The curse of scale in financial markets- and how GE is getting rid of it – to shareholder applause

There is a latter day curse victimizing financial institutions. That is to be recognized by the regulator as a “Systematically Important Financial Institution” (SIFI) In other words one regarded by the regulators as being “too-big-to-fail”. Hence the requirement by regulators of any SIFI of very strong balance sheets that ensure against failure. This translates into ample highly liquid assets on the asset side of the balance sheet that yield minimum income for the bank. Such safe assets will have to be accompanied by secure funding in the form very long dated liabilities that may be expensive to raise. It may be required that such debt be converted at very short notice- to be given by the regulator- into equity – should solvency come under serious threat. Such unfavourable terms for debt holders would add further to the cost of such funding . Furthermore short term liabilities that can be withdrawn at the whim of lenders, for example deposit liabilities,do not qualify as desirable secure forms of funding. Regulators then require of banks good cover in the form of capital and holdings of cash or near cash to be acceptable sources of bank funding. These requirements make short term deposits a much more expensive source of funding for banks.

The problem with such safe guards and fail-safes is that they must all come with reduced returns on the capital subscribed by shareholders in any SIFI. Less risk forced upon borrowers and lenders (higher costs of raising funds and lower rewards for allocating them) translates inevitably into less profitable financial businesses with diminished prospects for growth. These lesser prospects for shareholders immediately subtract from the long term value of any bank or financial business to its shareholders. Such is the curse on shareholders. It is also a curse on potential borrowers from a financial institution. It means less appetite by banks to lend even at higher charges and to much slower or negative growth in their loan portfolios.

South African banks are also having to face up to additional constraints on both sides of their balance sheets imposed by the international bank regulation convention known as Basle 3. This means significantly increased costs for banks raising funds and reduced returns on shareholder capital they risk. It must also mean both more expensive bank loans and fewer borrowers qualifying for them. It is not a formula designed to facilitate economic growth for which bank credit is an essential ingredient.

One way to break the spell over the SIFI is to reduce the scale of your financial activities – that is for a financial institution to become as systemically unimportant as possible- something shareholders will welcome and the regulators cannot easily stop, as General Electric (GE) is now in the process of doing. GE announced the disposal of USD26b of its real estate assets and property lending to the Blackstone Group and Wells Fargo last week, the first steps in winding down its Financial Division. GE’s intention is to dispose of USD200b of property and financial assets and associated liabilities under its control. GE Capital accounted for 57% of GE earnings in 2007- pre the Financial Crisis – and this contribution is planned to decline to 10% of earnings in 2018. GE has also announced that ; USD50b of the asset sale proceeds will be used to buy back shares equivalent to about 17% of its current market value while it intends to maintain its dividend –another means to return excess cash to shareholders.

The share market reacted very favourably to the news, adding nearly 14% GE’s share price and as much as USD37b dollars to its market value almost overnight. (See below) Perhaps also worth noting is that despite the recent jump, a GE share is worth but half of what it was in 2002.

Clearly exiting its SIFI status can be a market value adding move something the shareholders in SIFIs everywhere will not fail to notice. Reducing the size of GE and prospective earnings from the financial division, while releasing capital for prospectively superior returns, inside and outside GE has already added value for GE shareholders. Making the additional point, if it needs to be made, that it is not earnings per share or the growth in earnings per share that matters for shareholders, but return on capital, especially improved returns on reduced capital employed, that can add to the value of a share.

An unknown to the market is to what extent such downsizing to avoid an unwelcome, “too-big-to-fail” status, will give pause to the regulators. Or will the growth of alternatives to banks (in the form of more profitable shadow banks and other lightly regulated lenders) encourage them to further extend their regulatory reach at the further cost of shareholders and borrowers? An alternative, less regulation intensive and profit destroying approach would be to recognize the possibility of financial or business failure, of even the largest financial institutions. Such failure would have to be accompanied with severe penalties for shareholders and also debt holders of failing institutions. A credible threat of failure with its highly wealth destroying consequences for equity and debt holders will restrain risk taking in the first instance. But in the event of failure it will need well designed bankruptcy procedures, known in advance by bankers and central bankers, to limit the potential collateral damage to soundly managed competitors. The Global Financial Crisis was not only a response to excessive risk taking – encouraged it should be recognised by US government interventions in the market for mortgages. It was aggravated by the lack of clear procedures for winding down or supporting financial failures. Fixing this failure is a better approach than regulations that attempt to eliminates both the risks of failure but also and the returns and the benefits to customers that come with taking such risks. The rewards of success, because of the risk of failure is the essential raison d’etre for any business enterprise including financial businesses. Denying the trade off between risk and returns will eliminate both as well as all potential SIFIs that have so much to contribute to any successful economy .

A helping hand from Europe

How European Central Bank (ECB) Quantitative Easing (QE) moved the markets, including the rand and the RSA Yields. Is this good news for emerging market economies?

The unexpected scale of the intended QE in Europe announced on Thursday moved the markets. Most conspicuously it weakened the euro vs the US dollar. Such weakness must be good for European exporters and thus for growth prospects in Europe regardless of how much more lending European banks will do with their pumped up cash reserves. Some stimulus from a weaker euro will add something to the demand for bank credit, which has been as weak as the supply of bank credit from European banks – hence the case for QE.

US dollar strength and euro weakness was an entirely predictable response to what became a wider interest rate spread in favour of US Treasuries over Bunds.

The rand not only gained against the euro but also strengthened against the US dollar on the QE facts.

This strength was however not confined to the rand. It was also extended to many of the other emerging market currencies. The rand lost a little bit of ground against the Brazilian real and gained against the Turkish lira. It also held its own against the Mexican peso and Indian rupee as we also show below. Thus euro weakness vs the US dollar extended to emerging market currencies, including the rand.

The strength of the rand vs the euro was linked with further strength in the RSA bond market. We have alluded in previous notes to the recently strong relationship between the rand/euro and RSA long bond yields. This trend of declining RSA yields associated with rand/euro strength held up strongly over the past few days. It indicates that the lower euro interest rates and a wider spread in favour of RSA (and presumably other emerging market) bond yields also attracted flows of funds out of or away from Europe – enough to move emerging market bond yields lower.

It was not only emerging market bond markets that seemed to benefit from changes in flows of funds in response to ECB QE. Emerging market equity markets, including the JSE when measured in US dollars, also outperformed the S&P 500.

Lower interest rates and determined reflation in Europe have improved global growth prospects. It does appear that EM bond and currency markets have benefitted and that EM economies may grow faster in response to the sustained improvement in the US economy and now hopefully better growth prospects in Europe on which EM economies depend. So much can be read into market moves. As we have mentioned before it is hard to predict other than dollar strength Vs the Euro in the light of the sustained spread in the yields offered by US Treasuries over German Bunds. It seems that the wide spread between Euro yields and EM yields can help to protect EM currencies including the ZAR from dollar strength. This means less inflation as well as low long term rates. It can also mean lower short term rates that might help stimulate growth even as inflation comes down.

Point of View: In praise of the global consumer plays

How the global consumer plays on the JSE have kept up well with the S&P 500.

A noticeable feature of global financial markets has been the strong recent performance of the S&P 500 Index, both in absolute and even more impressively in relative terms. As we show in the charts below, the S&P 500, the large company benchmark for the US equity market, continues to outperform both emerging markets (EM) and also the US smaller listed companies represented in the Russell 2500 Index.

The S&P 500 has gained approximately 15% against the MSCI EM benchmark since a year ago and is about 5% stronger vs the Russell.

We also show that, compared to a year ago, the SA component of the benchmark EM Index (MSCI SA) that excludes all the companies with a primary stock exchange listing elsewhere (SABMiller, British American Tobacco, Anglo American, BHP Billiton and the like) has done well compared to the average EM market, of which only about 8% will be made up of JSE listed companies. The JSE All Share Index, converted to US dollars, has lagged the S&P 500 by about 10% over the past 12 months.

Continue reading Point of View: In praise of the global consumer plays

An extraordinary day in the markets

For a while now – since 19 September to be precise – the markets have stopped worrying about what US growth might do to interest rates (threatening equity valuations) and began to worry about growth itself.

News of deflation in Europe had fed these fears and helped force bond yields everywhere (including RSA yields) lower. Yesterday morning a weak US retail number, announced before the market opened in New York, was more than enough to encourage a dramatic sell off of leading equities and an equally dramatic rush to the apparent safety of bonds. We show the intraday moves in the bond markets below.

Equity markets and interest rates: September suffering

September was a tough month for equities, even though interest rates had declined by month end.

September proved to be a difficult month for equities and it was especially difficult for emerging market (EM) equities, including the JSE that once more behaved like the average EM equity market. The S&P 500 lost less than 2% of its US dollar value in the month while the EM bench mark lost almost 8% of its value and the JSE All Share Index, measured in US dollars, had fallen by more than 8% by the end of the month. Continue reading Equity markets and interest rates: September suffering