National income accounts: Challenges – and some helpful responses

The SA national income accounts – updated to 2013 – indicate the challenges facing the economy and helpful responses being made by some of the important economic actors.

The better, if not exactly comforting, news from the SA Reserve Bank’s March 2014 Quarterly Bulletin, about the economy in 2013, is that export revenues (in current rands) picked up and are now growing a little faster than imports, having lagged well behind imports in recent years.

This smaller difference between imports and exports in Q4 2013 added significantly to GDP, which was 3.8% larger in Q4 than a year ago.

Dragging down expenditure and GDP growth in Q4 2013 was an extraordinary run down in inventories that were estimated to have declined by as much as R22.3bn in constant prices. The improved trade balance added 7.8% to Q4 growth, while the decline in inventories reduced Q4 growth by 5.2%.

The decreased level of inventories, with high import content, would have helped improve the balance of foreign trade. But the reduced demand for goods held on the shelves and in the warehouses may well reflect less confidence by the business sector in the growth outlook. Such a lack of confidence would also reveal itself in an increase in the dividends paid out to shareholders of SA companies, including to the increased proportion of foreign owners on the share registers of SA companies. Dividends paid to foreign shareholders went up sharply in 2013 while dividends received by SA shareholders in offshore companies declined as sharply, adding to the current account deficit.

The current account deficit, seasonally adjusted, nevertheless declined sharply from an annual rate of R215.8bn in Q3 2013 to R178.9bn in Q4, while the trade deficit declined from an annual rate of R114bn in Q3 to R62.6bn in Q4. The estimated actual current account deficit in Q4 was R36bn, down from R61bn in Q3, 2013.

Slow growth may well mean a surplus on trade and a smaller current account deficit and thus less dependence on foreign capital. Such trends should not be regarded as good economic news, although perhaps it is welcome to foreign investors concerned about the dependence of the economy on foreign capital, given that foreign capital has become more risk averse in recent months.

Between 1995 and 2003, when the economy grew slowly, the current account was balanced and the economy accordingly attracted very little foreign capital. The same pattern held more recently after the economy slowed down in 2009. The economy grew much faster between 2003 and 2008 because it could attract foreign capital and the current account deficit could widen. Surely faster growth made possible by foreign capital is to be preferred to slow growth arising out of fear that foreign capital may be withdrawn or become more expensive.

There is a virtuous economic circle for the SA economy. Demonstrate faster growth, promise higher returns to investors, and capital from both domestic and foreign sources will be made readily available to any business enterprise. The faster the rate of growth, the better the case businesses have to add to the productive stock of real capital, plant and equipment, to hire more workers and managers and with company investments in training, to help the work force to become more skilled and efficient and so capable of earning more. Growth leads and capital follows.

The major challenge faced by the SA economy is that the growth rates have slowed down recently, mostly for reasons of our own making. SA has a structural growth problem, not a structural balance of payments problem. Grow faster and the balance of payments will sort itself out.

But the growth issues facing the economy have been exacerbated because foreign capital has become more expensive since May 2013 for reasons largely beyond SA’s influence. This has led to a weaker exchange rate and upward pressure on prices further depressing already slow growth in real consumption spending. These price trends in turn raise the danger that interest rates will be set higher, again further depressing domestic spending and reducing prospective growth rates and the business case for adding to capacity. These expectations of weaker growth discourage capital inflows and may lead to a still weaker rand, which is anything but a virtuous economic circle.

The scope for an economic revival in SA, led by households, is limited, given the recessionary state of the formal labour market and so the income constrained limits to the growth in household credit. It would seem realistic to predict that faster growth in SA over the next few years could only be led by a surge in exports. A stronger global economy and higher prices for the metals and minerals we produce and export is a necessary condition for an export led recovery. Continuous production by the mines and factories is also necessary for greater export revenues and volumes. These were not possible in 2012 and 2013, given the pervasive strikes that reduced output from the mines and factories.

Hopefully the business sector could “come to the party” as the Minister of Finance invited business to do in his recent Budget speech. In this regard the good news suggested by the updated National Income Accounts is that the business sector (represented by the National Income Accounts for non-financial corporations, including the publically owned corporations, Eskom and Transnet) have indeed dressed up their performance. SA corporations increased their capital expenditures in 2013 and proved willing to fund their larger capital budgets by raising additional debt finance on a significant scale, despite deteriorating cash flows, represented in the figure below by Gross Corporate Savings.

But the same statistics indicate one of the structural weaknesses of the SA economy – a low domestic savings rate compared to a higher rate of capital formation. Hence a funding gap that can only be overcome by use of foreign savings. (See the figure below that indicates gross savings and capital formation rates in SA).

The figure also indicates that almost all the savings made in SA are made by the corporate sector in the form of retained cash. The government and household sector contribute little to the savings pool.

That the rate of capital formation is greater than the savings rate is surely a positive indicator for the economy. With economic growth the primary objective of economic policy, a slower pace of capital formation in SA would surely not be recommended. Such advice would be equivalent to advocating a structurally smaller current account deficit, since the difference between capital formation and gross savings is by definition the current account deficit and also the net foreign capital flows. Such advice is often loosely given without proper regard for its implications for economic growth.

Attempts to encourage a higher rate of domestic savings might make good economic sense. Significantly increased savings are however unlikely to be forthcoming from SA households. Achieving a higher gross savings rate would for all practical purposes require a willingness to tax corporate earnings at a lower effective rate so that they could save and invest more.

Lower taxes on corporate income would have to be accompanied by higher taxes on personal incomes and household spending. This is a change in the tax structure that does not appear politically possible, given also a presumed unchanged government propensity to spend. In the absence of any higher propensity to save, the path forward for the SA economy remains as it has been. Grow faster to attract savings from global capital markets and do what it takes to encourage business to grow faster so that they can attract more capital from abroad.

The markets in 2014: Identifying the key performance drivers and drawing some scenarios

Developed and emerging equity markets, including the JSE, came under pressure in January 2014 but recovered strongly in February and early March. The JSE in February did especially well for both rand and US dollar investors.

We show in the figures below how these developments on the JSE – a poor January followed by a recovery since – are strongly associated with movements in the bond markets. In January, long dated US Treasury yields were falling while SA yields in rands (unusually) were rising. In February, US yields moved sideways while SA yields fell. Hence the yield spread between SA bonds and US Treasuries widened sharply in January and narrowed in February, to the advantage of the JSE (in rands and US dollars) and the rand. These relationships between interest rates, the rand and the JSE developments are not coincidental. They are causal.

 

The yield spread is the risk premium attached to SA assets. The wider the risk premium, the higher the discount rate attached to rand income, and the lower the value of the rand and the US dollar value of SA assets. In the figures below we show how the rand/US dollar exchange rate and emerging market (EM) equities responded to the yield spread in 2014. The rand responds to capital flows into and out of the SA bond market and the JSE.

If we could accurately predict the direction of US interest rates and the risk premium, we would be able to accurately predict the direction of the rand and the JSE.

In the figures below we demonstrate these relationships since January 2013, using daily data. The S&P 500 has been an outperformer over this period and the JSE in US dollars consistently tracks the EM average very closely. This relationship is not coincidental either. JSE earnings and dividends in US dollars track the EM average closely because JSE earnings are more dependent on the state of the world than on the SA economy – as is the case for most EM listed companies. The JSE and EMs generally have performed better relative to the S&P 500 recently after lagging behind badly in 2013.

 

The patterns may be more or less regular, but predicting the direction of US rates and the yield spread is anything less than obvious. We can however suggest alternative scenarios and their implications, and assign our sense of the probabilities.

Four possible scenarios for the US economy:
+ = above expected growth or inflation
– = unexpectedly low growth and inflation.

1. Growth + Inflation – The triumph of Bernanke

2. Growth – Inflation + The scourge of Stagflation stalks the land

3. Growth – Inflation – More of the recent same?

4. Growth + Inflation + Punchbowl not removed in time

 

Scenario 1: Unexpectedly strong growth with no more inflation. This implies higher US nominal and real interest rates and will call for an early reversal of quantitative easing (QE)

Implications: Good for US equities and cash but bad for long dated bonds, yield plays, inflation linkers and EM. Good for the US dollar. EM currencies will come under pressure. Risk spreads may decline, helping higher yield credit, including EM credit, given less default risk. The preference then would be for developed market equities over EM equities since they are more able to win the tug of war against the higher cost of capital (though in due course EM equities will also benefit from a stronger global economy).

Assigned probability: 30%

Scenario 2: Stagflation – slow growth with more inflation

This implies low real interest rates with a steep yield curve as higher expected inflation gets priced into the long end of the bond market. This is ideal for inflation linkers: risk spreads widen and more inflation will be better for equities than bonds, though not good for either. Stagflation will be better for EM equities that offer more growth at lower real discount rates. Cash will have appeal if short rates stay above inflation. Fears will enter the markets of not only inflation but also of inflation fighting responses that will further reduce the US and global growth outlook. Bad for the US dollar, good for precious metals.

Probability: 10%

Scenario 3: More of the recent same. Below par growth – below par inflation

More QE will mean low real and nominal rates (the failure of QE will raise policy issues and encourage more direct intervention in markets, adding risk and volatility). Bonds to be preferred over equities – EM equities and currencies will be preferred to developed markets and currencies and defensive stocks may be worth paying up for. Gold will have appeal given low real rates and danger of intervention.

Probability: 25%

Scenario 4: Punchbowl not removed in time; QE overshoots, meaning above par growth with above par inflation

Real and nominal interest rates will kick up. Equities will be preferred over all bonds – credit may offer equity like returns. Developed market equities will be preferred over emerging markets. Cash will be better than bonds – high real interest rates will counter inflation expected in the gold price. Real estate with rental growth prospects will have strong appeal as an inflation hedge.

Probability: 35%

The least promising short term scenario for EM equities bonds and currencies, including the JSE and the rand, would be expectations of still stronger growth in the US with less inflation and higher real and nominal interest rates. This would represent something like the conditions that prevailed in 2013 after the tapering tantrums of midyear that threatened emerging markets. Over the longer term, a stronger global economy would help emerging market economies and their companies.

For now less optimism about US and global growth and lower interest rates would be helpful to EMs and currencies. Over the long run, the ideal conditions for all equity investors would be strong global growth rates with low inflation. For bond investors, a combination of higher real interest rates and higher real income from their bond portfolios – without more inflation to drive up nominal bond yields and drive down bond prices – would also be welcome.

The least promising short term scenario for EM equities bonds and currencies, including the JSE and the rand, would be expectations of still stronger growth in the US with less inflation and higher real and nominal interest rates. This would represent something like the conditions that prevailed in 2013 after the tapering tantrums of midyear that threatened emerging markets. Over the longer term, a stronger global economy would help emerging market economies and their companies.

For now less optimism about US and global growth and lower interest rates would be helpful to EMs and currencies. Over the long run, the ideal conditions for all equity investors would be strong global growth rates with low inflation. For bond investors, a combination of higher real interest rates and higher real income from their bond portfolios – without more inflation to drive up nominal bond yields and drive down bond prices – would also be welcome.

Hard Number Index: The economy is growing – but the pace of growth has slowed

Our Hard Number Index of economic activity (HNI) was little changed in February 2014. As the chart below shows, the SA economy as indicated by the HNI is growing (numbers above 100 based on January 2010, indicate growth) but the pace of growth is slowing down slowed and that its forward momentum has stabilized at the slower pace first registered in January 2014 .

The HNI is compared to the Reserve Bank Coinciding Business Cycle Indicator that is based upon a larger set of data derived from sample surveys. As the chart shows, the Reserve Bank Indicator is only updated to November 2013. It also indicates a growing economy with the pace of growth picking up in November 2013.

The HNI is derived from two equally weighted and very up to date releases for SA unit vehicle sales and the notes issued by the Reserve Bank for February 2014. Both statistics reflect actual sales in February or real notes in circulation at February month end, making them hard numbers rather than estimates based on small sample surveys.

In February the unit vehicle sales on a seasonally adjusted basis declined from January levels while the note issue, adjusted for CPI, picked up some momentum, largely cancelling each other out,in the calculation of the HNI. While declining on a seasonally adjusted basis, unit vehicle sales, having peaked in early 2013, are still maintaining a satisfactory pace.

If the current trend in sales is maintained, the industry should be selling new vehicles at an annualised rate of 620 000 units in February 2015, that is about 6% down on the sales in February 2013, about 3% off current sales volumes and way ahead of the post recession sales volumes of early 2009. No doubt the industry would be well pleased should domestic vehicle sales decline by only 3% over the next year.

Interest rates and the availability of credit from the banks will influence these vehicle sales outcomes. The latest news on interest rates and the exchange value of the rand is rather encouraging in this regard. A recovery in the rand has helped reduce interest rates across the yield curve. A week ago, short term rates were expected to rise by over 2 percentage points over the next 12 months. Now they are expected to rise by only 1.66 percentage points over the same period.

Our view is that interest rates will not increase by more than 50bps over the next 12 months and even this increase is not at all certain. Rates may well remain on hold. The interest rate outcomes and the inflation outlook will depend mostly on what happens to the rand over the next few months. If the rand holds at current rates of exchange, the inflation outlook will improve and the case for raising rates at all will fall away. The expected state of the economy is for slower growth, as revealed by the business cycle and, in an up to date way, by the HNI, while it is also confirmed by credit growth and by growth in household spending: these are trending down rather than up. This strongly suggests that the interest rate cycle itself should be trending down rather than up. It would have done so but for the weak rand.

Joseph Stiglitz, a celebrated American economist, in his speech to the Discovery Investment Conference on Wednesday, 5 March, agreed with our long expressed view on the inadvisability of blindly targeting inflation irrespective of the state of the economy. We would add a further reason for not raising rates, namely the absence of any predictable influence of interest rates over the direction of the rand and therefore of inflation. As we have argued, using the evidence from the market, higher interest rates cannot be relied upon at all to add strength to the rand.

The value of the rand is determined by global forces well beyond the influence of SA short term interest rates. Yet by further reducing domestic demand and so the growth outlook and the case for investing in SA businesses, higher interest rates may well frighten away foreign capital and on balance weaken the rand.

Raising interest rates in SA is justified if domestic spending, fueled by domestic credit, is growing rapidly, thus helping to drive up the prices of goods and services. It is not at all justified if prices are rising because of reduced supplies of goods and services.

An exchange rate shock of the kind that has driven the rand weaker over the past six months, is as much a supply side shock as a drought would have reduced food supplies, so causing prices to rise. It makes no more sense to raise interest rates when a drought forces up food and other prices than when conditions in global capital markets drive down the value of the rand and similarly tends to push up prices.