Italy, Europe and beyond

Renewed volatility in bond and currency markets. Learning the lessons of monetary history.

Europe (especially Italy, but also Spain) rather than emerging markets (especially Turkey) has become the new focus of attention in financial markets. Bond yields in Italy and Spain have increased sharply in recent days. The two year Italian bond yield is up from zero a few days ago to the current 2.82% while the spread between 10 year Italian bonds and German Bund yields have risen from 1% to 2.87% in three days.

Rising US interest rates were the proximate cause of some earlier distress in emerging bond markets and now in the past few days have reversed course. From a recent high of 3.12% the yield on the key 10-year US Treasury Bond has fallen back to 2.83%. RSA bond yields have also receded in line with Treasury bond yields. Yesterday they were at 8.59% and about 28 basis points lower than their recent high of 8.87% on 21 May. However the risk spread with US Treasuries has widened marginally, from recent lows.

 

While long term interest rates in the US have fallen back, the US dollar has strengthened further against the euro and most currencies, including emerging market (EM) currencies like the rand. German Bunds are another safe haven and the 10-year Bund yield has also declined, from 0.64% earlier this month to the current 0.33%. This has allowed the spread between Treasuries and Bunds to widen further – to 2.6%, helping to add strength to the US dollar.

 

It should be appreciated that RSA bonds have held up well under increased pressure from US rates and now also some European interest rates. In figure 4 we compare RSA dollar denominated five year (Yankee) bond yields with those of five year dollar bonds issued Turkey and Brazil. While all the yields on these dollar denominated bonds have risen and also very recently have fallen back, the RSAs have performed relatively well.

 

The US dollar went through an extended period of weakness against its developed market peers and EM currencies between mid-2016 and the first quarter of 2018, after which the dollar gained renewed strength. Dollar strength can be a particular strength to EM currencies and the recent episode of dollar strength has proved no exception in this regard.

As we show below in figures 5 and 6, the rand performed significantly better than the EM Currency Index from December 2017 and has recently performed in line with the average EM currency vs the US dollar and much better than the Argentine peso and the Turkish lira recently. In figure 6 the declining ratio EM/ZAR indicates relative rand strength.

 

We may hope that the rand will not be subject to any crisis of confidence. So far so good. But were the rand to come under similarly severe pressure as has the Turkish lira, one would hope that the Reserve Bank would avoid the vain and expensive attempts to defend exchange rates that Argentina and Turkey have made. Throwing limited forex reserves and much higher short term interest rates at the problem can only do further harm to the real economy – and very little to stem an outflow of capital. As has been the latest case with Turkey and Argentina.

It was the mistake the Governor of the Reserve Bank Chris Stals made in 1998 when failing to defend the rand during that emerging market crisis. The best way to deal with a run on a currency – caused by exposure to a suddenly stronger dollar – is to ignore it. That is to let the exchange rate absorb the shock and live with the (temporary) consequences for inflation. Defending the currency provides speculators with a one way bet against the central bank attempting to defend the indefensible. It is much better to let them bet against each other and let the market find its own equilibrium. The renewed volatility in Europe, we may also hope, will continue to hold down US and RSA interest rates – and deflect attention from emerging markets. 30 May 2018

Recent Research

Much of my recent research output has been published in the Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, now published for Columbia Business School by Wiley. (See references below) Some earlier versions of this work may be found on the Blog- but copyright prevents me from posting the published versions.

Global Trade – Hostage to the Volatile US Dollar, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Volume 30, Number 1, Winter 2018

The Beliefs of Central Bankers about Inflation and the Business Cycle—and Some Reasons to Question the Faith, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance; Volume 28, Number 1, Winter 2016

A South African Success Story; Excellence in the  Corporate use of capital and its Social Benefits with David Holland, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Volume 26, Number 2, Spring 2014

2013 Nobel Prize Revisited: Do Shiller’s Models Really Have Predictive Power? with Christopher Holdsworth, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Volume 26 Number 2 Spring 2014

Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis (Or Why Capital Structure Is Too Important to Be Left to Regulation) with Christopher Holdsworth, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Volume 22, Number 3, Summer 2010

Podcast: The case for looking beyond the large caps quoted on the JSE

Find below a link to a podcast with Barry Shamley, Portfolio Manager. Investec Wealth and Investment  discuss the case for looking beyond the large caps quoted on the JSE . This is the first trail of a series of podcasts that I will be conducting and posting on the website.

https://investecam.kuluvalley.com/view/kTdb9BFjT4H#/

Retail peaks and troughs

Retail spending has gathered momentum. Have we reached a (low) peak in the retail cycle?

The volume of retail sales in South Africa has gained momentum, off a very weak base. By March real sales were up 4.8% compared to a year before. Will this cyclical recovery in spending at retail level accelerate or fall back? The answer will depend on the future path of inflation in SA, to which short term interest rates and the cost of credit for households and firms are linked. The future path of the rand will be critical to the inflation outcomes, as we discuss below.

This growth in spending was stimulated by a sharp decline in retail inflation from early 2017 (see figure 1 below). Retail inflation in March 2016 was 7.4% and declined steadily to 1.6% in March 2018. Retail sales growth was a negative 1.7% in December 2016. Growth in sales a year later was over 5%. The real sales cycle was at a trough when the retail price cycle was at its peak in Q4 2016.

(Retail inflation is calculated as the annual change in the retail price deflator, being the ratio of retail sales at current prices to retail sales at constant prices. It has fallen far below headline CPI inflation that was 3.8% in March 2012.)

A large part of the answer to whether or not the retail recovery will accelerate or decelerate will depend on the direction of retail prices and on interest rates that will take their cue from the price trends. As may be seen in figure 1, the time series forecast is for a slowdown in sales growth from its peak and a modest pick-up in retail inflation from its recent trough. It will take rand strength to avoid these outcomes.

In figure 2 we show this clearly negative relationship (inflation up and sales growth down) over an extended period. It also shows how low the current rate of real sales growth is in comparison to the previous peak growth rates realised in 2006 and 2011. There would be little reason to regard the current rate of retail sales growth as representing a peak in the cycle – were it not for a concern that retail price inflation may have reached a cyclical trough.

The declining trend in retail and headline inflation since mid-2016 had much to do with the stronger rand. Another force acting particularly on food price inflation was the end of the drought in the eastern part of the country of 2016. The drought had pushed food price inflation to double digits. Food price inflation was 3.5% in March 2018. Inflation peaked after the USD/ZAR exchange rate had reached its weakest point in late 2015. And headline and retail inflation receded after the rand had come to strengthen on a year on year basis. Thus the future of inflation in SA will depend, as ever, on the exchange rate, given the openness of the economy to foreign trade. Exports and imports together add up to the equivalent of 60% of GDP.

We compare CPI (headline) inflation with retail price inflation in figure 3 below. We show the impact of the exchange rate on inflation in figure 4.

 

In figure 5 we compare the correlated movements in the USD/ZAR and trade-weighted rand. Both rand exchange rates are helpfully for inflation trends that still marginally stronger than they were a year ago, even after recent US dollar strength and rand weakness.

 

The key to the exchange value of the rand in the months to come (and so for the outlook for inflation) will be the behaviour of the US dollar. Dollar strength vs peers is likely to mean weakness in emerging market currencies, including the rand, as has been the case since mid-April. Dollar strength in 2014 was associated with emerging market currency weakness until mid-2016. A degree of dollar weakness, and rand and emerging market strength followed until very recently. It may be seen that since April 2018, renewed dollar strength vs the euro, yen, sterling and the Swiss franc has been associated predictably with emerging market and rand weakness.

The degree to which the rand moves independently of the other emerging market exchange rates as shown in the figures may be regarded as the additional SA-specific political events that can influence the exchange value of the rand. SA risks weakened the rand compared to other emerging market currencies in 2015 – and a diminished sense of SA-specific risks to investors strengthened the rand in a relative sense in 2016 and again in late 2017.

Thus it should be appreciated that most of what happens to the rand will reflect global forces acting on emerging market currencies generally, events over which SA has no influence. Nor are SA interest rates likely to influence the rand exchange rates in circumstances when global capital flows dominate exchange rate movements. In our view, with the Ramaphosa presidency now firmly in place, the exchange value of the rand in 2018 will be influenced largely by what happens to the US dollar and all emerging market currencies.

The recent strength of the US dollar is a clear danger to the rand and SA inflation. A stronger US dollar means rand weakness and more inflation in SA and at best stable short-term interest rates. More inflation and unchanged interest rates will hold back retail sales. A weaker dollar however would mean less inflation, possibly lower interest rates and continued strength in retail sales volumes.

The dollar strengthens when the US economy grows faster than other developed economies and vice versa. Relatively faster growth in the US means that US interest rates are likely to rise relatively to interest rates in Europe and Japan, so attracting flows into the dollar, as has been the case recently. More synchronised global growth is to be hoped for to restrain dollar strength and protect the rand and improve the outlook for inflation and growth in SA.

SA has little influence over the direction of the rand and hence inflation and the retail sales cycle. The best SA monetary policy can do in these circumstances is to let interest rates take their direction from the state of the economy and not the outlook for inflation – which is dominated by forces beyond interest rate influence. The danger to the economy comes from interest rate settings that react to the impact of a stronger US dollar on domestic inflation. 23 May 2018

Not so quiet on the interest rate front

Things became more active on the global interest rate front last week, led by an advance of US yields. The key 10-year US Treasury yield was below 3% earlier in the week, but was at 3.12% onThursday before pulling back to 3.05% on Friday (it was ar 3.07% this morning). Not only have yields moved higher, but the spread between US Treasury and German Bund yields have widened further, to 2.5%.

This may be thought to be enough of a carry (enough US dollar weakness priced in, that is) to attract funds to the US and restrain the upward march in US rates and the US dollar. The US dollar has gained not only against the euro and other developed market currencies, it has gained against emerging market (EM) currencies, like the rand, as is usual when the dollar rises against the euro, yen and sterling. A strong dollar is a particular threat to EM currencies. The JP Morgan EM exchange rate index is now at 66.1 while the the US vs developed market currencies index (DXY) is trading at 93.87.

The rand has been among the better EM performers in the face of the advancing dollar as we show in figures 4 and 5 below (all rates in these charts up to 18 May – though the rand did come under motre pressure than other EM currencies on Friday). The ratio of the USD/ZAR to our own construct of eight other EM currencies and their exchange rates with the US dollar, improved significantly between November 2017 and March 2018 and the USD/ZAR has maintained its rating since then. The story of the rand has once more become a story of the US dollar rather than of South African politics. And seems very likely to remain so.

This ratio was 0.917 on the Monday 14 May – it weakened to 0.934 by the Friday. The story of the rand has once more become a story of the US dollar rather than of South African politics, and seems very likely to remain so.

Interest rates in the US have risen (and the dollar has strengthened) because the acceleration in US growth has been confirmed by recent labour market trends and by the strength in retail sales volumes reported last week. The state of economies outside the US, in Europe and even in emerging markets however, appears less certain. Global growth appears, at least for now, less synchronised – making for fewer correlated movements in short- and long-term interest rates.

It is of interest to note that US shorter term interest rates have been rising faster than long rates. The spread between the 10 and two-year Treasury bond yields have narrowed further. This flatter yield curve indicates that the US may be getting closer to the end of the cycle of rising short rates. Or in other words the GDP growth rates that justify higher short rates may well have peaked and are slowing down- which if so will cause short rates to decline from higher levels in the not too distant future. (See figure 6 below)

It is of particular importance to note that the recent increase in US yields have not been a response to more inflation expected. Inflation-protected real yields offered by the Treasury (TIPS) have increased in line with vanilla bond yields. The spread between nominal and real 10-year treasury yields has remained largely unchanged around 2.2%. That is to say, the bond market continues to expect inflation to remain at the 2% level for the next 10 years. So what is driving nominal yields higher is more growth, rather than the expectation of more inflation, thus representing interest rate developments that are less dangerous to equity valuations than if it were only inflationary expectations that were driving yields higher. The more GDP (and so earnings growth) expected, the more it improves the numerator of any present value calculation, perhaps enough to compensate for higher discount rates.

South African bond yields, as well as the USD/ZAR, have moved higher in response to US yields. However the spread between RSA and Treasury yields has remained largely unchanged. The spread, which indicates by how much the rand is expected to weaken against the US dollar over the years, narrowed sharply after November 2017. In other words, as the political news out of South Africa improved. Figure 8 below shows the SA exchange rate risks and the more favourable trends in RSA and US long bond yields, and in exchange rate expectations since January 2017.

Conclusion: how best to react to dollar strength

A stronger US dollar is seldom good news for the growth prospects of emerging market economies, including South Africa. It puts upward pressure on prices and downward pressure on spending. It furthermore raises the danger of monetary policy errors of the kind Argentina has been making: raising interest rates to fight exchange rate weakness and the (temporarily) higher prices that follow. This then slows down economic growth further, without helping and maybe even harming the exchange rate. Slower growth drives capital away and interest rates, become less attractive when a still weaker exchange rate is expected.

The wise policy approach is to ignore of exchange rate weakness that is caused by dollar strength and not by excessive domestic spending. South Africa made such monetary policy errors during the last period of US dollar strength between 2011 and 2016. We may hope that such errors are not repeated. We may hope even that this period of dollar and US strength is a temporary one – and that growth outside the US resumes an upward trajectory. 21 May 2018

The Tencent effect

A good day for Naspers shareholders. Dare they hope for Tencent-like performance in the future?

Naspers had a very good day yesterday. It ended up over 5% in rands and almost as much in US dollars. It took the JSE higher with it thanks to its large size and share of the JSE by market value (approximately 20% of the All Share Index). Demand for Naspers shares from abroad may even have helped the rand recover on the day. The JSE All Share Index ended up by 15%. Naspers is now worth approximately R1.4 trillion.

The reason for this renewed enthusiasm for Naspers shares was a surprisingly good set of results from Hong Kong-based Tencent – reported after the Hong Kong market closed. Tencent is currently up by 6% in New York. Naspers has a 31.01% share of Tencent worth approximately R2 trillion at the close of trading on the JSE the day before. Naspers understandably rises and falls on a daily basis with the value of Tencent – though not necessarily to the same degree.

That is because there is more to Naspers than its stake in Tencent. We show in the figure below that the market value of Naspers has trailed behind that of Tencent, when both are measured in US dollars. Tencent is up 12 times since 2010 and Naspers has added (only!) about six times to its 2010 value.

Tencent and Naspers have also outperformed the S&P 500 Information Technology sector that includes all the big names in US technology stocks (the famous FAANGS) Facebook, Apple, Amazon Netflix, Google (Alphabet) to which Microsoft could be added, another superb IT company. On a day-to-day basis there is also a highly correlated movement between Tencent and the S&P Information Technology Index. Tencent and Naspers are high beta plays on global IT, but with significant alpha to add to returns.

Yet Naspers, while worth R1.4 trillion, is valued at significantly less than its stake in Tencent. Naspers furthermore has other assets – as well as debts and cash – that would add further to the difference between the sum of Naspers’ parts – its net asset value (NAV) and its market value. This difference between what Naspers would be worth if broken up and sold off and what it is worth as a going concern is a mammoth R700bn. Put another way, the Naspers management, while to be congratulated on their decision to invest in Tencent in the early 2000s, could possibly be accused of wealth destruction elsewhere. Everything else that it has done, other than invest in Tencent, has reduced the wealth of its shareholders.

Naspers conducts a very large investment programme, investing far more than the cash it has received as dividends from Tencent – US$248m in 2017. According to David Smith of Investec Securities, Naspers injected net cash into its ventures of US$3.43bn in 2014, US$1.43bn in 2015 and US$1.98bn in 2016. In 2017 it extracted cash (reduced debts) by US$1.8bn.

Recently Naspers enjoyed a major success when it sold its stake in Flipkart – an Indian internet company for US$2.2bn, realising a gain of US$1.6bn, or a rate of return of about 21% p.a. over six years and for about 30% or US$500m more than the market had thought it was worth. Clearly value adding but not as value adding as the 41% p.a. returns generated by its investment in Tencent over the same period.

The proceeds of this sale, as well as the R10bn received from reducing the Naspers share of Tencent to 31%, has since been added to the Naspers cash pile. Were investors of the view that this cash could produce cost of capital-beating returns of the Flipkart kind, the market value of Naspers would benefit and the gap between NAV and market value would narrow. Or equivalently, Naspers could then perform more closely in line with Tencent.

But this appears not to be the case. The market appears of the view that the stronger the Naspers balance sheet, the more its stake in Tencent is worth and the more cash it has to invest, the more it will be inclined to invest in ventures that destroy value for shareholders. That is to say, the cash invested by Naspers is expected to earn less than if the cash were returned to shareholders and invested by them. The large difference between NAV and the market value of a Naspers share reflects in part the losses expected to be incurred in the investment decisions the company will make in the future. The market value of Naspers is set lower to compensate shareholders for this danger that their capital will be wasted on a large scale. Only a lower Naspers share price can then offer market equaling returns; hence the gap between NAV and the market value.

A further reason why Naspers has lagged behind Tencent is that Naspers has issueda large number of shares. Shares have been issued not only to fund its investment programme but also to reward its managers. There were 290.6m Naspers N (low voting) shares in 2006. By 2017 this had grown to 431.5m shares in issue, an increase of 48%. Between 2012 and 2017, Naspers issued an extra 46.8m shares with 58% of the new issues going tp staff compensation. Tencent by contrast has issued very few shares over the years. Clearly the value of a Naspers share reflects in part the danger of further dilution of this order of magnitude.

Naspers could add market value and close the value gap by adopting a more disciplined approach to its investment and incentive programmes and convincing investors that it would do so. In other words, to quote its one time MD and now chairman, Koos Bekker, to throw less spaghetti at the wall so that perhaps more will stick. And to align the interests of managers and its shareholders by rewarding both in some proportion to a reduction in the absolute gap between the NAV and market value of Naspers.

Perhaps some progress in this regard is being made. This year the performance of Naspers and Tencent has been better aligned – as we show below and is reflected in a more stable ratio Naspers/Tencent over recent months. Shareholders in Naspers will hope for more of this more comparable performance. 17 May 2018

Dividing the JSE into its critical paths

Julius Caesar divided Gaul into three parts. To better understand the JSE (if not to conquer it) we would divide it into four parts: SA economy plays, global plays, resource companies and in an important category of its own, Naspers, that is a play on global information technology.

The first of these are the banks, retailers, some of the listed property counters and many of the small and mid-cap, which perform distinctly better when the rand strengthens, inflation and interest rates come down and spending by households and firms gather momentum. When the rand weakens and inflation and interest rates move higher, they perform poorly. They depend on the SA economy for sustenance.

The second part consists of the global consumer and property plays listed on the JSE. Their (foreign currency) earnings depend on the prevailing state of the global economy. They may have their primary listing and jurisdiction elsewhere, with a relatively small proportion of their shares held by South Africans. British American Tobacco and Richemont fall into this category. Their share prices are determined by investors offshore. Their US dollar or sterling share prices are then translated back into the rand equivalents on the JSE, at prevailing rates of exchange. Their rand values go up and down as the rand weakens or strengthens, for any given dollar value of their shares.

But their dollar value may also be changing at the same time. The better their expected performance (in dollars) the more valuable they become in dollars too, to be translated almost simultaneously into rand values (and vice versa). Higher dollar values for such stocks may well overcome rand strength and lower dollar values may even drag down their rand values even if the rand weakens at the same time. They may not in fact then act as a rand hedge at all.

When rand weakness or strength has its origins in SA political developments, the global consumer and property plays will act as a hedge against the SA-specific forces that can weaken or strengthen the rand. They then perform best in rands when rand weakness, for SA reasons, accompanies the good global growth that supports their dollar values. Their rand values will then rise for both reasons: a weaker rand and rising US dollar valuations. However when the rand strengthens as it did recently for SA reasons, the opposite may happen. Their rand values can decline. Thus they are thus better regarded as SA rather than rand hedges.

In the figure below we show how an equally weighted basket of 18 SA economy plays dramatically outperformed a basket of 13 equally weighted global plays (excluding Naspers) after January 2017 and until recently. The SA plays were benefitting from a strong rand, strong not only against the US dollar, but also against other emerging market currencies, for largely SA-specific reasons linked with the demise of the Zuma regime. The global plays, for partly the same SA-specific reasons, were moving strongly in the opposite direction. It should be noted that this included Steinhoff, with an equal weight in the basket of global plays, which lost almost all of its value for company specific reasons. This is always a danger to any portfolio and highlights the case for diversification.

 

Thus the JSE as a whole – subject to these opposite forces with about equal weights in the All Share Index, but then helped by the gains made by Naspers and resource companies – has gained about 14% since January 2017.

Which brings attention to the third part of the JSE: resource companies. Most of their revenue is earned on world markets in US dollars. Some of their production is carrried out in SA and in rands. A weak rand is helpful to their revenues and may even help widen their operating profit margins, when rand costs lag behind rand revenues in response to a weaker rand. But a weaker rand and weaker emerging market currencies may well be associated with weaker global growth and lower metal prices.

In these circumstances, as followed the end of the super commodity cycle in 2011 and lasted until mid 2016, the weaker rand could not make up for the lower US dollar values attached to resource companies worldwide. JSE-listed resource companies were not rand hedges: their rand values declined with the weaker rand. They are plays on the metal price cycle – not on the rand. However they will perform best – as will the global consumer plays – when the rand is weak for SA reasons and when global commodity prices are holding up.

The fourth part of the JSE is Naspers, with its large holding in Tencent, an extraordinarily successful Chinese technology company. The rand value of Naspers tracks the value of its Tencent shares enough to have made it the largest company listed on the JSE. It now accounts for about 20% of the JSE, from a mere 1.3% weight in 2009. Without Naspers the JSE as a whole would be worth no more today than in 2014. The JSE All Share Index has become a play on Naspers, though the additional investment and acquisition activity expected of Naspers as well as expected head office expenses have made Naspers less valuable than its stake in Tencent and its other valuable parts.

 

Naspers is itself a play on Tencent and Tencent is in part a play (a high beta play) on global technology. The recent weakness in Naspers and Tencent can be explained by declines in the values attached to global tech companies. On a day-to-day basis the direct link between the movements in the S&P IT Index and of Naspers and Tencent shares has become very obvious.

 

And so most companies listed on the JSE will do outstandingly well for investors when faced with a combination of the surprises of rand strength and strength in the global economy, associated with improvements in underlying metal prices that will add to the US dollar and rand values of the global and resource plays. That rand strength may take off some of the gloss off the rand value of share portfolios will be of little concern to SA rand investors and even less interest to foreign investors on the JSE. And the JSE will do even better should Tencent and global technology continue to surprise investors with their results. A further boost to Naspers shareholders would come should it be able to convince the market about the quality of its own ambitious investment programme.

The potential upside and the potential dangers should it not turn out so well for the rand, the global economy and IT call for active investors. The risks to investors on the JSE are too concentrated to justify a passive approach to the JSE as a whole. 10 May 2018

Time-series-based Financial Analysis led us down a blind alley – could Big Data Analysis repeat the same mistake?

Abstract

 This paper considers the new thrust of Statistical Analysis and Operations Research in the area of so-called Big Data. It considers the general underlying principles of good statistical modelling, particularly from the perspective of Pidd (2009), and how some initiatives in the Big Data area may not have applied these principles correctly. In particular, it notes that demonstrations of applicable techniques, which are purported to be appropriate for Big Data, frequently use data sets of stock market share prices and derivatives because of the huge quantum of high frequency share price data which is available. The paper goes on to critique the frequent use of such historical stock market price data to forecast stock market prices using time series analysis and details the limitations of such practice, suggesting that a large volume of work done towards this end by statisticians and financial analysts should be treated with circumspection. It is seen as unfortunate that a large contingent of extremely able students are directed into areas that encourage time series modelling of stock market data with the promise of forecasting what is essentially unforecastable. The paper also considers which approaches may be appropriately applied to model and understand the process of share price determination, and discusses the contributions of the Nobel-prize winning economists Fama and Shiller.

The paper then concludes by suggesting that the Big Data initiative should be treated with some caution and further echoes the sentiments of Pidd; namely that the focus in Operations Research and Statistics should remain firmly on creative modelling, rather than on the singular pursuit of large amounts of data.

Read full paper here: Kantor 2018 – Big Data

Artificial intelligence, robots and a world of abundance

The pace of technological and scientific change is both rapid and accelerating. Robots controlled by powerful computers have invaded factory floors, warehouses and distribution centres with great effectiveness.

The number of workers employed in traditional occupations has, accordingly, shrunk. Transistors, sensors and cameras may soon combine to eliminate the need for someone in the driver’s or pilot’s seat, and move us about faster and more safely than before, while at the same time eliminating millions of jobs.

A common modern refrain in response to the challenge of the robots is: where will all the workers go?  Will they go into other jobs or into unemployment? And, if the cohort of the unemployed is to become a much larger one, how will society cope with the assumed failure of an economy to employ most of those who seek work?

Replacing workers with machines is not something new
The advance of knowledge and its application to production – so improving the ratio of output to inputs of resources of land, labour and capital – is not something new. Economic progress, accompanying scientific advances and the invention of ever more powerful machines has been more or less continuous since the 17th century. It then accelerated in the 19th century with the growth in mechanised industry, which was described by historians as the (first) industrial revolution.

The increased production of goods and services enhanced by ever more productive machinery of all kinds (medical equipment included) has been accompanied by consistent advances in the average standard of living and life expectancy, as well as the rapid growth in population. The world’s population has more than doubled since 1970, increasing from 3 billion souls to more than 7 billion today. On average, we numerous humans are better supported today by higher levels of production of the essentials for life: food, shelter and medical care. We are provided for with more of the luxuries of life, including more time off work.

We choose more leisure – when we can afford to do so
A preference for more leisure has been exercised in ever greater volume as the average hours per week worked has declined. Leisure is a highly desired form of consumption for which income and other forms of consumption have been willingly sacrificed. Choices have been made by those who can afford to reduce hours at work. Some of the associated drudgery and dangers of work have been eliminated with the aid of machines, helping to make work less onerous and even pleasurable. Nice work – if you can get it.
Those who thrive with the help of robots are likely to choose more leisure and the services that accompany time off work. 
This growth in population has been accompanied by a rapid (more or less) increase in workforce numbers. The increased number of humans surviving and employed today has been accompanied by a large reduction (billions fewer) of those having to merely survive in poverty. Absolute poverty is conventionally defined as those earning or consuming the equivalent of two US dollars per day. Most would describe these developments as progress, even if happiness, however defined, may remain as elusive as ever.

These increases in incomes and output represent impressive and consistent economic progress (compounding growth in output and incomes) made over the past 300 years. Yet there is much more to be done to raise average living standards to the levels now realised by those in the upper quintiles of income distribution in the most economically developed economies. This appears an attainable prospect given the record of past economic performance.

 Only the (few) well off in their comfort zones might wish to halt economic progress
There is, therefore, every reason, out of concern for our fellow humans, to encourage the scientific revolution and make humans ever more productive and able to earn more than subsistence incomes.
Robots’ capabilities are bound to improve with developments in artificial intelligence (AI) that will make the machines less dependent on their human supervisors. 
The numbers of workers employed designing, building, servicing and operating each robotically enhanced unit of equipment will also decline, aided in their efforts by AI. The robots, with enough enhanced artificial intelligence at their disposal, may be able to write their own operating instructions. Therefore, we may see the need for even fewer writers of the underlying computer code that provides the platform for their intelligence.

Output per person employed and, as a result, total output will rise with the application and utilisation of these new wondrously productive machines. Production – the output of goods and services produced with the aid of capital equipment, including what we now describe as robots of one kind or another – may grow even faster and more continuously than in the past.

This productivity provides society with opportunities and challenges. The challenge, as always, will be to maintain order and stability. A growing economy will surely provide the opportunity to satisfy competing interests, particularly those that come with unequal rewards – if only relatively.

Will machines become substitutes for, rather than complements to, human action?

So, will the pace of change now leave more behind, whose dissatisfaction may then become a source of violent instability for society? The less skilled may be more vulnerable than they have proved to be in the past, since they may be less able to compete directly with the robots for robotic-type work, which may be all that many humans undertake and are capable of.

The same displaced workers may be unable, for want of relevant skills, to find alternative employment building and servicing the ever more numerous robots. Or, they may be capable of providing service to those earning higher incomes from owning, designing, managing, building and maintaining the robots, given competition from the increasingly dexterous robots.

Humans will adapt, as they always do, to changing circumstances

All may not be about to be lost by human agents in the competition with machines. I am informed that while computers now exist that will always be able to beat a chess grandmaster, the master chess player, accompanied by a computer, can typically beat the same computer unaided. The highest incomes in the years to come may be earned by those who are best able to work with the robots.

Those who thrive with the help of robots are likely to choose more leisure and the services that accompany time off work. Empathetic humans may have great advantages, compared to inhuman robots, when supplying the services that accompany leisure. This could include, for example, walking the dogs and looking after the cats and birds of the affluent. In particular, if alternative employment and income earning opportunities in the production of goods (rather than services accompanying leisure) are lacking, humans may try harder to serve, and so help keep the robots at bay. Robots, it might be added, help avoid the drudgery and danger of many kinds of work that workers do not regard as any more than a means to the end of earning a living.

Humans, as we are well aware, are highly adaptable to changing circumstances. This is why we have become the pre-eminent species and there are so many more of us commanding the planet and consuming more.

We may have enough time to adapt to competition from robots and the opportunities they open up, including becoming more skilled teachers, with the aid of robots. Computers may (at last) help teachers become capable of adding rapidly to the skills of their students, as they have done for chess players, thereby improving their own skills, productivity and employment prospects as they improve the skills and employment prospects for their students.

The scope for redistributing what is produced more abundantly will increase

But empathetic humans can do more than compete more effectively. A growing volume of output, made possible by science and robots, coupled with the right mix of economic policies, provides even more opportunity to take from the more productive to give to the less productive, including the unemployed and those without the capacity to contribute much to the output of the economy. The past tells us that as GDP increases so does the size of government and the share of incomes (output or GDP) that is taxed and redistributed by governments.

This is a process that is strongly encouraged by the less economically advantaged, and to which their elected representatives will respond. The ability to respond materially and perhaps sufficiently to calm the disaffected will be governed by the growth in the economy. The more that is produced by the economy, the more that can be redistributed without seriously damaging the process of growth itself.

The relatively poor and the unemployed could thus continue to look to an improved standard of living if society is productive enough and the tax base large enough to make more welfare pending feasible. We can expect more of this compulsory taking and giving to happen should our economies become more productive and should not all share equally in its advance, as is bound to be the case.

The interdependence of welfare and work, and of income and its growth

Such generous welfare will have some of the (unintended?) consequences we can already easily observe. The wealthier the state, the greater have to be the employment benefits that make choosing work (sacrificing leisure) a sensible decision. As unemployment benefits increase, incentives to work will obviously deteriorate.

Thus, welfare benefits of all kinds will tend to reduce the supply of potential workers and, perhaps unintentionally, increase the employment benefits of those still in work. As technology continues to improve, as total output and the tax base of the economy rises, unemployment benefits are likely to improve compared to the wages offered to the less skilled. If so, fewer and fewer people will remain part of the workforce and they will be given welfare benefits to be at leisure.

A highly productive society will be able to afford to support the relatively poor and the unemployed generously. But will it do so generously enough to avoid violent resentments of the better off? Resentment and opinions may well lead to a set of policies that put a brake on invention and innovation and risk taking – the true source of economic progress.

Those not working because society can afford to support their leisure – given a lack of skills and adaptability – may create a whole other set of problems. Society, under pressure from increased structural levels of unemployment, will be required to find ways to make not working a psychologically meaningful state, and to make such arrangements acceptable to the fewer taxpayers as well as those receiving benefits.

Compulsory work, while perhaps helping less fortunate humans and improving the environment in exchange for welfare, may become a component of the adjustment to growing affluence made possible by the robots. Families may be prevented from having as many children as they might prefer as part solution to the problem of too many people and not enough work for them.

What if the robots delivered true economic abundance and solved the economic problem for us?

But what if we took the advance of the robots to its full logical conclusion, to an imaginary state of the world where robots, aided by superior AI, completely replaced all humans in the workplace? When[1]  the robots, with enough AI at their command, completely replace their human managers and collaborators? Robots would be able to manage themselves with a single-minded purpose (programmed originally by humans) to produce more goods and services for humans to consume, and for whom the robots are the servants (perhaps better described as slaves) with no preferences of their own.

If robots replaced all workers, the only income earned would be from owning robots who produced all the goods and services supplied to an economy – that is to the people who make up the society. But there would be an overwhelming abundance of goods and services for humans to consume.

Since there would be no work for humans to engage in, there would be no income from work to be sacrificed for leisure or to be saved for consumption in the future.
It should be recognised that if and when the robots are enabled to take over all the work, the economic problem of scarcity will have been resolved. The difficulty of society having to determine what should be produced and who should benefit from the production would have been overcome by the advancement of the robots. Trade-offs between those who produce and others who also benefit from their production will no longer be relevant. The perhaps unimaginably productive robots will be providing more than enough goods and services so that no person will be short of anything to accompany their leisure.

Since there would be no work for humans to engage in, there would be no income from work to be sacrificed for leisure or to be saved for consumption in the future. The only source of capital to replace and produce new and better robots would then be the savings made out of income received from owning robots.

Abundance solves not only poverty but inequality of incomes as well

Therefore, given that there is no economic problem, the inequality problem can be solved very easily. As the robots gradually take over all the work, differences in income earned will be caused by owning robots in unequal amounts rather than through income from declining work. Inequality of economic outcomes could then be resolved by a similarly gradual process expropriating and nationalising the primary means of production – the super productive robots.  Compensation for expropriation would be paid to avoid disrupting the process of robot accumulation.

Collective ownership of the means of production will take over from the individual wealth owners without any of the usual dire consequences, because incentives for individuals to produce and save more will have no further purpose. Permanent abundance will have been secured for all humans by the robots.

Adam Smith’s hidden hand that turns private interest into public benefits will have done its work. The unequal rewards that we now have to offer to talented, risk-loving humans so that they will deliver the goods will have become redundant.

Self-interest becomes irrelevant in the midst of abundance: everybody has more than enough of everything and has only to decide how to allocate their time.   So, owning anything, aspiring to wealth through saving that is intended to be a source of future income, and encouraging wealth creation will make no sense.  Protecting rights of ownership (property rights) to encourage savings and investment will also have served its function.

The now all-embracing collective – the state as owner of all the abundant means of production (the robots) would spread the equivalent of the abundant free cash flow generated by the robot-owning state-owned companies equally to all the population. That is, the state as owner would spread equally all the surplus (cash) around that has been generated by the productive robots – after capital has been reinvested in new and better robots and in the social infrastructure that supports the leisure of all not working.

For example, the supply of roads, swimming pools and sports stadiums has to be determined and the balance distributed as income to the population. It should be understood that in these circumstances of robot-supplied abundance, the robots would be programmed (by other robots)  only to meet the full and satiable demands of the leisure class – that is, the entire population.

Robots will just do what other robots programmed by robots tell them to do and they will produce more than enough to keep us at comfortable leisure and out of work. They will be productive slaves without any preferences of their own to get in the way of maximising output. AI and robots will, therefore, have replaced intelligent humans in the production of everything. There would be no differential rewards of spending power to breed resentment. Full equality of incomes is a logical consequence of superabundance.

A different world would mean the evolution of a different species

That some people have a (natural) human capacity for greater enjoyment of leisure than others may then become a problem that will have to be addressed by the political process. Legislation against unequal utility might be called for with the required dose of pharmaceuticals (or implanting of genes) to make sure that all are rendered equal in consumption and happiness.

The economic logic of robot-supplied abundance that demands no sacrifices from humans in the form of work or saving, would be a very different world. It would be essentially inhuman as far as we understand the human condition. That is, the harsh world we now inhabit that demands sacrifice (work and savings) and the acceptance of unequal rewards for unequal effort and sacrifice.

This acceptance of inequality of outcomes as the means to increased abundance for all has proved very difficult for many, particularly intellectuals and academics whose rewards are not well correlated with their IQs.

It is the envy of the presumed undeserving but economically successful, who deliver mere stuff to the masses and even more to the boring bourgeoisie, that inspires so much of the postmodern critique of a productive system at work.

The attack from the critics of society after abundance and full equality of incomes has been achieved (despite their worst efforts to slow the process down) would presumably be on the failures of many to consume the finer things in life.

Instruction on the art of life itself, as Keynes put it, might become but another popular but entirely voluntary and charitable activity. A further benefit of abundance is that the taxpayers would no longer have to fund their critics who advocate their elimination. There would be no taxes to be paid and no stipends of any kind for writers or artists and musicians. They will all do what they love to do without monetary rewards.

Abundance, however, would require that humans evolve as a very different species. Humans would be back in the Garden of Eden. Perhaps then, as with the first time around, having to start all over again, learning about what became the unfortunate necessity of work and sacrifice. Perhaps abundance is a frightening, unwelcome prospect for many. But would it be wise to stop the advance of the robots that promise to eliminate poverty and therefore even work itself? Choosing abundance (or rejecting it) will be a collective decision made by those humans in the way of the marching robots.

[1] A possibility welcomed in inimitable style by the most famous economist of his time, John Maynard Keynes, in his essay Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, written in 1930 and published in his Essays in Persuasion, Macmillan and Company, London, 1931. The book is available as a Project Gutenberg Canada Ebook. www.gutenberg.ca
 Keynes writes:
“I draw the conclusion that, assuming no important wars and no important increase in population, the economic problem may be solved, or be at least within sight of solution, within a hundred years. This means that the economic problem is not – if we look into the future – the permanent problem of the human race.”
 And later
  “Thus for the first time since his creation man will be faced his real, his permanent problem – how to use his freedom from pressing economic cares, how to occupy the leisure, which science and compound interest will have won for him, to live wisely and agreeably and well.
 “The strenuous purposeful money-makers may carry all of us along with them into the lap of economic abundance. But it will be those peoples, who can keep alive, and cultivate not a fuller perfection, the art of life itself and do not sell themselves for the means of life, who will be able to enjoy the abundance when it comes.”