVA accretive.

The leading advisor on corporate governance in the US now agrees with the all importance of EVA when evaluating managers. Fortune Magazine of the 29th March reported that

“On Wednesday, ISS, the U.S.’s leading adviser on corporate governance, announced that it’s starting to measure corporate pay-for-performance plans using a metric that prevents CEOs from gaming the system by gunning short-term profits, piling on debt, or bloating up via pricey acquisitions to swell their long-term comp. ISS’s stance is a potential game-changer: No tool is better suited to holding management accountable for what really drives outsized returns to investors, generating hordes of new cash from dollops of fresh capital……”.

Positive EVA’s or improvements in EVA do not translate automatically into share market beating returns. The share market will always search for companies capable of realizing EVA. And who reward their managers accordingly in ways that align their interest with those of their shareholders. Such remuneration practice provide investors with useful clues about prospective EVA. It will help them follow the money. Managers after all will do what they are incentivized to do.

When EVA is positive, realizing as much of it as may be possible, calls for raising cash rather than paying it out- negative rather than positive cash flow – after spending to sustain the established capital stock. Not only retaining cash – not paying dividends but raising fresh capital- equity or debt- can make every sense if EVA enhancing.

Paying up for prospective EVA will raise share prices and reduce realized market returns. And investment activity that is expected to waste capital will reduce share prices to improve prospective returns. Investors may change their minds about how sustainable EVA will be. Investors, by adding or reducing the period of time before margins inevitably fade away in the face of predictable competition, can make large differences to the market value of a company- and can do so overnight.

These expectations as well as changes in the climate for doing business, as in interest rates that help determine the cost of capital, are often well beyond the control of managers. Managers should be encouraged by shareholders and investors to maximise EVA – not their share prices or total shareholder returns over which they can have little immediate influence, given all the other value creating or destroying forces always at work. They should neither be indulged, when by luck more than their good judgment, the market takes all share prices higher. Nor should they be penalized when the market turns sour.

Shareholders and their managers with EVA linked rewards- should hope that positive EVA surprises – when sustained – will be appreciated by investors willing to pay up for their shares. It may take time to convince investors of the superior capabilities of a management team and their business models. But superiority can only be demonstrated by consistently adding economic value beating the cost of capital.

The paradox of paid holidays

Looking forward to the (paid) Easter holidays? Despite appearances to the contrary, you are paying for it.

The Easter holidays are upon us. Many will be enthusiastically taking time off, believing they will be enjoying a “paid holiday”, in other words, enjoying a holiday paid for by their ever-obliging employers. They are wrong about this – especially if they work in the private sector. They will in fact be sacrificing salary or wages for the time they spend not working.

This is based on the simple assumption that there is a consistent relationship between the value they add for their employers and the hours or days spent working – and that therefore they are paid according to the contribution they are expected to make to the output and profitability of the firm. Wages are not typically charitable contributions.

It makes no sense for some employer, the owner of a business, with a natural concern for the bottom line, to pay you for time spent on holiday, or on weekends off or when sleeping or traveling to or from work. They are unlikely to survive the competition if they did not take into account the accompanying loss of production, revenue and profits incurred when their employees are not working.
Those known costs must mean salaries, wages and employment benefits given up by the worker. There are no paid holidays, any more than there are free lunches in the company canteen.

Those paid on an hourly basis and at the end of every day or week will be under no illusions about having to sacrifice income when not working. Many of them might well be willing to work on the Easter weekend if given the opportunity to do so. They may well prefer to consume goods and services other than leisure.

It is those who are paid on a pre-determined monthly basis who may be inclined to believe that they are being paid to go on holiday. They should appreciate that the more time they are expected to take off, or the larger the contributions the employer may be making to medical insurance or pension contributions, training levies and the like, the less they will inevitably be taking home in their monthly paycheque. They are sacrificing salaries so that their employers can better stay in business and offer them employment.

The same bottom line and hence a sense of sacrificing pay may not apply in anything like the same force in the public sector, where the taxpayer picks up the salary, pension and medical aid bill, regardless of its size; where measuring the output of the public employees is not nearly as easy and where performance measures are often strenuously resisted.

European workers typically take many more days off than their US or South African counterparts. It is a widening trend that has evolved only over the past 30 or so years. We are often surprised at how little time the typical US worker takes off. Why is it so that the average US worker consumes significantly less leisure, takes less time off, therefore sacrifices less pay for holidays and consumes proportionately more other stuff that they prefer to pay for?

Is it a cultural difference, or are US workers naturally more hard working than their European or South African cousins? Maybe, but if that’s the case, why have these differences in working behaviour become so much more pronounced in recent decades? (Incidentally, the average number of hours worked per day in Europe and the US does not differ much). The striking difference is in the average number of days worked.

It may be because US workers and their employers enjoy more freedom to choose pay over leisure. Perhaps the regulations that determine compulsory time off for holidays or festivals are by now less onerous on US than European employers (and on formal South African businesses).

Were maximising output and money income and employment the primary objective of policy, South Africa would be wise to adopt the US rather than the European practice: allow the number of days off to evolve (mostly) out of competition for workers, rather than be regulated for them and their employers. And have fewer “paid holidays”.