Higher interest rates – good or bad news?

Interest rates globally have been on a sharply upward tack in recent weeks. Whether this is good or bad news depends on the reasons for the higher interest rates. If the higher rates are largely a response by markets and central banks to expectations of permanently higher inflation, it will be bad news for all but short-term lenders. The increases however could be caused by something else, by an increase in the real productivity of capital and in the willingness of borrowers to pay up for now more valuable capital.

Higher rates driven by increased demands for capital portends faster growth in incomes. More supply to come, perhaps even with less inflation, as increased debt funds income and output enhancing plant and equipment and value adding R&D. And the response to market determined interest rates in the marketplace for assets, including the value of the companies that invest in plant and equipment and R&D, will depend on the causes of higher interest rates, and their effects.

The market determined present value (PV) of any company will depend in part on estimates of the flow of operating profits over time and after taxes. The stronger these expected flows of revenues less costs, and the longer the period over which the estimated operating profits will flow, the more valuable any company will be. But since operating profits earned in the future are less valuable than profits now, the value of future profits will be discounted by an appropriate rate of interest, by the opportunity cost of capital. The higher these costs, the higher this discount rate, the less valuable the company- for any expected flow of operating profits and taxes.  A 100 worth of operating profits after taxes to be received in ten years’ will be worth 39 today given with a discount rate of10% p.a. and worth only 25 should the discount rate be 15% – close to the cost of capital in SA.

But the discount rate for such a PV calculation will not be established independently of the top line for the average company. The more growth in revenues and costs expected across the wider global economy, perhaps aided by inflation and real growth, the stronger the top line of the PV calculation, the more demand for capital to invest, and so the higher the discount rate is likely to be. It is very possible, as is the case this year In the US, for returns on equities to be positive while returns on bonds are negative. The numerator of the PV calculation, the growth expected operating profits, has been more powerful recently than the denominator, the higher discount rate. This outcome, a positive correlation between equity and bond market returns is by no means unusual. [1]

When real inflation protected yields rise it should be regarded as the response to a real increase in the demand for capital. When the nominal yields on a vanilla bond increase, it could be because more inflation is expected. And or because real yields have risen. The recent increase in the yield provided by the key US 10-year Treasury Bond from 4.45% p.a. in early June to well over 5.2 % p.a. by October 12th, some 79 basis points, has been accompanied by an even larger increase in the equivalent inflation protected bond (TIPS) of 84 basis points. That is the increase nominal interest rates in the US have been driven by an even larger increase in real yields in the US.

Fig. 1; Real Interest Rates in different Currencies. 10-year Inflation Protected Bond Yields

Source; Bloomberg and Investec Wealth & Investment

The difference between the respective yields, the lower initial real yield on a fully inflation protected bond, and the higher yield on a vanilla bond, exposed to the risk of inflation, can be assumed to reflect inflation expectations. These differences in yields are described as breakeven yields that compensate the lender for expected inflation. inflation expected is little changed this year and close to but still above the inflation target of 2% in the US. Real 10-year yields in the US are now close to 3% p.a. It is a real rather than an inflation story driving higher long term interest rates in the US.

Fig. 2; US Nominal and Real Inflation Protected Bond Yields and their Differences. Daily Data June-October 2026

Source; Bloomberg and Investec Wealth & Investment

Which given the importance of the US in the market for capital has driven interest rates higher across the globe. Higher real yields in the US are highly consistent with the underlying strength of the US economy. Revealed by highly buoyant indexes that measure economic activity, especially activity in the service sectors (PMI’s) and by the very strong growth in bottom line earnings. The huge growth in capex spending by the IT superscalars now more than exhausting still very large internally generated cash flows, has become a source of much newly issued debt. Borrowing to fund growing fiscal deficits is another important source of demand for capital. And a now stronger USD is consistent with an increased flow of foreign capital to the US.

When real inflation protected yields rise it should be regarded as the response to a real increase in the demand for capital. When the nominal yields on a vanilla bond increase it could be because more inflation is expected. And or because real yields have risen. The recent increase in the yield provided by the key US 10-year Treasury Bond from 4.45% p.a. in early June to well over 5.2 % p.a. by October 12th, some 79 basis points, has been accompanied by an even larger increase in the equivalent inflation protected bond (TIPS) of 84 basis points. That is the increase nominal interest rates have been driven by an even larger increase in real yields in the US. It is the real demand for capital that is driving interest rates higher in the US. Indeed, good news about the US economy.

Fig.3; US Production Managers Composite Index. Monthly Data and Long-term Interest Rates

Source; Bloomberg and Investec Wealth & Investment

A postscript – Some reflections on interest rate spreads. Real and Nominal rates

The sustained differences in real yields between the different currencies, including the much higher real yields on offer in SA, is explained by expected exchange rate movements. The real yields on offer are realised in different currencies. The return from the inflation linker in a foreign currency will be reduced or increased for a foreign currency investor by movements in exchange rates. The expected real fully inflation protected returns therefore depend in part on the expected movement in exchange rates. Higher real yields offered in a domestic currency may be offset by exchange rate weakness. Furthermore, judged by past performance, there can be no presumption of exchange rates following purchasing power parity. (PPP) The movements in exchange rates are very unlikely to closely match differences in inflation. Independent currencies therefore carry real exchange rate risk. The risk that is of deviations from PPP.

The same expectations of exchange rate movements made explicit in the market for vanilla bonds may be applied to the market in independent currency inflation linked bonds. For example, the higher real rand yield on an RSA inflation linker (4.2% + SA inflation) when compared to the lower 3% p.a. USA TIPS yield of the same term, 93% plus US inflation) will be reduced for a USD investor, by a weaker USD/ZAR exchange rate. The difference in 10- year interest rates available on vanilla RSA Bonds when compared to the lower yields offered by 10-year US Treasury Bonds, indicates that the rand is currently priced to weaken Vs the USD by an average 3.8% p.a. rate over the next ten years. If such exchange rate expectations prove accurate, the expected dollar returns from the 4% plus inflation real rand return are not relatively attractive. The risks of exchange rates not complying with PPP are not easily hedged. Inflation linkers eliminate the risk of inflation – but only in the domestic currency.

Fig.4; RSA-USA Real interest rate spread – before and after expected ZAR weakness.

Source; Bloomberg and Investec Wealth & Investment

A consolation for investors in RSA Bonds -the carry has narrowed recently.

One important recent consolation for investors in RSA bonds is that while RSA yields have risen, they have risen by less than US bond yields. The carry- the extra reward for holding RSA bonds – has declined rather than widened. And as discussed, by implication of interest parity, the ZAR is expected to depreciate at a lower rate which implies less pressure from the rand prices of imports and exports on the SA CPI than before.

Fig.5; RSA and USA 10 year Bond Yields and their Spread (Daily Data June – October 2026)

Source; Bloomberg and Investec Wealth & Investment

Measuring sovereign risks of default.

The difference between the yield on a same currency USD denominated RSA bond and a US Treasury Bond provides a less complicated view of sovereign risk. It carries default risk- but not currency risk. Thus this spread may be regarded as compensation for the risk that a government issuing the foreign currency denominated bond might not be able to pay the interest or capital repayment in the foreign currency. The difference in the yield offered by a RSA Yankee – dollar denominate RSA bond – and an equivalent US Treasury Bond therefore represents the risk of default. This interest rate spread may be regarded as a Sovereign Risk premium. The yield on the five-year RSA Yankee bond has widened recently in line with bond yields generally including dollar denominated debt issued by other emerging market issuers.  As has the RSA spread over US Treasury Bond yields widened marginally, indicating more sovereign risk. But of some further consolation to investors in RSA Yankee bonds is that this sovereign risk spread is significantly lower than it was in early 2025.

Fig.6; RSA sovereign risk identified. Daily Data 2026.

Yield

Source; Bloomberg and Investec Wealth & Investment


[1] The correlation between daily per cent moves in the S&P 500 Index and a US Treasury Bond Index in 2026 is a positive (R=0.41) it was negative for much of 2025.

A tale of two economies- USA and RSA

In my previous column I pointed to their extraordinary gains in bottom line profits of the US corporation. Profits as a share of the Gross Value Added (GVA) of all non-financial corporations in the US have risen from about ten per cent in 2019 to about 16% now. This profit ratio was below 4% in the early 2000’s. The growth in profits is much more conspicuous in the bottom earnings line than in top line revenue growth. The average US company has become significantly more efficient. They have also been investing heavily to grow their capacity.


Fig.1: US Nonfinancial Corporations; Gross Value Added (GVA) and Net Profits. (2000=100) Quarterly

Source; St.Louis Reserve Bank. Investec Wealth & Investment

Fig. 2; US Nonfinancial Corporations. Profit Ratio %. Profits after Taxes/Gross value Added. Quarterly 2000- 2026

Source; St.Louis Reserve Bank. Investec Wealth & Investment

I have examined the performance of the South African Nonfinancial Corporations that accounted for about 60% of all GVA or GDP in 2025. The differences in outcomes are striking. Top line growth in the GVA of SA non-financial corporations has been tepid. Real growth in GVA was less than 5% between 2019 and 2025. Bottom-line growth reveals no surge in efficiency and the reluctance of these corporation to commit to capex or to raise capital is striking.


Unlike the US, the SA Nonfinancial Corporations reveal a very stable relationship between bottom line earnings and their GVA. The profit ratios – both at the gross and net levels have remained largely unchanged – no trend higher or lower in the profit ratios since 1995 can be observed. The share of the operating surplus in GVA has been about 50% and the ratio of income after taxes- Disposable Incomes – have hovered around 20% p.a. without revealing any obvious trends in either direction.

Fig.3 RSA Nonfinancial Corporations Gross Value Added and Net After Tax Profits (1995=100) Annual Data

Source; SA Reserve Bank and Investec Wealth and Investment


Fig.4; SA Non-Financial Corporations Real Gross Value Added (2015=100)

Source; SA Reserve Bank and Investec Wealth and Investment

Fig.5; RSA Nonfinancial Corporations; Key Ratios to Gross Value Added

Source; SA Reserve Bank and Investec Wealth and Investment

Most distressing and depressing of GDP growth, to date and in the future, is that the capex of SA private business enterprises has stagnated. Adjusted for inflation it is running at about the same level reached back in 2005. The ratio of the capex of non-financial corporations to their contribution to the economy (GVA) was 24% in 2012- it is now less than 18%. The ratio of capex to household consumption spending follows a very similar pattern.


Fig. 6: Non-Financial Corporations; Ratio of Capex to Gross Value Added and to Household Consumption Spending

Source; SA Reserve Bank and Investec Wealth and Investment

Fig. 7; SA Non-Financial Corporations; Real Capex (2015=100)

Source; SA Reserve Bank and Investec Wealth and Investment

How is this failure to grow to be explained? The usual explanation would be to refer to the supply side constraints that have hampered the economy- lock downs and logistic failures are obviously front of mind. Clearly you cannot meet a potential demand for exports unless you can get the metals and minerals and other stuff competitively to markets offshore. Supply side reforms that introduce private style incentives are under way and promise to relieve some of the constraints on meeting foreign demands. And will encourage more capex building mines, harbours roads and railroads.


A willingness to invest in additional capacity to meet the growing demands of households for goods and services is also essential to the purpose. The US corporation has had the stimulus of a growing domestic market. The average SA business has had no such encouragement. Household consumption spending adjusted for inflation has grown by about only 7.5% since pre-Covid 2019. The spending of the SA household has grown not nearly rapidly enough to stimulate capex.


The flat ratio of capex to household consumption spending reveals this dependence of capex on final demands. Capex spending is derived from the growth in household spending. It is quite unrealistic to expect otherwise. SA business has been in a holding pattern. It has learned to survive without much growth in its domestic market.


But they could do much better for the economy than paying dividends and buying back shares from still satisfactory cash flows. They could do more capex and raise capital from abroad to fund faster growth if there was a growth case to do so. Without extra supplies there cannot be much growth. But without extra demands for potential suppliers of goods services and employment extra output and capacity will not be solicited. Supply creates demand and demand determines supply. They are two blades of the same scissors. They work together to cut the cloth.


Real household spending growth of the order of the less than one per cent p.a. is growth defying. The aim of monetary policy should be to target household spending growth of the order of 3% p.a. with more accommodating interest rate settings to make such growth and growth in bank lending possible. And to see where such faster growth would take supply- including supplies of foreign capital to help fund growth and support the ZAR.


Alas with the oil price shocks the SARB in lock step with other central banks has raised rates. SA households will therefore be growing their spending at a still slower rate in the months to come – under a supply side shock- fuel price plus higher interest rate pressure. Faster growth will again have to wait for lower inflation and interest rates. The SARB is not about to change its approach out of sensitivity to the state of the SA economy. It will be inflation led- whatever the cause of higher prices.

Fig.8; SA Real Household Consumption Spending (2015=100)