Category: SA Economy

The SA economy in Q2 2015 was not as it appeared – after taking an inventory

According to the first readings of gross domestic output (GDP), in real terms for Q2 2015, the SA economy performed very poorly. It is estimated by Stats SA to have shrunk by 1.3% on a seasonally adjusted annual rate in the quarter.

(All figures are taken from the Quarterly Bulletin of the SA Reserve Bank, September 2015.)

On a second reading for the second quarter of figures provided by the SA Reserve Bank, which include estimates of the demand side of the economy, the outcomes, on the face of it things. seem even worse. Gross Domestic Expenditure (GDE) is estimated to have declined by as much as a 7.2% rate in the quarter. The outcomes were not nearly as dire as might be inferred from either the GDP or GDE estimates. Final demand, the sum of spending by households, firms and the government sector, actually grew by about 1%. That final demands continued to grow at a very modest pace is consistent with our own measures of economic activity. What turned final demands into very weak GDE growth rates was a dramatic decline in inventories. Inventories in Q1 grew by R8.8bn on a seasonally adjusted annual rate. In Q2 they declined by the equivalent rate of over R38bn. This decline in inventories was enough to reduce real GDP in the quarter by as much as 6.2%.

The Reserve Bank needs to change the narrative on inflation and interest rates to take full account of the economic realities

The rand exchange rate since 1995 has proven to be anything but predictable. Despite this, with the help of hindsight it is possible to explain why the rand has behaved as it has over the years. It can be shown that, since 2014, it has been more a case of US dollar strength, against almost all currencies, than rand weakness that explains the rand/dollar exchange rate. In recent weeks the rand has also weakened against the euro, again also in line with almost all other emerging market currencies.

Explaining dollar strength is an art form all of its own. It has much to do with the superior performance of the US economy over the past few years, allowing US interest rates at the long end of the yield curve to rise relatively to rates prevailing in Europe and Japan. The strength of the US recovery has also led the money market to believe that short monetary policy determined rates in the US are soon about to rise – adding to the demand for US dollars.

A consistently important influence on the foreign exchange value of the rand is the state of global capital markets. When global allocators of capital feel more secure about the state of the global economy, they favour riskier assets and riskier currencies. And vice versa: when caution rules, funds flow in the opposite direction to safer havens. The rand as a well traded emerging market currency (as well as rand denominated bonds and equities) falls into the category of one of the more risky, that is volatile, currencies and markets, as do most other emerging markets (EM) currencies. Currency moves associated with the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008-09, shown in the figure above, illustrate the vulnerability of the rand to such events.

It is possible to measure such risks in the bond markets. Measures in the form of a wider or narrower interest rate spread between South African or other EM debt can help identify the degree of risk aversion or appetite prevailing in the global capital markets. RSA and other EM US dollar-denominated debt trades at higher yields than US Treasury Bonds. These higher yields compensate investors for the risk that the debt issued in US dollar may not be honoured.

Foreign investors may also hold local currency denominated debt, for example rand debt, and so receive interest income in rands and other local currencies rather than dollars. Since the local central banks print their own currency and as much as they choose, there is no danger of any formal default on such debt, only that they may lose some of their US dollar value should inflation accelerate. The risk to these offshore investors holding local currency denominated securities is that the guaranteed interest income paid in a local currency will lose dollar value should the higher interest currency depreciate over time. The higher interest rates on rand-denominated debt compensate investors for expected rand weakness. The equilibrium and relationship between the difference in the interest rate for securities of the same duration and risk class and the contemporaneous percentage difference between spot and forward exchange rates is known as interest parity. Arbitrage maintains this relationship.

It can be demonstrated that the spot rand will generally weaken as these interest rate spreads widen – and vice versa when the spreads narrow. In the figure below we show two measures of SA risk: exchange rate risk and sovereign or default risk. The yield spread between RSA 10 year bonds and US Treasury bonds of the same duration is shown on the left hand scale while the cost of insuring RSA dollar debt of five years duration against default, known as the Collateralised Debt Security (CDS) spread issued by global banks, is shown on the right hand scale. Higher spreads of either kind are generally associated with rand weakness and vice versa for rand strength. It may be noticed how these spreads widened dramatically in 2008. Both spreads have moved in a narrower band since 2010 while the CDS spread fell back towards about 200bps.

It is possible to identify risks of default associated more specifically with SA rather than with EM bonds generally by comparing the CDS spread for RSA bonds with the spreads attached to all other EM debt, as estimated by JPMorgan. As may be seen in the figures below, SA risk and EM risk measures are highly correlated over time, indicating very similar forces at work. A wider difference between the EM Index spread and the RSA CDS spread, indicates a more favourable relative status for SA and vice versa. It may be noticed that this difference narrowed after August 2012 indicating a deterioration in RSA credit rating. However it may also be seen that the credit standing of SA has improved relative to other EM debt over the past year. Russia, Brazil, Turkey, Malaysia and Indonesia have all been making heavy recent weather of their connections to global finance. It may also be noticed that SA’s relative standing in the debt markets deteriorated before the GFC, as the repo rate increased and then improved in a relative sense compared to the EM average during and after the global crisis.

The rand may however also weaken or strengthen in response to perceptions of SA specific risks, independently of developments in global markets. Political and economic developments in SA may cause the market to sell or buy rand-denominated securities, leading to wider or narrower spreads or for the debt rating agencies to change their credit ratings.

The unrest and violence at the Marikana platinum mine in August 2012 was one such unfortunate SA event that weakened the rand against all currencies, including other emerging market currencies. It can be shown that the rand has traded off the weaker post-Marikana base ever since; though much of the direction of the rand exchange rate since can be explained by global rather than further SA influences.

Economic theory suggests that a primary influence on the exchange value of a currency is the difference between the rate of inflation in the home currency and inflation experienced by its trading partners. The exchange rate is expected, in theory, to move to compensate for these differences in inflation in order to maintain global competitiveness for producers and distributors in both the domestic and foreign markets. What is lost or gained by relatively fast or slow inflation of prices and costs, is expected to be offset by compensating movements in the exchange rate, thus maintaining Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). Unfortunately for the theory and the SA economy, PPP can contribute very little to any explanation of the exchange value of the rand since 1995.

It is the capital account rather than the trade account of the SA balance of payments (BOP) that has dominated the rand exchange rate ever since the capital account was integrated with the trade account of the BOP in 1995. The figure below makes the point very clearly. The difference between the theoretical PPP equivalent rand and the market rand makes for the real rand exchange. It is the deviation from PPP that makes a real difference to exporters and importers. A weak real rand makes exports more profitable and imports more expensive. According to Reserve Bank estimates, the real trade weighted rand is now about 20% weaker than its PPP equivalent and 10% weaker against the US dollar according to our own calculations, using comparative CPIs in SA and the US to infer the theoretical PPP USD/ZAR exchange rate.

The reality is that the highly unpredictable exchange rate leads changes in the SA CPI. Currency depreciation does not accompany or follow changes in the CPI as PPP theory would presume, it tends rather to lead inflation. How much inflation will actually follow a weaker rand will also depend on the underlying trends in the global commodity markets. Also important for subsequent inflation will be the impact of changes in tax rates and administered prices, also hard to predict

As we show below, there is a highly variable relationship between changes in import prices and consumer prices in SA, even as changes in import prices tending to lead changes in headline inflation, the lags are also variable. Hence to forecast inflation in SA, with any degree of accuracy or conviction, would require not only an accurate prediction of the essentially unpredictable exchange rate, but also of the almost equally difficult to predict pass through effect of a weaker rand on the CPI. Import price inflation is now running well below headline inflation, so helping to contain the inflation impact of the weaker rand.

If inflation in SA in say two years cannot be predicted with any degree of accuracy or conviction, as would appear obvious given all the unknowns that could impact on consumer prices over any 24 month period, then one can have little confidence that monetary policy and changes in the repo rate will help realise some narrowly targeted rate of inflation. The fan charts of the Reserve Bank published in its 2015 Monetary Policy Review that indicate the possible inflation outcomes, confirm the difficulty in forecasting inflation with any confidence. The chart below shows that there is a 90% chance of inflation in SA in 2017 being somewhere between 3% and 10%.

In practice in these unpredictable circumstances, all the Reserve Bank can do is react to inflation, rather than anticipate inflation and act appropriately to help stabilise inflation and the economy. In reacting to realised inflation by raising its repo rate when inflation is accelerating, the Reserve Bank has a further problem. The impact of interest rate changes on the rand is itself unpredictable. The impact of higher interest rates on the exchange value of the rand is as likely to weaken as strengthen the rand. Higher interest rates, if they are regarded as likely to slow down the economy, may well imply lower returns to capital and discourage capital inflows. If this turns out to be the case, higher interest rates may well be associated with more inflation.

However what can be predicted with conviction is that higher interest rates will suppress spending and reduce the rate of economic growth. Hence it is possible that higher interest rates will lead to no less inflation and perhaps lead to more inflation, given what might subsequently happen to the rand, and could be accompanied by slower growth.

The policy implication of the unpredictable rand and inflation is that the Reserve Bank should only react to inflation when prices are rising because domestic demand is increasing faster than domestic supplies, perhaps because money and credit supplies are growing too rapidly. It should not react to higher prices irrespective of the cause of such higher prices. For example, higher prices that follow exchange rate or other supply side shocks, following droughts or higher taxes on domestic goods or services. These shocks depress demand and higher interest rates will depress demand even further to no useful anti-inflationary effect.

The Reserve Bank might argue that if it didn’t react to higher inflation, whatever its cause, inflation would trend higher because of so-called second round effects. If it failed to react, more inflation would come to be expected and in turn lead by some self-fulfilling prophecy and producer pricing power, to more inflation itself. There is no evidence to support the view that more inflation expected leads to more inflation.

Indeed inflation expected in SA has remained remarkably stable around the 6% level, the upper range of the inflation targets. Expected inflation is a constant rather than a variable in the SA inflation story.

The problem for policy makers is that the market has been conditioned to expect higher interest rates, irrespective of the cause of higher inflation and the implications this may have for the economy. The task for the Reserve Bank is to change the narrative to take full account of the economic realities. The value of the rand and its impact on inflation is unpredictable and monetary policy should not be expected to react to it or other supply side shocks to the CPI that are of a temporary nature. The flexible exchange rate should be regarded as a shock absorber for the economy – not a threat to it. The proper task for the Reserve Bank is to manage aggregate spending in SA in a counter cyclical way. Chasing inflation targets, regardless of their provenance, can lead to pro-cyclical monetary policy.

The past week or two of exceptional market volatility was not so much a case of China sneezing and the world catching cold – but the sense that China may have little idea of how to cope with a cold. Its feverish interventions in the Shanghai stock market and perhaps also the currency market did not make a good impression. Surely the advice – starve a fever but feed a cold – holds everywhere.

Clearly there is much room for further slips before China becomes more of a fully market and service-driven economy – policy errors that will continue to complicate the calculation of market values in and outside of the Middle Kingdom. Fortunately, the US economy, despite some doubts about possible China contagion, remains well set on its recovery path. A major upward revision of US Q2 GDP growth rates released yesterday would have served as a helpful vapor rub for unnecessarily troubled breasts.

It remains for the Fed to get its long heralded first interest rate hike out of the way – to help confirm that the US economy has normalised, even when accompanied by below normal inflation rates. Our sense is that the markets will be reassured rather than troubled buy a 25bp increase in the Federal Funds rate, while giving the Fed ample time to consider its next move on the path to normality.

It is emerging market (EM) equities that have lagged far behind the progress made in developed equity markets since 2011. They have most to gain from a US recovery that can be expected to promote faster growth everywhere. EM equities and currencies, South Africa naturally included, lost relatively most in the recent turmoil. It is encouraging to observe that EM equities (priced in US dollars) have recovered as much as (or more) than the US market in recent days.

Also coming back with the recovery in equity markets was the volatility indicator for the S&P 500 (the VIX) and the risk premium for SA and the rand – indicated by the spread between RSA and US bond yields. There is clearly scope for further declines in these risk indicators and if they do decline to anything like normal levels, we will see further strength in the S&P 500 – and also in the rand.

What also may have been noticed in all the turbulence and rand weakness was that there was only one place to hide in the equity markets from rand weakness – in gold shares. In other words, there were no rand hedges, other than the gold shares. The rand value of even the most globally exposed counters, the global consumer plays and their like, declined with the cost of a US dollar.

There is an important difference between equities that can be regarded as rand hedges (rand values that rise with rand weakness\) and SA economy hedges. When the rand weakens for global reasons the dollar and the rand value of most equities and bonds will decline, as recent trends confirm. Hence there are no rand hedges outside the gold mines when the global risk outlook deteriorates. When the rand declines for South African specific reasons – those companies on the JSE with a largely global footprint – will see the US dollar value of their activities largely unaffected; hence rand weakness for SA reasons can then translate into higher rand values.

Gold is different. Its price and the value of gold mines, in US dollars, tends to rise in troubled times. Hence the extreme behaviour of JSE-listed gold mines in August. Between 17 August and 24 August, the JSE mold miners gained 27.8%. This was while the USD/ZAR exchange rate moved from R12.90 to R13.21 – down some 2.3%. Over the same few days of rand weakness the All Share Index went from 50751 to 47631, a decline of 6.3%. Over the next three days the Gold Mine Index gave up 19.25% of its rand value at the close on the 24 August as the All Share Index added 3.1% and the rand stabilised.

Clearly, SA gold shares can protect portfolios meaningfully against global risk aversion, even though they have proved to be a very expensive form of portfolio insurance over the longer run. The SA gold mines have suffered from not only higher costs of production and declining grades of ore mined, they have also proved vulnerable to SA events (strikes and the like) that limit production. Investors in SA mines should wish for a weaker rand in response to additional global risk aversion, unaccompanied by greater SA risks to their production.

The state of the SA economy – reading the tea leaves and providing a recipe for a stronger reviving brew

The trend in retail sales volumes in 2015, now updated to May, help confirm that the SA economic engine is stuck in a slow growth gear of between 2% and 2.5% a year. Year on year retail inflation is also fairly stable between 4% and 5%.

Our Hard Number Index (HNI) of SA economic activity, based on new vehicle sales and cash issued by the Reserve Bank, adjusted for consumer prices, updated to the June month end, indicates a very similar pattern to that of retail, a pattern of slow growth. This is predicted to continue for the next 12 months at its current very pedestrian pace. We add the Reserve Bank Co-incident Business Cycle Indicator, based on 12 economic time series, for comparison, also smoothed and extrapolated beyond March 2015, the latest data point for this series. All of these indicators of reveal similar trends and cyclical turning points that provide very little sense of a cyclical upswing. The HNI shows up as a very reliable leading indicator of retail volumes and the more broadly measured business cycle.

It may be of some consolation that the indicators still predict some positive growth, though higher interest rates, if imposed by the Reserve Bank, may threaten even these predictions of slow growth. There is no suggestion that spending growth is about to pick up to add to inflationary pressures that are almost entirely the result of higher taxes on fuel and energy and municipal services generally.

The series for import and export prices to March 2015 suggest deflation rather than inflation emanating from the balance of payments and the exchange rate. The rand is weaker against the US dollar but stronger against the euro and only marginally weaker on a trade weighted basis compared to a year ago. Import or export prices (measured by the export or import deflator) were lower in Q1 2015 than they were a year before and so are not adding pressure to SA inflation rates: nor is domestic spending. The tax increases and the drought in the maize belt that have pushed the CPI temporarily higher, will not respond favourably to higher interest rates that the Reserve Bank seems intent on imposing on a highly fragile economy.

The case for raising short term interest rates in these circumstances is, in our judgment. a very poor one. It is certain only to further depress domestic spending without promising to have any predictably favourable influence on inflation or inflation expected over the next 12 – 18 months. As we will show SA needs lower rather than higher interest rates if it is to escape from slow growth forever.

The question the Reserve Bank should be considering – as should all those with responsibility for economic policy – is how can the economy hope to break out of this seemingly indefinite prospect of slow growth? Ideally it would be increased exports that lead the economy to faster growth. But exports from SA will be constrained by the weakness in metal and mineral prices associated with slow global growth and the fact that global supplies of metals have caught up with the extra demand that came from China in the boom years before 2008, though as we have seen recently, merely keeping the factories and mines working rather than shut down through strike action can help to add to exports and employment and incomes.

Stimulus from government spending has also run its course – it was ended by rising government debt and interest payments and threats to credit ratings accompanying these adverse trends. Increased duties on fuel and energy as well as higher income tax rates are not only adding to inflation- they are an extra burden on household budgets. And to look to the capital expenditure programmes of publicly owned corporations to lift the economy, as was the official case made a few years ago, would seem only to court further disaster. The clear reluctance of private business to invest more in their SA operations will continue until their capacity to produce more is challenged by increased demands form their customers. Private businesses in Q1 2015 reduced their capital expenditure and their payrolls.

The essential condition for any step up in SA growth rates is an increased willingness of households to spend and borrow more. Household spending accounts for about 60% of all spending and without encouragement for the rest of the economy from the household sector (encouragement now clearly lacking), the economy will not grow faster. How then could this come about? A look back at how the economy managed to grow much faster between 2003 and 2008 may be instructive.

In figure 3 below we show how spending in 2008 collapsed as retail prices rose sharply after the rand weakened in response to the Global Financial Crisis. Notice also the extraordinary growth in retail volumes between 2003 and 2007 as retail inflation subsided. Inflation subsided then as the rand strengthened and lower interest rates followed lower inflation so stimulating consumption spending further. Bank lending, as mentioned (particularly mortgage lending to households), grew even faster than consumption spending, so providing strong support for the spending intentions of households.

At the peak of the growth cycle in mid 2006, bank lending to the private sector was 26% up on a year before and mortgage lending had grown by about 30% on a year before. The value of residences owned by households increased by an average 21% a year between 2003 and 2007, adding significantly to the willingness of households to borrow and spend and banks to lend to them on the security of rising house prices. See figure 5 below that illustrates these housing and household wealth effects.

SA spending grew faster than output between 2003 and 2008 and the current account went into deficit, having remained in balance throughout the slow growth years that preceded the boom. Foreign capital more than made up the shortfall in domestic savings. The boom in spending and growth between 2003 and 2008 could not have continued without support from foreign capital that proved very forthcoming.

This helps make an essential point: growth improves returns on capital and attracts additional savings from all sources, domestic and foreign, to fund faster growth and benefit from higher returns on capital invested. Slow growth repels capital because expected returns fall away. The limits to spending and growth are set by the supply of savings from domestic and foreign sources. But to attract capital, conditions for it need to be attractive. Expected growth rather than stagnation or worse is the essential lure for capital.

If the economy were to grow faster in response to a pick-up in household spending, the lack of domestic savings might prove a constraint, should foreign capital not be fully forthcoming. If this were to happen, the rand would come under pressure and higher inflation would then call for higher interest rates – trends that would in turn inhibit any incipient recovery in household spending.

The point to be recognised is that unless the economy asks for more foreign capital the answer as to how much would be made available, only time and evidence would be able to tell. But there would be no point in inhibiting any recovery in household spending for fear that it might soon run into the sands. Entry into a virtuous circle of something like the 2003-2007 episode of faster growth will hopefully be attempted sometime in the not too distant future and would have to be led by faster growth in household spending. South Africans can only hope for the chance to test the market for capital to fund our growth.

One positive influence on spending will be the improved state of household balance sheets. The household ratios of debts to assets have declined – helped by a recent improvement in the value of houses, which are up by about 10%.

Explaining the actions of trade unions in SA. Why it is not irrational to go on strike for higher wages even when employment declines. What are the policy implications?

The season of outrageous demands for wage increases is upon us. And, more important, it is the season of wage agreements that appear to take little account of the hundreds of thousands of workers outside the mine and factory gates who would willingly accept employment for current benefits.

Even more unsettling will be the loss of jobs, as managers replace unskilled workers with machines and more skilled and experienced workers productive enough to justify their higher costs of hire. The losers will be the newly unemployed with little opportunity for alternative employment on anything like the same conditions.

How then can one make sense of this seemingly irrational behaviour by the unions making the demands? How they can not be aware, it will be asked, since their members will continue to be retrenched in large numbers. Why then do the unions do what they do? They are surely as well aware as any that higher real wages can lead to job losses in the sectors of the economy where they exercise the power to strike?

The answer must be that they are well aware of the economic circumstances and the trade off between wage gains and job losses, which they make for their own good reasons. We would suggest that, in fact, unions are not in the business of maximising employment or employment opportunities. Rather, unions are in the business of maximising the total wages paid to their members. The objective they quite rationally and self-interestedly attempt to achieve is the highest possible wage bill, not the number of wage earners or members of the union. It is the total wage bill agreed to by employers that forms the basis for collecting dues from members. Therefore (percentage) increases in employment benefits can more than compensate for fewer workers employed. And better paid members may be more willing and able to pay their dues.

It is theoretically and practically possible for the wage bill paid by firms to rise in both nominal and real terms even as employment drops away. This is precisely what has happened in the mining and other sectors of the SA economy. While employment has declined in recent years, total compensation paid to employees of all kinds has continued to increase, and so presumably have the dues paid to their unions (collected conveniently by the employers themselves).

To put these outcomes in terms familiar to the financial sector, the asset base of the unions and staff associations from which they collect their fee income, the wage bill, has continued to rise as the unemployment rate continues to remain damagingly high to the economy, but not necessarily to the unions. There is nothing ignorant or irrational in all this, just predictable self-interest at work. Such an explanation fits the facts of the economy and its labour market well.

The statistics help make the point. The SA economy may well have become less labour intensive – fewer worker hours employed per unit of GDP – but the share of total remuneration in GDP or total value added has changed very little. The wage bill (not numbers employed) has risen more or less in line with output as we show below. The share of owners and funders and rentiers in SA output peaked in 2008 (before the global financial crisis) and has been in decline since, as the share of employees, has been rising. That is despite or maybe because of slow growth that reduces the rewards for savings and the demands for labour – but not necessarily the rewards of those, the majority who hold on to their jobs.

A similar picture emerges for the mining sector. In the figures below we compare mining output in money of the day (R millions) with total compensation paid by the industry to its employees. The share of mining output accrued by employees has been rising in recent years. In other words, the unions appear to be successful if their objective is (as we infer) to increase the wage bill paid by the industry rather than the numbers employed.

While mining employment was at 2008 levels in 2013, average employment benefits per worker employed have risen consistently, at an over 11% average annual rate in money of the day terms , and equivalent to an average increase of 4.5% in real terms, using the GDP deflator to convert nominal into real growth of employment benefits or rather costs to owners. The average employee in the mining sector came with an average cost to employers of over R220 000 per employee in 2013. Not bad work if (big if) you can get it.

Presumably these risks of default decline as growth prospects improve. And improved growth prospects (lower risk) are well associated with higher share prices. In the figure below we show the relationship between the value of the MSCI Emerging Market Index benchmark and the JSE ALSI and the CDS risk spread over recent years. We show how the CDS spread for RSA five year US dollar-denominated debt and the JSE in US dollars have moved in consistently opposite directions.

One trusts that the foreign currency traders operating in SA closed any long positions on the US dollar or short exposures to the rand before they took off for their Easter holiday weekend. Uncle Sam did not take time off and reported on US employment as usual early on Good Friday 8h30 (14h30 SA time), New York time.

There were clearly enough traders at their computers to react instantaneously to what was an unexpectedly weak increase in jobs added. Accordingly the dollar was marked down and the rand and other emerging market currencies were marked up.

Bloomberg reports that the USD/ZAR opened that day at R11.9747, reached a low of R11.669 and closed at R11.79. At the time of writing, the rand was trading at R11.7789, about 1.97% stronger than its levels late on Thursday 2 April 2015 (See below).

Lower average inflation in SA is surely welcome – but will it make doing business or consumption less risky? The benefits of lower inflation in SA may well be less obvious than they seem.

The average price that SA consumers paid for goods and services actually fell by 0.2% in January. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) measured 110.8 in January compared to a level of 111 reached in December 2014 (based on December 2012 = 100). The CPI first reached the level of 111 in August 2014 and is now lower than it was five months ago. Thus headline inflation, calculated as the year on year change in the CPI, has fallen away sharply and, if present trends in the CPI were to continue (which is unlikely) , inflation in a year would be below 2%.

The CPI is but an indicator of the average prices paid by the average SA household for a fixed representative basket of goods, as pre-determined by Stats SA based on its surveys of household spending patterns. As we are all well aware, any average can hide a large dispersion about the mean. The old saw about feet in the fridge and head in the oven yielding a moderate average bodily temperature makes the point. Some of the goods and services included in the CPI may be rising at a much faster rate than others – some important items may even be falling, helping to reduce the CPI and the average inflation rate. This has been the case over the past 12 months.

The different components of the household budget have realised very different inflation rates. The average price increased by 4.4% since January 2014. Food and non-alcoholic beverages, with a large weight in the average budget of 15.41%, rose by an above average 6.5% over the past 12 months. Inside the food trolley, dairy products, milk, eggs and cheese rose by as much as 12.1% year on year. The goods helping to hold down average inflation in 2014 were petrol, with a 5.6% weight, was down 17.6% over the 12 months, while the prices of so called private transport, with a weight of 7.25%, fell by 13%. Telecommunication equipment, presumably high quality or computer power adjusted, was estimated to have fallen by 12.1% in 12 months.

While the quality adjusted prices charged for cell phones and the like may well fall further, the chances of fuel prices declining further seems remote – since even if the rand price of a barrel of oil were to decline further, National Treasury is bound to levy a higher excise tax on petrol and diesel.

Clearly the all important relative prices – the price of food relative to the price of transport – changed quite dramatically and can be expected to continue to do so. Businesses have to be constantly aware of the changing relationship between the prices of the goods and services they buy, including labour services, and the prices they are able to charge in their market places and adjust accordingly.

Presumably households consume more of the relatively cheaper goods and less of the more expensive stuff. They may well trade down – that is sacrifice quality for price as goods or services become relatively more expensive. Stats SA only periodically (every five years or so) adjusts its CPI trolley of goods and services for such shifts – that may be influenced by price as well as by innovations on the supply side of the economy.

Another way of measuring prices is through the use of deflators, as used in the National Income Accounts to convert the value added in money of the day prices to their real equivalent. A deflator takes current consumption or expenditure patterns and converts them into their constant price equivalents. In other words, it calculates what the goods and services bought today would have cost in some base year. Changes in this deflator then offer an alternative view of inflation.

A comparison between the Household Consumption Goods Deflator and the CPI, based on 2010 prices as well as the respective inflation rates, is shown below. The trends are similar but not identical.

Using the deflators can demonstrate just how much relative prices have changed in SA over the years. Deflators are available for a large number of items included in total household consumption. The deflators for the main categories – household spending; non-durable goods, mainly food and beverages; semi durables, mainly clothes and footwear; durables, namely vehicles, furniture and appliances; and household services, utilities, restaurants, entertainment and domestic service – are shown below and are based on 1990 prices for purposes of comparison. As may be seen, the prices of food and services have increased at a much faster rate than the prices of semi-durable and durable consumer goods. Food prices have increased by over seven times since 1990 and clothes and footwear by only two times, with services increasing at almost the same rate as non-durables. We also demonstrate how much more relatively expensive food and services have become.

A large part of the theoretical case made for low rates of inflation is that low inflation helps stabilise relative prices. Such greater certainty about relative prices – or the relationship between the prices of the goods and services we sell and those we buy – would be helpful to producers and consumers. It would help to reduce uncertainty about relative prices and so reduce the risks of undertaking consumption and production over time, which would thus be to the advantage of economic growth.

Unfortunately there is no evidence that lower consumer goods inflation in SA has in any way reduced the dispersion of the prices of goods and services consumed by households about their average. According to the deflators, the rates of inflation of the many goods and services consumed by households differ now by as much as they ever have, as we show below.