Go to the supermarket thou sluggard- consider their ways and be wise

In mysterious (super) markets we should trust to serve our economic interest – not regulators of prices

A typical supermarket carries many thousands of separate items on its shelves. It may also offer a variety of other services at its tills or counters, including payment or transaction services. The operating profit margins on these different items or services will vary greatly and may even vary from day to day as buyers take advantage of opportunities to buy low and sell high. Their suppliers may also offer discounts for prompt payment or bulk orders or their payment terms may be extended to help add profit margins.

The shopper couldn’t possibly hope to know such details nor should they care to know. All they might be aware of is the price of some KVI (known value item), for example a jar of coffee or a box of tea. And the supermarket will try and make sure that the KVIs are priced competitively. If the tomatoes are a profitable line at the vegetable counter they may well help cross subsidise the cooking oil, but nobody other than the shop managers needs to be well aware of this.

What will matter to the shopper, a matter of which the shopkeeper will be well aware, is not the price of any one item on the menu, but of the cost of a trolley load of groceries and the cost in time and transport of collecting it. Shareholders and managers care whether the selling price of the average shopping trolley or basket will more than cover the average costs of delivering the trolley load – rents and employment costs included. Most important is that these prices on average are high enough to provide a satisfactory return on the capital invested in the chain of shops and distribution centres and trucks needed to keep the shelves well stocked and so the customers coming through the doors. Margins may go down and true profits go up, to the ultimate advantage to both customers and shareholders.

If the realised return on capital is above risk adjusted returns, shoppers and non-shoppers can be assured that the essential service of supplying and delivering goods and services to households will continue to be provided at prices they prove willing to pay for. Indeed, the more profitable the enterprise, the more likely the retail offering will be extended to more locations, with fuller stocked shelves in ever greater variety.

Consumers generally can be assured that the cure for high or “exploitative” prices and margins is high prices themselves. High prices that lead to above normal or required returns on capital encourage more supply, that in due course will reduce prices. In other words, consumers can rely on market forces to supply goods and services and to restrain pricing power.

The owners of profitable firms are well incentivised to expand their offerings. Unprofitable firms who are unable to charge enough (sometimes inconveniently for their loyal customers) will go out of business. Perhaps as consumers we should worry more about unsustainably low prices than unsustainably high prices. High prices bring more goods with greater variety; low prices will mean reduced supplies and less variety and quality.

In the presumed absence of competition, we rely on regulators to determine prices on a cost plus basis; hopefully not too high a return that might mean very high prices not vulnerable to competitive forces. There is a danger that regulation of some prices in an essentially bundled offering may fail to recognize the overarching role played in the economy by return on capital and the important tendency for excess returns to be competed away.

The threats to SA consumers of additional regulation that come to mind are the potential assaults on the menu of charges made by furniture retailers who supply furniture bundled with credit, delivery costs and perhaps personal insurance. Or on the suppliers of chickens bundled with brine, the proportion of which is regulated. Or the services of cell phone companies, who among the services they provide, include connections to other cell phone companies, that are now subject to a lower regulated charge.

The itemised insurance or delivery charges levied by a furniture retailer may look exorbitantly high, seemingly well above observable costs. A regulator may then demand lower charges for them. But such lower charges may well mean a higher price for the separately itemised furniture item. The insurance charges may well have cross subsidised the price of the furniture item. Then lower charges for insurance will mean higher explicit prices for the furniture itself, if the cost of capital is to be recovered. Similarly, by reducing the cell phone interconnection charge – the cost of a bundled pre paid contract – perhaps the subsidized cell phone itself may well will go up. And if it costs less to bulk up a chicken with brine than with mealie meal, the price of chicken will surely reflect this as the chicken producers compete with each other to make extra sales.

Provided furniture retailers, cell phone companies or chicken producers compete with each other, we need not concern ourselves with the charges of the individual items, than we need to concern ourselves with the gross profit margins of all the separate items provided by a supermarket. We can rely on competition rather than regulation to constrain prices and to secure essential supplies.

An easy to recognise feature of regulated markets is insufficient supply and non-price rationing – that is long queues for service or forced sacrifices of quality and variety. Think of the waiting lists for “free housing” or medical services at public hospitals in SA or of power load shedding due to the lack of regulated generating capacity.

The essential problem is that it is hard to understand and appreciate the hidden hand of market forces. It seems easier to think that prices are some simple mark up on costs. The problem is compounded in that students of economics are more easily and taught how markets fail than how they work in what appears to be mysterious ways. History tells us that governments (that is government officials) are much more easily prone to failure to supply essential goods and services than market forces driven by profit seeking companies.

The price regulator is bound to be some university-trained economist. The successful entrepreneur does not need to understand theoretical economics at all – only how to buy low and sell high and the more they succeed the better off we will all be. More important than price competition will be innovation, new products / services or improved methods of production that are introduced to the economy by enterprising companies and risk loving individuals. These companies and individuals will have high prospective margins very much in mind but in turn will be subject to emulation and margin pressure. Regulation can only serve to stifle, not promote, innovation.

Equities: Crossing the 50 000 barrier for the JSE

Democracy has been very good for SA shareholders

The JSE crossed a milestone yesterday, with the All Share Index closing above 50 000 for the first time. It first closed above 5000 in April 1994, just before SA became a fully-fledged democracy. Over the same period, dividends per Index Share have grown from R117.89 in April 1994 to R1373.25 today, and that is at an average rate of 13.68% a year. Earnings per share have increased at a compound 13.18% a year rate, implying something of a modest and surely deserved rerating for the Index over the years.

 

The move from 5 000 to 50 000 is equivalent to an average annual compound return of 14.41%. Inflation averaged 6.32% a year over the period. Real JSE returns therefore have averaged over 8% over the period, a more than adequate reward for the risks shareholders have had to bear. The best month for the JSE since 1994, compared to a year before, was in April 2006, when the annual return was a positive 54%, while the worst decline in annual returns was realised in February 2009, when the ALSI Index had lost 43%.

That the Index has been able to increase about 10 times since then is no accident – it is the result of excellent performances by the managers of the companies that make up the JSE, not only in the form of higher levels of earnings and dividends delivered to shareholders, but also in much improved returns on the capital provided by share and debt holders.

The progress of South African companies in increasing their efficiency and value is depicted graphically in the chart below. Until 1994, the year that SA became a full democracy, the average South African company was earning a real return on the cash invested by companies- the return in the form of real cash out compared to real cash in (cash flow return on operating assets, or CFROI) at or below 6%, which is the global average for non-financial firms. Thus South African companies were generally destroying shareholder value before 1994, especially when considering how much higher the real cost of capital would have been in those highly uncertain times. But since 1994, the median CFROI has sloped upwards and remained well above 6%.

Today’s median listed South African company is reporting a very healthy CFROI of 10%. And as can also be seen in the figure, the performance of the top and bottom quintiles of SA companies has also sloped upwards, indicating more value creation for the best firms and less value destruction for the worst. At present, some 20% of South African companies are generating economic returns on capital above 15%, which is world-class profitability.

(It is worth noting that if a company generates a 10% inflation-adjusted return on capital, it generates enough cash to grow its assets at 10% in real terms.)

How does SA compare to other countries?

We show in the chart below the inflation-adjusted economic returns on capital of listed non-financial companies in a number of different countries during the past decade (Matthews, Bryant and David Holland, “Global Industry CFROI Performance Handbook, Credit Suisse HOLT”, February 2013). In what may come as a surprise to many, the figure reveals that South African companies have been generating the highest median economic returns in the world, better than Australia’s and those of the US and the UK. This is an accomplishment to take pride in, one that demonstrates that listed South African companies are well managed and competitive.

Most important to recognize and appreciate is that SA’s democracy gave SA companies the opportunity to engage globally in the years after 1994, in ways that politics made impossible before. JSE listed companies have been able to realise the economies of scale and specialisation that access to global markets in good services and capital makes possible. SA shareholders have every reason to be grateful for SA democracy, which helped produce such unexpectedly good returns on capital.

The SA balance of payments – a conundrum inside a mystery

The SA economy is vulnerable to large swings in foreign portfolio flows into and out of our debt and equity markets. It should be appreciated that the funds are attracted in part because they can be withdrawn at short notice, in what have proven to be liquid and, to a degree, resilient markets.

Furthermore the SA economy, given a lack of domestic savings (the result of a bias towards consumption spending to which government policies of redistribution and transformation contribute) cannot hope to sustain even modest growth without significant inflows of foreign savings, at the rate of 5% of GDP.

The difference between low savings, at about 14% of GDP, and higher rates of capital expenditure, running at about 19% of GDP is equal to the deficit on the current account of the balance of payments. South Africans, to maintain their standard of living, must hope that, on balance, capital continues to flow towards South Africa – for which we have to give up an increasing net flow of interest and dividend payments abroad. As a result of capital attracted over the years these payments now account for over half of the current account deficit.

These shocks may have little to do with South African events and much more to do with global events, for example global financial crises or decisions of the US Fed that impact on markets and yields in a global capital market, of which SA and other emerging markets are an integrated component of. Another factor may be the exchange controls that still apply to domestic portfolios. That the share of these portfolios held offshore may not exceed specified limits – 25 or 30 per cent – may mean that relatively favourable offshore market moves (perhaps the result of rand weakness) may require the partial repatriation of SA portfolios held abroad.

It needs to be appreciated that for every foreign seller or buyer of a listed security (unlike a new issue), there will be an equal and opposite domestic investor, attracted (or repelled), by lower (higher) prices and higher (lower) yields led by these foreign flows. These variable prices and yields act as one of the absorbers of the shocks that result in more or less foreign capital flowing in or out of the rand.

The other important shock absorber is the variability of the exchange value of the rand. A weaker rand may well lead to thoughts of a rand recovery, encouraging capital inflows while a stronger rand may well lead to the opposite.

We show, in the figures below, the link between these foreign net bond and equity market portfolio flows over a rolling 30 day period and the 30 day percentage move in the rand/US dollar since 2005. Rand weakness is represented by a positive number. The correlation between these two series is a negative (-0.40) over the period 2013-2014. Since early 2013, the worst 30 day period saw net outflows R1.382bn and the most favourable, net inflows of R759m. The best 30 day period for the rand saw it gain 12.5% and the worst was a depreciation of 5.6%.

Clearly these capital flows play a statistically significant impact on the value of the rand, though as clearly there are other forces acting on the currency market over any 30 day period. Foreign capital flowed out heavily towards the end of 2013 and then again in January 2014, enough to cause significant rand weakness. These flows have sinced turned positive and helped the rand to recover.

Ideally, capital flows to and from SA would be more predictable and the rand less volatile, to the benefit of SA based business enterprises. It would also make inflation and the direction of short and long term interest rates much more predictable, further reducing the risk of running an SA-based business. But there seems little chance of this, given the continued dependence of the economy on foreign capital and the shocks, both positive and negative, domestic and foreign, that will continue to affect flows of capital and the terms on which capital is made available.

The Reserve Bank has published its latest Financial Stability Report (FSR) (March 2014). Among its understandable concerns is this dependence of the SA economy on flows of portfolio capital into and out of the equity and bond markets.

The FSR shows how these flows in and out of the rand and shows how these flows were closely linked to much larger flows out of emerging markets generally:

The report states that “non-resident investors in South Africa were net sellers of R69 billion worth of domestic bonds and equities between October 2013 and March 2014. Over this period, a large part of of equity sales was concentrated in the mining and media sectors. Since the beginning of 2014, equity outflows from the banking sector have accounted for the largest proportion of equity outflows…………

The report goes on to state rather “…It would appear, however, that not all sale proceeds from the sell-off were transferred abroad”

This statement that indicates that not all the flow into and out of the rand from abroad can be accounted for by the statisticians and the banks that supply the record of foreign trade and financial transactions. The balance of payments accounts, that should sum to zero theoretically, are in reality balanced by what is often a very large item, known as Unrecorded Transactions. This line item was particularly large in Q4 2013, of R30.6bn, compared to recorded capital flows of R5.3bn. We show some of the the key balance of payments statistics below and the importance of unrecorded transactions in the scheme of things.

The reality is that the the SA balance of payments is somewhat mysterious; and so conclusions about the role of capital flows in the economy must be treated with some caution. The capital flows themselves may be under- or overestimated, as may exports or imports or even interest and dividend payments.

What however is fully known and recorded is what happens to the rand and security prices. Presumably the exchange rate and security prices act to equalise the supply and demand for the rand and securities denominated in rands on a continuous basis.

The important conclusion to draw is to let the markets act as the shock absorber, and for the monetary policy authorities to set their interest rates with the state of the domestic economy in mind. Monetary policy should aim at minimising the gap between actual and potential output. Interest rate stability and predictability is within the remit of monetary policy and should be an aim of policy. The influence of unpredictable exchange rates, led by unpredictable capital flows, on the rand and on inflation, are best ignored.

The improved return on capital invested by SA business

By Brian Kantor and David Holland

Why it is good economic news even though the new darling of the left, Thomas Piketty, thinks that high returns on capital raise income inequalities and thus should not be encouraged.

A success story – improved returns on capital realised by JSE listed companies

If a company can generate a return on capital that beats the opportunity cost of the capital it employs, it will create shareholder value. The market will reward the successful company with a value that exceeds the cash invested in the company.

The inflation-adjusted cash flow return on operating assets, CFROI®, for listed South African firms has improved consistently and impressively since the 1990s. Using CFROI® we have been able to demonstrate that political freedom has proved fruitful for SA businesses and their shareholders.

The economic return on capital has improved spectacularly over time, with today’s median firm reporting a very healthy CFROI of 10%. Until 1994, the average South African company was sporting a CFROI at or below the global average of 6%. South African companies were generally destroying shareholder value before 1994, especially when considering how much higher the real cost of capital would have been in those highly uncertain times.

Since 1994, the median CFROI has sloped upwards and remained above 6%. The new South Africa has been a value-creating South Africa! Note that at the peak of the commodity super cycle in 2007-8, the median CFROI was a stunning 12%. The top and bottom quintiles have also sloped upwards, indicating greater value creation for the best firms and less value destruction for the worst firms. Presently, 20% of South African firms are generating economic returns on capital above 15%, which is world-class profitability.

The benefits of efficient business and excellent returns on capital can be widely shared in inclusive share ownership, through pension and retirement plans as well as perhaps via a sovereign shareholding fund that can be built up to fund genuine poverty relief and opportunities for the poor. Broad-based empowerment in the form of employee- and community-based share options can be used to turn outsiders into insiders.

Such attempts to broaden the ownership of productive capital perhaps accord well with the recently revived critics of capitalism, following Piketty, who have found new reasons to question the advantages to society of high returns on capital. It is argued that such high returns on capital may well increase inequalities of income because they go mainly to the wealthy. Even should such high returns raise the rate at which national income is increasing, it makes such outcomes a mixed blessing, especially for those who have come to regard income equality as an important goal of economic policy.

Some facts about the distribution of SA incomes, taxes and government expenditure.

Let us give a South African nuance to this debate. Any discussion of the causes and consequences of economic growth and the distribution of benefits always has a distinctly racial bias in that white South Africans, on average, enjoy significantly higher incomes than black South Africans.

The distribution of wealth in South Africa is even more unevenly distributed in favour of white South Africans, given the much higher past incomes and the savings realised from them. The middle and higher income classes, those who are likely to become important sources of savings and contributors to pension and other funds, are increasingly made up of black South Africans. The times are changing and dramatically so, Loane Sharp, labour market analyst writing for Adcorp, indicates:

“Changes in the labour market after the end of apartheid have worked spectacularly well for blacks. Since 1995, on a like-for-like basis adjusting for skills, qualifications and work experience, blacks’ wages have been rising at 15% per annum whereas whites’ wages have been rising at just 4% per annum. Average wages for blacks and whites should converge as early as 2021 though, admittedly, average wages for entire race groups belie vast variations between individuals. The number of high-earning blacks – that is, those earning more than the average white – has increased from 180,000 in 2000 to 1.5 million today, with more than 40% of these employed in the public service, which has been used to great advantage, much like the predecessor apartheid state, to promote the welfare of a particular racial group.” (Source: Adcorp Employment Survey.)

According to the UCT Unilever Institute, the black middle class went from 1.7 million in 2004 to 4.2 million in 2012 to 5.4 million in 2014. The white middle class has been roughly stagnant: 2.8 million in 2004 to 3.0 million in 2014 (Source: UCT Unilever Institute). The number of high-earning blacks (i.e. those earning more than the average white) went from 120,000 in 2001 to 1.9 million in 2014 – 77% of these were in the private sector (Source: Adcorp).

The income differences within the different racial groups have probably widened with the rapid growth in the black middle class and the transformation of the public service that now provides much less protection for low-skilled whites. Most important, the unemployment rates indicate that a regrettably low percentage of the potential black labour force is not working in the formal sector and therefore not earning or reporting any income.

The income statistics and the GINI coefficient that measures income inequalities in SA do not indicate the important role the SA government plays in ameliorating poverty and therefore supporting consumption expenditure. The distribution of expenditure, including the benefits of expenditure by government agencies, especially if divided by racial categories, will look very different to the distribution of income or wealth. Of all government expenditure, equivalent to 33% of GDP, some 60% is classified as social services, that is spending by government on health, education and protection services. Much of these budgets are allocated to the improved employment benefits of the black middle class who work for government, supplying so-called social services. But measuring the quality of delivery is much more difficult than measuring how much is spent on them.

Yet of this expenditure on welfare, spending that constitutes 60% of all government expenditure, some 15% or nearly 5% of GDP, consists of cash supplied on a means tested basis to the identified poor. That is cash paid monthly as old age pensions, child support grants or disability grants. These payments have been growing strongly over the years, keeping up fully with inflation, and have provided an important form of poverty relief.

The taxpayers who have paid for this relief (and other government expenditure) are to an important degree income tax payers. Of all government revenues, which amount to about 30% of GDP, some 55% come from taxes on income and profits of businesses. Registered companies are budgeted to contribute nearly 35% of these income and profit taxes, or nearly 20% of all government revenue, in this financial year 2014-15. Of the personal income taxpayers, the highest income earners, those expected to earn over R750,000, will pay over 40% of all the income tax collected, while earning about 24% of all personal incomes – which include all reported income, interest, dividends and rents generated from assets.

These relatively high income earners constitute only 4.6% of all the 15.254 million potential income tax payers on the books of the SA Revenue Service (SARS). Of these registered for income tax purposes, some 8.835 million will fall below the income tax threshold of R70,000 income per annum and so will not contribute income tax. These low income earners will generate only 11.5% of all expected reported incomes in fiscal year 2014/15. (Source: Budget Review 2014, National Treasury, Republic of South Africa, Table 4.2).

These statistics from SARS confirm how unevenly distributed income is in South Africa and also how much redistribution of income is taking place via income taxes as well as via the distribution of government expenditure, which is biased in favour of the poor.

Higher income South Africans, it should be recognised, will be consuming and paying for almost exclusively private education, health care and will also employ privately supplied security services. The relationship between taxes paid and benefits received is not at all as balanced as it may be in the developed world where the biases in spending are often in favour of the middle class, who make up a large proportion of the electorate. To stay competitive in the global market for skills, this relatively unfavourable balance of taxes paid for benefits received by the high income earners and income tax payers has to be made up in the form of higher pre-tax salaries – purchasing power adjusted – compared to employment benefits and government services available for scarce skills in the developed world.

The scope for raising income or wealth tax rates would seem very limited – given the mobility of skilled South Africans and their capital. Higher tax rates, at some point, would inevitably mean lower tax revenues. The government appears well aware of this trade off, given that the Budget plan for the next three years is to maintain hitherto very stable ratios to GDP of government expenditure (33%) and government revenues (30%). Clearly the limits to government expenditure and redistribution of incomes will be set by the rate of economic growth. Redistribution with growth, to which efficient use of capital will play an important part, would seem the only realistic option.

Economic reality means tradeoffs, not least for economic policy

That growth in SA historically has occurred unfairly, with unusual degrees of income and wealth differences, is a fact of economic life that even SA governments, whose best intention is to reduce income and wealth inequalities, would have to take account of. Policies designed to achieve greater equality of economic outcomes may restrict growth rates and thus growth in government revenues that support redistribution of income and wealth. These are developments that would make achieving a greater degree of equality of economic outcomes and (what is not the same thing at all) realising less absolute poverty, that much harder to achieve.

South Africans have only to look north to Zimbabwe to recognise how the aggressive redistribution of wealth (without compensation) can destroy wealth creation and economic growth. While perhaps achieving greater equality it has also resulted in significantly greater poverty.

The consequences of income redistribution and transformation in SA: more consumption spending and lower savings.

The transformation of the income levels and prospects of the black middle class in SA as well as the income and welfare support provided for poor South Africans has had the effect of raising consumption spending as a share of GDP and reducing the gross savings rate. Gross savings, of which more than 100% are now made by the corporate sector from cash retained and invested by them, have fallen from around 25% of GDP in the early 1980s to current levels of about 14%. Fortunately the rate of capital formation, encouraged by high returns on capital has held up much better to the advantage of economic growth and tax revenues.

But the difference between domestic capital formation and savings has to be made up by infusions of foreign capital. By definition the difference between national gross savings and capital formation is the current account deficit on the balance of payments (see below).

South Africans have had to rely on foreign capital to an important degree, in order to maintain their consumption expenditure, much influenced as it has been by the transformation of the economy, in the form of the rise of the new middle class and the redistribution of income and government expenditure towards the poor. Foreign investors, essentially attracted by high returns, have become very important shareholders in JSE-listed corporations and rand-denominated government debt. Some 40% of SA government debt denominated in rands is now held by foreign investors. South Africans have been significant net sellers of SA equity and debt and foreigners net buyers over recent years.

Raising consumption expenditure rates has been no free lunch for South African wealth owners. They have had to gradually give up a share of their wealth and income from capital invested in JSE -listed companies, mostly held in the form of pension and retirement funds managed for them, to foreign share and debt holders. Of the current account deficit, which is running at about 6% of GDP, an increasing proportion, now equivalent to about half or 3% of GDP, is accounted for by net payments of interest and dividends abroad.

High returns on capital have made higher levels of real expenditure by lower income South Africans and previously disadvantaged black South Africans not only possible, but relatively painless for the wealthy share and debt holders who have gained directly from a rising share and debt market. The tax outcomes, and strongly rising government revenues, have not destroyed this growth process.

The implications for South Africa seem clear enough: to encourage economic growth so as to be able to redistribute more income and wealth to the poor. Any bias in favour of redistribution without growth would be destructive of wealth and incomes. Local and foreign investors, upon whom we depend to maintain our current levels of income and expenditure, don’t like uncertainty and much prefer transparency in government and corporate policy.

If global risk appetite is diminished, then shareholders in all countries will suffer. But those with the least uncertainty when it comes to corporate governance, government policy, inflation, and tax policy will be perceived as safe and suffer less. There are immense benefits to aligning policy with uncertainty reduction. A lower real cost of capital will increase market values, and make marginal investments more attractive. This fuels growth and reinvestment, which create more jobs and tax revenue. Typically, a 1% change in the cost of capital or required returns for investors means a 20% change in equity valuation! This is the old fashioned goal: less risk, more growth should be the aim of economic policy, rather than the chimera of enough income equality.

Pat on the back but much work needs to be done

South African companies should continue to focus on generating world beating returns on capital while government focuses on minimising uncertainty for them. In particular the government should remove the constraints on employment growth in South Africa and encourage labour intensive entrepreneurs to compete with the labour-shy formal business. More competitive labour markets (and the lower labour costs that would come with it) might allow smaller businesses, with less easy access to capital markets, to compete more effectively with formal business, if only they were allowed to do so.

Most important is that South Africans should recognise what should be obvious to all but the ideologically blind. When it comes to delivery, SA business has proved successful and our society should be building on this success. Business to business relationships in SA – subject to competitive forces – work well. By contrast, positive government to business relationships have been profoundly compromised and government delivery of services, despite an abundance of resources provided mostly by taxpayers, has been gravely inadequate.

If we can beat the world in managing businesses for return on capital, we can complete the job in building a South Africa where all prosper. South Africa is its own worst enemy by not according successful business enterprise the respect it deserves from policy makers.

The successes of business can be widely shared beyond current shareholders in the form of higher incomes and in revenues for the state, as well as increased employment. Growth with distribution is a worthy goal for policy and high returns on capital can contribute to this.

David Holland is Senior Adviser, HOLT and adviser to Credit Suisse. The views expressed are his own and not necessarily those of HOLT or Credit Suisse

Easter effects and the economy: A moveable feast

That moveable feast, Easter, is always a complicating factor for economists relying on monthly updates, coming as it often does at different times in either March or April.

Easter is late this year, and this can cause problems for economists, forecasters and policymakers. The President of the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi, informed an interrogator accordingly at his most recent press conference last week of Easter effects – when discussing the of the timing of ECB quantitative easing, an all important issue for the market place.

Question: Can you describe a little bit more what kind of information you are looking for on whether or not these latest inflation figures are changing your medium-term outlook? If you’re not going to act when its 0.5%, what does it take to get you to act on some of these things? And my second question is: you clearly changed the rhetoric a little bit in terms of your willingness to act swiftly – being resolute – but do your rhetoric and your easing bias lose credibility each passing month that you do nothing in the face of these very low inflation rates?

Draghi: On the first point: there are a couple of factors that somehow clouded the analysis of whether this latest inflation data would actually be a material change in our medium-term outlook or not. One has to do with the volatility of services prices and the fact that Easter time this year comes remarkably later than last year. The explanation is that, around Easter time, services expenditure usually goes up – demand for services goes up – especially travel, and this affected last year’s prices and it’s going to affect this year’s prices. So you have a base effect which produced much lower inflation data in March and may well produce higher inflation data next month.

Easter holidays always have an impact on spending in South Africa and flows through shops and show rooms. With Easter coming later this year, economic statistics for March 2014, especially when compared to March last year need to be treated with particular caution. Perhaps the best approach to reading the state of the economy around Easter time would be to take an average of March and April activity.

Our Hard Number Index (HNI) of the state of the SA economy at March month end combines these two very up to date releases – vehicle sales and the notes issued by the Reserve Bank (adjusted for CPI). Both are hard numbers not compromised in any way by the vagaries of sample surveys.

The HNI, as the chart below shows, captures the turning points in the Reserve Bank Coinciding Business Cycle Indicator. This indicator has only been updated to December 2013, making it not very useful as a measure of the current state of the economy. Two months can be a long time in economics as well as politics. The HNI for March is barely changed from the February reading, indicating that the economy has neither picked up nor lost momentum. It remains as it was on course for slower growth.

The HNI turned lower in the third quarter of 2013 while the Reserve Bank Indicator for December was still pointing higher. Numbers above 100 for either Index indicate that the economy is growing, but the HNI suggests that the forward momentum of the economy has slowed down. If present trends continue, the growth rate of the economy will slow down further in the months ahead.

As we also show below, the HNI does a good job approximating the growth trends in real Household Consumption Spending and Gross Domestic Spending (GDE). These add spending by the government sector and spending on capital goods and inventories to the all important household spending category, which accounts for over 60% of all spending. Both growth rates appear to be tracking lower in line with the HNI.

The rand however, as the past weeks have demonstrated, will not have to wait for smaller trade and current account deficits on the balance of payments – it will respond to movements of capital in and out of emerging markets. The best hope for the SA economy over the next two years will be a revival in emerging bond and equity markets that leads to a stronger rand and less inflation. Less inflation, accompanied by (at worst) stable short term interest rates and accompanied by lower rates further along the yield curve, could revive household spending, an essential ingredient if the economy is to grow faster in a sustained way.

A reprise of a rand recovery, accompanied by lower interest rates and less inflation, which led to the boom of 2003-2008, may seem as unlikely now as it did then. Such a scenario may be improbable, but it is not impossible. We must hope for such a fertile egg from the Easter Bunny.

National income accounts: Challenges – and some helpful responses

The SA national income accounts – updated to 2013 – indicate the challenges facing the economy and helpful responses being made by some of the important economic actors.

The better, if not exactly comforting, news from the SA Reserve Bank’s March 2014 Quarterly Bulletin, about the economy in 2013, is that export revenues (in current rands) picked up and are now growing a little faster than imports, having lagged well behind imports in recent years.

This smaller difference between imports and exports in Q4 2013 added significantly to GDP, which was 3.8% larger in Q4 than a year ago.

Dragging down expenditure and GDP growth in Q4 2013 was an extraordinary run down in inventories that were estimated to have declined by as much as R22.3bn in constant prices. The improved trade balance added 7.8% to Q4 growth, while the decline in inventories reduced Q4 growth by 5.2%.

The decreased level of inventories, with high import content, would have helped improve the balance of foreign trade. But the reduced demand for goods held on the shelves and in the warehouses may well reflect less confidence by the business sector in the growth outlook. Such a lack of confidence would also reveal itself in an increase in the dividends paid out to shareholders of SA companies, including to the increased proportion of foreign owners on the share registers of SA companies. Dividends paid to foreign shareholders went up sharply in 2013 while dividends received by SA shareholders in offshore companies declined as sharply, adding to the current account deficit.

The current account deficit, seasonally adjusted, nevertheless declined sharply from an annual rate of R215.8bn in Q3 2013 to R178.9bn in Q4, while the trade deficit declined from an annual rate of R114bn in Q3 to R62.6bn in Q4. The estimated actual current account deficit in Q4 was R36bn, down from R61bn in Q3, 2013.

Slow growth may well mean a surplus on trade and a smaller current account deficit and thus less dependence on foreign capital. Such trends should not be regarded as good economic news, although perhaps it is welcome to foreign investors concerned about the dependence of the economy on foreign capital, given that foreign capital has become more risk averse in recent months.

Between 1995 and 2003, when the economy grew slowly, the current account was balanced and the economy accordingly attracted very little foreign capital. The same pattern held more recently after the economy slowed down in 2009. The economy grew much faster between 2003 and 2008 because it could attract foreign capital and the current account deficit could widen. Surely faster growth made possible by foreign capital is to be preferred to slow growth arising out of fear that foreign capital may be withdrawn or become more expensive.

There is a virtuous economic circle for the SA economy. Demonstrate faster growth, promise higher returns to investors, and capital from both domestic and foreign sources will be made readily available to any business enterprise. The faster the rate of growth, the better the case businesses have to add to the productive stock of real capital, plant and equipment, to hire more workers and managers and with company investments in training, to help the work force to become more skilled and efficient and so capable of earning more. Growth leads and capital follows.

The major challenge faced by the SA economy is that the growth rates have slowed down recently, mostly for reasons of our own making. SA has a structural growth problem, not a structural balance of payments problem. Grow faster and the balance of payments will sort itself out.

But the growth issues facing the economy have been exacerbated because foreign capital has become more expensive since May 2013 for reasons largely beyond SA’s influence. This has led to a weaker exchange rate and upward pressure on prices further depressing already slow growth in real consumption spending. These price trends in turn raise the danger that interest rates will be set higher, again further depressing domestic spending and reducing prospective growth rates and the business case for adding to capacity. These expectations of weaker growth discourage capital inflows and may lead to a still weaker rand, which is anything but a virtuous economic circle.

The scope for an economic revival in SA, led by households, is limited, given the recessionary state of the formal labour market and so the income constrained limits to the growth in household credit. It would seem realistic to predict that faster growth in SA over the next few years could only be led by a surge in exports. A stronger global economy and higher prices for the metals and minerals we produce and export is a necessary condition for an export led recovery. Continuous production by the mines and factories is also necessary for greater export revenues and volumes. These were not possible in 2012 and 2013, given the pervasive strikes that reduced output from the mines and factories.

Hopefully the business sector could “come to the party” as the Minister of Finance invited business to do in his recent Budget speech. In this regard the good news suggested by the updated National Income Accounts is that the business sector (represented by the National Income Accounts for non-financial corporations, including the publically owned corporations, Eskom and Transnet) have indeed dressed up their performance. SA corporations increased their capital expenditures in 2013 and proved willing to fund their larger capital budgets by raising additional debt finance on a significant scale, despite deteriorating cash flows, represented in the figure below by Gross Corporate Savings.

But the same statistics indicate one of the structural weaknesses of the SA economy – a low domestic savings rate compared to a higher rate of capital formation. Hence a funding gap that can only be overcome by use of foreign savings. (See the figure below that indicates gross savings and capital formation rates in SA).

The figure also indicates that almost all the savings made in SA are made by the corporate sector in the form of retained cash. The government and household sector contribute little to the savings pool.

That the rate of capital formation is greater than the savings rate is surely a positive indicator for the economy. With economic growth the primary objective of economic policy, a slower pace of capital formation in SA would surely not be recommended. Such advice would be equivalent to advocating a structurally smaller current account deficit, since the difference between capital formation and gross savings is by definition the current account deficit and also the net foreign capital flows. Such advice is often loosely given without proper regard for its implications for economic growth.

Attempts to encourage a higher rate of domestic savings might make good economic sense. Significantly increased savings are however unlikely to be forthcoming from SA households. Achieving a higher gross savings rate would for all practical purposes require a willingness to tax corporate earnings at a lower effective rate so that they could save and invest more.

Lower taxes on corporate income would have to be accompanied by higher taxes on personal incomes and household spending. This is a change in the tax structure that does not appear politically possible, given also a presumed unchanged government propensity to spend. In the absence of any higher propensity to save, the path forward for the SA economy remains as it has been. Grow faster to attract savings from global capital markets and do what it takes to encourage business to grow faster so that they can attract more capital from abroad.

Hard Number Index: The economy is growing – but the pace of growth has slowed

Our Hard Number Index of economic activity (HNI) was little changed in February 2014. As the chart below shows, the SA economy as indicated by the HNI is growing (numbers above 100 based on January 2010, indicate growth) but the pace of growth is slowing down slowed and that its forward momentum has stabilized at the slower pace first registered in January 2014 .

The HNI is compared to the Reserve Bank Coinciding Business Cycle Indicator that is based upon a larger set of data derived from sample surveys. As the chart shows, the Reserve Bank Indicator is only updated to November 2013. It also indicates a growing economy with the pace of growth picking up in November 2013.

The HNI is derived from two equally weighted and very up to date releases for SA unit vehicle sales and the notes issued by the Reserve Bank for February 2014. Both statistics reflect actual sales in February or real notes in circulation at February month end, making them hard numbers rather than estimates based on small sample surveys.

In February the unit vehicle sales on a seasonally adjusted basis declined from January levels while the note issue, adjusted for CPI, picked up some momentum, largely cancelling each other out,in the calculation of the HNI. While declining on a seasonally adjusted basis, unit vehicle sales, having peaked in early 2013, are still maintaining a satisfactory pace.

If the current trend in sales is maintained, the industry should be selling new vehicles at an annualised rate of 620 000 units in February 2015, that is about 6% down on the sales in February 2013, about 3% off current sales volumes and way ahead of the post recession sales volumes of early 2009. No doubt the industry would be well pleased should domestic vehicle sales decline by only 3% over the next year.

Interest rates and the availability of credit from the banks will influence these vehicle sales outcomes. The latest news on interest rates and the exchange value of the rand is rather encouraging in this regard. A recovery in the rand has helped reduce interest rates across the yield curve. A week ago, short term rates were expected to rise by over 2 percentage points over the next 12 months. Now they are expected to rise by only 1.66 percentage points over the same period.

Our view is that interest rates will not increase by more than 50bps over the next 12 months and even this increase is not at all certain. Rates may well remain on hold. The interest rate outcomes and the inflation outlook will depend mostly on what happens to the rand over the next few months. If the rand holds at current rates of exchange, the inflation outlook will improve and the case for raising rates at all will fall away. The expected state of the economy is for slower growth, as revealed by the business cycle and, in an up to date way, by the HNI, while it is also confirmed by credit growth and by growth in household spending: these are trending down rather than up. This strongly suggests that the interest rate cycle itself should be trending down rather than up. It would have done so but for the weak rand.

Joseph Stiglitz, a celebrated American economist, in his speech to the Discovery Investment Conference on Wednesday, 5 March, agreed with our long expressed view on the inadvisability of blindly targeting inflation irrespective of the state of the economy. We would add a further reason for not raising rates, namely the absence of any predictable influence of interest rates over the direction of the rand and therefore of inflation. As we have argued, using the evidence from the market, higher interest rates cannot be relied upon at all to add strength to the rand.

The value of the rand is determined by global forces well beyond the influence of SA short term interest rates. Yet by further reducing domestic demand and so the growth outlook and the case for investing in SA businesses, higher interest rates may well frighten away foreign capital and on balance weaken the rand.

Raising interest rates in SA is justified if domestic spending, fueled by domestic credit, is growing rapidly, thus helping to drive up the prices of goods and services. It is not at all justified if prices are rising because of reduced supplies of goods and services.

An exchange rate shock of the kind that has driven the rand weaker over the past six months, is as much a supply side shock as a drought would have reduced food supplies, so causing prices to rise. It makes no more sense to raise interest rates when a drought forces up food and other prices than when conditions in global capital markets drive down the value of the rand and similarly tends to push up prices.

Resource companies: The earnings tide has turned

The JSE All Share (ALSI) Index earnings per share are growing again. As the chart below shows, nominal earnings are now back at the record levels of 2012, while real earnings and earnings valued in US dollars (at current exchange rates), while increasing,still have some way to go to get back to their peak levels of 2007-08.

The level of JSE ALSI earnings has been assisted by a very strong recovery in the earnings reported by JSE listed Resource companies for the period ending 31 December 2013, off a low base. We show the cycle of JSE Resource Index earnings per share below. The annual growth in these resource earnings is highly variable.

Trailing earnings had declined by as much as 40% on a year before by mid 2013, before their recent recovery. They had previously recorded over 80% growth in their recovery from the global financial crisis. Reported JSE Resource earnings are now increasing and in positive growth territory compared to a year before. These growth rates are gathering momentum of their very low base, helped by the still weaker rand and (hopefully) less disruption of mining output by strike action.

It seems clear that the share market typically anticipates the earnings cycle to some degree. Share prices hold up better than earnings when earnings are falling and when earnings pick up again share prices lag behind. In other words, the earnings are expected to follow a consistent cycle of periods of above and below normal growth rates. They are expected to recover to something like normal when earnings are most depressed and the earnings cycle is at its trough and to fall away back to normal when growth rates have peaked.

A consistent pattern of prices anticipating earnings shows up in the price to earnings multiple attached to resource earnings. The multiple tends to rise in the downswings of the earnings cycle and in to decline in the upswings. We show below the PE ratio for the Resource Index. The PE multiple was at a low point in early 2009 after the post crisis peak in the earnings cycle. Thereafter the PE multiple rose rapidly, even as earnings continued to decline to a negative growth rate of minus 40% p.a. in mid 2010. Then, after the reported earnings had again assumed a strong upward trajectory (reaching a peak of 80% p.a. growth by mid 2011), the PE multiple fell away sharply to a trough in mid 2012. Then the PE multiple recovered strongly as Resource earnings again fell away, having fallen by over 40% by mid 2013. This PE multiple, after rising in 2013 as earnings fell away, has now fallen in early 2014, with the recent uptick in reported earnings.

The crisp question then for investors looking for good returns from Resource stocks is whether or not the growth in resource earnings will be fast enough to overcome a declining PE multiple attached to these reported earnings? As we show below, the severe decline in the PE multiple from its peak in early 2010 was accompanied by positive returns from the Resource sector for a further 12 months – the growth in earnings over this period compensated for the lower value attached by the share market to these reported earnings. Something like this may well happen again: as the PE multiple recedes back to something like normal, the improved earnings may help improve absolute share prices.

The key issue then is the outlook for resource earnings themselves over the next 12 months. Based on history Resource earnings do have a tendency to normalise as the share market appears to expect it to do. We provide below a measure of normalised or cyclically adjusted Resource Index earnings.

This is calculated using time series forecasts based on the previous ten years of monthly data that is rolled forward every month. Our cyclically adjusted earnings are a time series best fit. We suggest that this measure provides as good an approximation of trend or normalised earnings expected by investors as can be derived by statistics. Reported and normalised Resource Index earnings are represented in the figure below over the long run going back to 1980, using 10 years of data going back to 1970 to generate the first estimate for January 1980 and then rolling the forecast forward for each month thereafter by dropping a month and adding one. We also show the results of this exercise close up for the period 2008 and 2014.

Reported Resource Index earnings are currently well below the normalised measure. If earnings do in fact trend back to these normalised levels they still have a great deal of catch up to do. That is, from R2000 of reported earnings per Index share to R2800, a potential increase of 40%.

Such an increase would, as we have shown, not be out of line with past performance and would provide scope for good returns even if the PE multiple falls away. This growth in earnings however is by no means predetermined. It will be dependent on some known unknowns, such as the value of the rand over the next 12 months as well the ability of the mine managers to sustain or even increase output and to control costs.

 

The rand / US dollar exchange rate, were it to strengthen, would not necessarily be a threat to Resource valuations. If the rand strengthens it may reflect a growing appetite by global investors to take on emerging market and commodity market risk. They would do so if the outlook for global economic growth improves and therefore becomes more promising for emerging market exporters and the prices they are expected to realise for their metals and minerals.

A stronger rand may well be offset on the revenue line of mining companies by stronger commodity markets and higher US dollar prices.

The rand may also benefit from improved SA specifics, in particular a resolution of the strike threats and action on the mines that so damage exports from SA, without the mines having to accede to costly wage increases. It is not the rand hedge qualities of the SA mines that will determine their long term value to shareholders. It will be their ability to generate a flow of earnings, or better still a flow of US dollar earnings, that will be decisive in the long run. In other words, the mine managers through good fortune (strong growth in China) and excellent cost management may prove that they are able to send the underlying long term trend in normalised earnings in a strongly upward direction.

The gambling industry: No ordinary industry

The casino industry, and the established gambling industry in general, face threats from new sources.

Gambling is no ordinary industry. Nowhere can anyone with simply the will and the capital to do so offer an open opportunity to the public to play games of chance for money.

To enter the gambling business, investors typically have to cross very high barriers to entry set by regulation. They will need to acquire a special licence and, much harder perhaps, a prescribed suitable venue to play the games. They will also have to satisfy strict instructions as to what particular games of chance and prizes they can offer.

The reason why societies intervene in the gambling market has much to do with a religious, essentially paternalistic, objection to gambling, or rather perhaps a visceral objection to the sometimes large gambling losses that may be suffered by particular gamblers they know or have heard about. The best practical argument for tolerating and legalising gambling services is that what inevitably follows prohibition or the imposition of onerous taxes: illegal gambling, which is even worse for the community.

This argument applies also to how society can best manage all of what are broadly regarded as the popular “vices”. Driving consumption underground is not good public policy.

Furthermore, if enthusiastic gamblers are prevented from gambling near where they live they will travel to jurisdictions near and far to do so. The opportunity to tax the activity for useful local purposes – perhaps to reduce the burden of other taxes or to provide employment at home rather than elsewhere – may well win the political arguments for and against licensing gambling.

The opportunity to tax gambling activity as an alternative to imposing other taxes, may well win the political arguments for and against licensing gambling. The prospect of employment at nearby casinos or race tracks, rather than far away, will be an additional argument for local or provincial authorities to license gambling venues.

The history of casinos in SA

The history of the large entertainment casinos in SA with their banks of slot machines and a variety of table games that attract many players, provides a good case study of the practical and political forces at work when dispensations for gambling are imposed or relieved. Casinos were illegal in SA before the so called “homelands” were allowed to license them. The customers would travel from SA to gamble and for other pleasures or vices not legally available closer to home. The homeland authorities would tax these activities and relieve the SA taxpayer of some of their burdens. In SA, consequently, there had also grown up a large, illegal, unregulated and untaxed, local casino industry.

With the re-unification of a democratic SA and the demise of the homeland authorities, it was sensibly decided to legitimise the casino industry in SA, to place it under the authority of the respective provinces and most important, to strictly limit the number of casino licenses nationally and by the province. Only up to forty casino licences in all could be issued and provinces were able to license their operation within the urban areas close to their potential customers. The distant, previously homeland casinos, while they retained their licenses, lost their competitiveness. Why travel further than to a convenient casino close to home?

The success of these newly established SA urban casinos in attracting custom soon became apparent. Their success in attracting a larger share of the household budgets for gambling became immediately and painfully obvious to the horse racing clubs and their dependents on the tracks and farms. Horse racing had benefitted from something close to a legal gambling monopoly in SA. The revenues from gambling on horses, shared with the private bookmakers and with the provinces as taxes, had helped support a thriving, labour intensive, industry. Horses are not easily groomed by robots. Casinos too provide employment and income earning opportunities for local business to supply their needs.

But the gains of the owners, workers, suppliers and the players at the new SA casinos, at the expense, in part, of the racing clubs and their extended network, help illustrate an important point.

The different gambling offers compete with each other for a fairly predictable share of domestic household disposable incomes, in SA equivalent to between one and one and a half per cent of disposable income on average, though the share does vary by province and by city. The demand for gambling services can also be shown to depend in part on the disposable incomes of households and also on the traveling time taken to access gambling venues. Both the poor and the rich tend to spend a lower than average proportion of their incomes on gambling than the middle income earners.

The role played by the archetypal foreign travelling high roller in the typical casino, outside of the special cases of Las Vegas and more lately Macau (casinos are still illegal in mainland China), has been shown to be minimally important to the large urban casino in South Africa and elsewhere. The SA casino business caters to a local customer base. Online gambling opportunities may be about to change all this – if allowed to do so.

But while the casinos compete with each other and with the tote, the lottery and the private bookmakers, the limits to entry have proved valuable to the licensed casino operators.

For these reasons, a partial casino monopoly in one urban area can prove so valuable – and something the operators are prepared to pay for (in cash or kind).

A turn around the Cape

On this basis the Western Cape Government in the late 1990s was persuaded to grant an exclusive 10 year right to operate only one casino within the Cape Town metropolitan region (as well as on the basis of a more decentralised economic development that would come with allocating a limited number of new licenses outside of the city).

The exclusive license was then determined by way of a competition, a beauty contest between different potential operators who were asked to compete for the licence by offering a variety of additional benefits to the province as well as the new casino itself in exchange for this exclusivity. Sun International and its partners won a closely contested bidding process with an offer of a themed casino in Goodwood plus other benefits to the province of a major financial and organisational contribution to help found the Cape Town International Convention Centre.

This exclusivity agreement has run its course and the province could exercise a further opportunity to extend the exclusivity agreement for upfront benefits in cash and kind in the broad public interest. Sun International, with a well established and well preserved casino complex in operation, would be in an especially strong position to compete financially for a new exclusive license and to offer significant benefits to the province and its citizens for a renewed exclusivity agreement.

Unlike its potential competitors it would largely save the cost of building a new casino. Yet judging by recent public commentary or rather the absence of it, the province seems inclined to forgo these potential benefits and seems inclined to allow the transfer of one of the rural casino licenses to the city.

The people of the province, as far as I am aware, have not been widely consulted on or informed about such a choice – of two casinos or one (with all the upfront payments in cash and kind that might be offered for continued exclusivity). It is a choice deserving of very serious consideration by the citizens of the Province and its elected representatives.

The upshot of any decision to permit two casinos would be likely to divide the market roughly between the two operators as well as to reduce the market for casino-like services in one of the rural areas, with the indirect knock-on effects on local employees and suppliers the loss of casino business would bring. Unless the total casino market in the Western Cape would grow significantly in response to an additional casino offering in Cape Town (an unlikely outcome) there would not be meaningfully more tax revenues for the province to collect nor any additional employment or ongoing economic activity. The rural area losing its casino would suffer obvious economic losses. The established Cape Town operator might well offer, in its bid for renewed exclusivity, additional benefits to the city or province in exchange for an extension of exclusivity.

Any additional hotel or entertainment facilities that might accompany any additional casino cannot be regarded as among the additional benefits provided by a new urban casino in Cape Town. There is no shortage of hotels, restaurants or entertainment amenities in Cape Town. Such additional entertainment facilities would very likely displace activity in restaurants and entertainment venues generally.

New threats

There is however a more serious threat to legitimate gambling interests in SA. It comes in the form of still more competition for the gambling rand from the proliferation of limited payout slot machines and electronic bingo terminals (EBTs) that are slot machines in practice. The latter offer an additional competitive advantage to the gambler in that they can promise effectively unlimited pay outs, unlike the limited payout slot machines previously licensed. Limiting pay outs restricts the competition of conventional casino-based slot machines for gambling revenue with casinos, the tote and the National Lottery. Unlimited, or less limited payouts, have an attraction to many casino or horse racing gamblers whose objective is the big win, even when the odds of doing so are very long shots.

The slot machines, masquerading as bingo machines, overcome this disadvantage of limited pay outs and may well become increasingly ubiquitous and competitive against the established providers.

A still bigger threat to established gambling enterprises is surely the online gambling opportunities that modern technology makes available. The cost of providing a gambling opportunity on the internet or participating in one, from home anywhere in the world, is close to zero. The offering therefore is infinitely scalable. By comparison running a casino or a racing club is a very costly enterprise because they employ people and require a physical structure and presence.

Lower costs of production of any good or service usually means lower prices as firms compete for a larger market share with better terms – and in the case of gambling this might well mean better terms or bigger potential prizes for the serious gambler.

This provides online gambling with a great competitive advantage over conventional gambling providers. The online sites that can attract many customers from all over the world, at very low cost, are likely to offer the better odds or the most commanding big payouts – especially if internet gambling pays very little tax!

The value of any casino or racing club is therefore under threat of the potential proliferation of EBTs and legal access to internet gambling. The threat from new technology and the great uncertainty about what the gambling landscape in SA will look like over the foreseeable future is currently influencing the value attached to Casinos and their licenses in SA. Therefore the case for establishing an additional casino in Cape Town, or the price the established casino might pay to keep it out, must now be subject to unusual uncertainty.

It is in the interests of the wider community that as much certainty as possible about the gambling landscape be created. The objective should be to maximise as far as possible the domestic SA public interest in the gambling industry for taxpayers, employers or employees and investors in addition to those of gamblers themselves. The possible migration to a highly competitive SA gambling industry dominated by offshore providers, with the interest of the serious gambler in effect treated as paramount, should surely not be allowed to happen by default, but only rather after careful consideration of its full economic and social consequences .

Hard Number Index: A mildly encouraging December

The first indicators on the state of the SA economy at the end of December 2013 are now available in the form of unit vehicle sales and the currency issued. These two hard numbers provide a very accurate and up to date estimate of spending by households and firms.

The news on spending in December is mildly encouraging when account is taken of seasonal influences on the sales of vehicles and the demand for notes. December, for obvious holiday reasons, is a very strong month for the notes held in wallets, purses and ATMs. It is also a weak month for vehicle sales, as holiday makers do not typically visit motor show rooms.

Yet while actual new vehicle sales fell from 50 806 units in November 2013 to 46 501 units in December, on a seasonally adjusted basis unit vehicle sales in December were well up on November sales, by some 3 605 units, or a monthly gain of some 6.9%. If the latest trends in new vehicle sales are extrapolated forward, using a time series forecast, the sector could be looking for sales in 2014 of 626 000 units. This would represent a minimal annual decline in sales volumes of some 2.36%, an outcome the industry would gladly settle for.

The manufacturing arm of the sector can hope to benefit further from much higher levels of exported units in 2014, after the disruptions caused by strike action in 2013. The National Association of Automobile Manufacturers in SA (Naamsa) indicated that exports of 275 822 units, though a record number, were some 61 000 units fewer than expected.

The money supply numbers at end December showed a somewhat similar improvement compared to November when seasonal influences are factored in. In the figure below we adjust the nominal note issue for the CPI and show that, on a seasonally adjusted basis, the real money base (supply of cash) picked up momentum in December 2013. When the latest statistics are used for a time series forecast, the real money base is predicted to have increased by 2.7% by year end 2014 – equivalent to nominal growth in the note issue of some 8% and consistent with an estimated inflation rate of about 6% in 2014. This is consistent with a predicted modest aggregate spending growth of about the same magnitude, of less than 3%.

What can be concluded from the latest economic news is that the SA economy has not, as may have been feared by some, fallen on its face. Rather, it seems able to sustain a modest forward momentum that, in the circumstances of disrupted production and a depreciated exchange rate that helps sustain high rates of inflation, may perhaps be consoling.

We combine the two hard numbers, unit vehicle sales and the real supply of cash in equal weights to form our Hard Number Index (HNI) of economic activity. We have previously shown that the turning points in the HNI – pointing to a pick up or slow down in the mostly forward pace of economic activity – track the Reserve Bank’s Coinciding Business Cycle Indicator Index very well. The distinct advantage of the HNI is that it is available within a week of the end of the previous month, rather than only three or more months later (as the Reserve Bank indicator is). The updated HNI is shown below. It shows that the SA economy is still growing and can be expected to continue to move forward at the current slow speed. The December data has helped to keep the HNI on this modestly faster track.

The opportunity for the economy to pick up momentum in 2014 will have to be led by exports and replacement of imported goods and services by domestic suppliers. The weaker rand can help promote exports and discourage imports, provided that the mines and factories stay open as do the restaurants, shops, hotels and B&Bs catering to foreign tourists.

A stronger pick up in the global economy, led by the US, will be helpful for exporters and the US dollar prices they receive. The scope for a domestic demand led stimulus for the economy is limited, given the state of global capital markets that are revealing a greater preference for developed rather than emerging market assets. The danger to the economy is not that domestic spending will pick up – but that it can slow down further under the pressures of higher prices and higher interest rates.

We must hope that the Reserve Bank does not attempt to fight higher inflation, since it has no influence whatsoever over inflation given the sources of higher prices: the exchange rate, a possible drought in the maize producing areas, as well as relentlessly higher taxes in the form of higher municipal charges for electricity and toll roads.

Higher interest rates can only reduce domestic demand without influencing prices very much, so slowing down growth and, by doing so, probably frightening away rather than attracting foreign capital. Slower growth may well mean even more rand weakness and more inflation.

The Hard Number Index: Little holiday cheer

A combination of vehicle sales and the money base (adjusted for inflation) provides a good and up to date leading indicator for the SA Business Cycle. New unit vehicle sales in November on a seasonally adjusted basis were 2 081 units down on October 2013 and were weak enough to turn the vehicle cycle in a Southerly direction. If current sales volumes are extrapolated, the industry is heading for an 8% decline in sales in 2014.

The demand for and supply of cash (adjusted for inflation) were also lower on a seasonally adjusted basis in November 2013 than in October 2013 and the outlook is for persistently slower growth in the money base in the year ahead.

 

Strike action in the motor sector and the consequent supply side constraints (rather than a lack of demand) may have been responsible for some of the lost sales in the show rooms that could be made up in December. The demand for cash in November is typically robust, given spending intentions for the holiday month of December that lead households and firms to hold more cash. The recent slowdown in demands for cash, adjusted for inflation, therefore does not suggest a buoyant season is in prospect for SA retailers.

It also indicates – when combined with vehicle sales that forms our Hard Number Index of the state of the economy – that the pace of growth in economic activity has stalled at a regrettably very modest pace.

The SA economy is running below its rather modest potential growth rate of about 3%. It is moreover very difficult to see where the impetus for growth can come from. The weaker foreign exchange value of the rand has added pressure on the prices of goods and services and is reducing the purchasing power of households. This ability to spend is also being undermined by higher administered prices; that is by what should be called higher taxes, in the form of tolls for roads and higher charges for electricity and other municipal services.

But the weaker rand not only inhibits the adoption of lower interest rates from which household budgets would benefit – especially in the form of lower mortgage payments. It has raised the possibility of higher interest rates – and so even more subdued household spending on which the economy is so dependent. So any stimulus from household spending for retailers or the local manufacturers seems a distant prospect.

This leaves higher export prices and volumes as the only possible source of faster growth over the next year or two. The weaker rand could be helpful to this purpose. It does make exporting more profitable and importing less profitable, at least until higher inflation erodes the benefits of a weaker rand. But raising exports does require fully productive mines and factories and the co-operation of trade unions, cooperation that was conspicuously absent in the third quarter, hence the weaker trade balance and slow GDP growth, both of which contributed to a weaker rand. Slow growth means low returns for investors and so discourages capital inflows that might support the rand.

The most conspicuous beneficiaries of the weaker rand would appear to be the service providers to foreign and perhaps also domestic tourists persuaded to holiday at home by expensive travel plans. Tourism after all contributes significantly more to the economy than mining and employs far more people. Farmers, provided the weather proves co-operative are also well placed to benefit from and respond to higher rand prices now available on foreign markets and also in the domestic market, where higher import parity prices might prevail.

The other hope is that a stronger global economy, while it has lead to higher interest rates in the US and elsewhere, and so (for now) pressure on the rand, will in due course help raise demand for as well as the prices of goods produced in SA. A combination of stronger exports and faster growth that encourages capital inflows and so a stronger rand, followed by lower interest rates, is the way out of the slow growth path upon which the SA economy is now set. The best monetary policy can do for the economy in these circumstances is nothing at all to interest rates. Higher interest rates can only further damage domestic spending and discourage the case for investing in South African assets. It could also very easily lead to a weaker rather than firmer rand. Slower growth with still more inflation should not be a policy option.

South Africans abroad: Return of the diaspora

 

The return of skilled South African from abroad has been a boon to the economy

SA may have made it difficult for firms to hire skilled foreigners. It has not done much, fortunately for the sake of the economy, to inhibit the flow of skilled South Africans back home. It should be doing all it can to encourage the diaspora to come back home.

The numbers of returning South Africans reversing the brain drain has been very impressive. I have been given an estimate of the number of returning professionals and managers by employment placement firm Adcorp, which is in a good position to know the details. The number Adcorp estimates is a very impressive 370 000 skilled migrants who have returned to SA since 2009. In recent years the SA economy has managed to do without attracting skilled foreigners in magnitude by absorbing large numbers of its own. Some sense of the importance of these returnees for the economy will be indicated below.

As may be seen in the figure below, the average real wage at which Adcorp was able to place young professionals or managers doubled through the SA economy boom years between 2003 and 2008, from R150 000 a year in 2003 to R350 000 in 2009. To convert these salaries to 2013 money, multiply by about 1.3 times. In recent years these real salaries at which Adcorp has been able to place clients has declined significantly. Clearly South African firms hiring skilled labour could have benefitted from access to immigrant skills before 2009 – just as they have benefitted from migrant skilled labour since.

 

Putting SA skilled migration trends in context

To give a better idea of the importance of 370 000 skilled entrants to the SA labour market we can refer to data supplied by SARS in its recently issued 2013 Tax Statistics, that can be found on the national Treasury web site. SARS reports 15 418 920 individuals as registered for PAYE. Not all potential income taxpayers earn enough to have to pay income tax (more than R60 000 a year in 2012). These numbers of registered taxpayers has increased dramatically in recent years as firms were forced to include all workers in their tax filings from 2011.

 

Of the 15.4m registered workers, some 5.1m actually paid income tax. 3.2m of these taxpayers earned a taxable income of more than R120 000 – perhaps qualifying them as skilled. These 370 000 returning migrants therefore represent more than 10% of the skilled labour force.

Who pays the tax – and some dissonance

It is of interest to note that 338 724 taxpayers reported taxable income of more than R500 000 in 2012. Of these, 73 250 taxpayers enjoyed taxable income of more than R1m in 2012, of whom 16 952 earned between R2m and R5m; while a mere 2 787 taxpayers reported taxable income of more than R5m.

What makes these statistics especially interesting is that the 15.4m taxpayers registered with SARS compare favourably with the employment numbers recorded by Stats SA in its Quarterly Labour Force Survey that records employment and unemployment from a survey of households. Stats SA reports a labour force of 18m of whom 10m only are estimated as formally employed.

 

Such grave dissonance between the numbers of employees recorded by SARS and by Stats SA needs to be urgently resolved if we are to say anything useful about the SA labour market and the impact of immigration and migration on it and design policies accordingly.

The greater the supply of skills the better the economy – and the poor stand to benefit most from skilled migrants.

For SA Jewish Board of Deputies,  The Big Immigration Debate- what type of immigration policy should South Africa adopt? With remarks from Naledi Pandor, Minister of Home Affairs, Mamphela Ramphele, Cris Whelan, Rapelanf Rabana and myself

Cape Town, 31st October 2013

Why immigrants are good for economic development

Increased supplies of any valuable resource, natural resources, fertile land, convenient waterways, minerals  etc as well as of labour or capital are helpful to an economy- they bring more output and incomes, including revenue for the Government. Immigrants not only add to the potential supply of labour they can add to the supply of capital as well as of enterprise. By capital one means not only their savings but of more importance the value of the skills they have acquired through education or training and through on the job learning in their home countries.

Immigrants are a self selected group – they have get up and go- a willingness to escape poverty or the lack of opportunity at home. They are therefore likely to have an above average degree of enterprise and risk tolerance.

The (present) value of their skills – realised in the production of goods and services – and represented by the employment benefits they earn – over and above those earned by unskilled workers with almost only their energy to offer – is described by economists as human capital. It can be calculated in a very similar way in which the present value of some flow of income from a machine or building can be estimated. Human capital is created through a process very much like that undertaken when more tangible capital, physical plant and equipment is added to the capital stock. It typically takes a willingness to save , to give up the current consumption of goods and services – while undergoing training or an education – for the sake of increased incomes and consumption in the future. In other words individuals save to invest in their skills the returns from which will be enjoyed over time in the form of extra income and additional consumption that comes with higher incomes. The returns from investing in human capital- the extra income associated with extra years of education- can  be very high indeed which is why such savings and investment activity is eagerly undertaken.

Often this training and education, the generation of human capital, will be highly subsidised by governments- that is by taxpayers hoping for a return on their contributions in addition to that realised by the better skilled individuals themselves. That is to say a better skilled or educated population generates positive externalities for the community at large.

The case for encouraging the immigration of skilled labour is for the host society to benefit from these externalities. That is to gain benefits beyond those realised by the migrants themselves, when given the opportunity to apply their skills or enterprise in the economy to which they have migrated .

Migration has income (output) effects but also influences income differences.

The extra supply of migrant skills or energy will have an influence on not only on total output (GDP) and incomes but also on real or relative employment benefits. That is on the relative or comparative incomes of the better off who benefit from human capital and the less well off who command very little of it. An increased supply of skilled workers will tend to reduce their scarcity value. By the same token an increased supply of skills will increase the relative scarcity of unskilled labour. The more capital, including the more human capital available to an  economy, the higher will tend to be the demand for and the so the real value of lower paid, less skilled labour

It seems clear that the value (real wages earned) earned by relatively unskilled labour local labour will benefit from an increased supply of human as well as physical capital. The more capital made available to an economy relative to its supplies of labour, the greater the scarcity of labour, the more demand for such labour, the more productive such labour and so the greater will be its rewards as employers compete for their services.  Workers with equal strength have long commanded a higher scarcity value in the US compared to China because of the relative abundance in the US of natural resources as well as of capital. Adding capital is very helpful to those with only their strength to offer employers – it is less obviously welcome by those advantaged with skills, human capital, who might resent the competition and the pressure on their employment benefits.

The political resistance to the migration of skilled workers would most obviously come from the economically advantaged, those with valuable education and skills – not those disadvantaged for want of education or training. The political resistance to the migration of unskilled labour will surely come from the relatively disadvantaged through lack of skills. Those in possession of scarce skills or capital more generally will have a strong economic interest in encouraging unskilled migrants. Less expensive labour intensive services for the homes of the better off, is an obvious benefit.

South Africa’s immigration practice has by design or practice been helpful to the advantage South Africans- and not helpful to the poor.

South Africa’s policies with respect to immigration- allowing by accident or design relatively free access for unskilled labour – from Zimbabawe or elsewhere in Africa- while by accident or design – raising barriers to the migration of skilled labour have surely been helpful to the those advantaged with skills or capital while being generally unhelpful to established unskilled labour.

Potential workers (unskilled and skilled) will migrate from regions with lower real employment benefits to those that offer more, if opportunity presents itself. By so doing all other things remaining the same they will add to the scarcity of labour in the home region and reduce it in the host region. Employers in the host region will welcome more labour and those in the home region will find their employment costs uncomfortable. The flow of people as the flow of capital is usually a response to growth and so the prospect of higher returns. Faster growing nations and regions attract workers and capital while slow growing regions repel labour and capital.

Push from conditions in the home country rather than the pull of an improved labour market in the host country can drive the flow of migrants

However there is the possibility of push rather than pull dominating outcomes in the labour and capital markets. Famine or failed nations can drive people and their savings away and help to depress returns in the host country that if growing slowly will find it more difficult to be hospitable. The case of people migrating away from Zimbabwe towards SA is a case more of push than pull. The case of skilled South Africans migrating away from the UK or the US after the Global Financial Crisis and its impact on employment opportunities is a further case of push more than pull.

South Africa may have made it difficult for firms to hire skilled foreigners. It has not done much, fortunately for the sake of the economy, to inhibit the flow of skilled South Africans back home. The numbers of returning South Africans reversing the brain drain has been very impressive. I have been given the number of returning professionals and managers by employment agency Adcorp- who are in a good position to know the details – as a very impressive 370,000 skilled migrants who have returned to SA since 2009. In recent years the SA economy has managed to do without attracting skilled foreigners in magnitude by absorbing large numbers of its own Diaspora. I will give some sense of the importance of these returnees for the economy at large below.

The impact on the remuneration of the professional classes in SA of this return is demonstrated by this figure shown below, also obtained from Adcorp. As may be seen the average real wage at which they were able to place young professionals or managers doubled through the SA economy boom years between 2003 and 2008 from R150,000 p.a in 2003 to R350,000 in 2009. To convert these salaries to 2013 money multiply by about 1.3 times. In recent years these salaries at which Adcorp have been able to place their clients has declined significantly. Furthermore the number of these placements by Adcorp has declined by as much as 60% No doubt in the face of the increased supply of skills provided by the returnees. Clearly South African firms hiring skilled labour could have benefitted from access to immigrant skills before 2009 – just as they have benefitted from migrant skilled labour since.

Source; Adcorp, Private Communication

 

Putting SA skilled migration trends in context

 

To give a better idea of the importance of 370 000 skilled entrants to the SA labour market we can refer to data supplied by SARS in their recently issued, 2013 Tax Statistics, that can be found on the national Treasury web site. SARS reports 15 418 920 individuals as registered for PAYE. Not all potential income taxpayers earn enough to have to pay income tax (more than R60,000 p.a. in 2012) These numbers of registered taxpayers have increased dramatically in recent years as firms were forced to include all workers in their tax filings from 2011. (See table below)

Of the 15.4m registered workers some 5.1m actually paid income tax. 3.2m of these taxpayers earned a taxable income of more than R120,000 – perhaps qualifying them as skilled. These 370 000 returning migrants therefore represent more than 10% of the skilled labour force. It will be of interest to note that 338,724 taxpayers reported taxable income of more than R500,000 in 2012, 73,250 taxpayers enjoyed taxable income of more than R1m in 2012 of whom 16,952 earned bwtween R2 and R5 million while a mere 2,787 taxpayers reported taxable income of more than R5m.

What makes these statistics especially interesting is that the 15.4 million taxpayers registered with SARS compare very favourably indeed with the employment numbers recorded by Stats SA in their Quarterly Labour Force Survey that records employment and unemployment from a survey of households . Stats SA reports a labour force of 18m of whom 10m only are estimated as formally employed. (See below)

Source; Stats SA QLFS

Such grave dissonance between the numbers of employees recorded by SARS and by Stats SA needs to be urgently resolved if we are to say anything useful about the SA labour market and the impact of immigration and migration on it.

Toll charges are not the problem, the way they have been determined is the problem

The SA National Roads Agency (SANRAL) very clearly misjudged its pricing power when setting the original tolls for the Gauteng commuter belt. Toll road charging is as much about politics as economics, as the Agency now knows only too well.

But what are the economic principles that inform SANRAL tolls? I trawled through the SANRAL website for answers and find very little by way of guidance. How “the right price” for a new road to be built and tolled is determined appears to receive very little attention or analysis in the documentation presented to the SA public by SANRAL.

There are some clues that indicate the tolling pricing philosophy. SANRAL pays close attention to the volume of traffic on its roads. To quote its Strategy: “Traffic data forms the basis of planning in SANRAL. Because it is important for SANRAL to have accurate traffic data for the entire national road network, it is covered by strategically positioned traffic counters.” Source: SANRAL Strategic Plan

SANRAL is also naturally well aware of its credit ratings and the strength of its balance sheets. Debt management would appear to play an important role in its tolling determinations , according to its Strategy Document:

“SANRAL has historically sought to reduce its dependence on transfers from the fiscus, using the strength of its balance sheet to finance the toll road programme…….. to allow it to continue its borrowing programme efficiently to fund the toll roads. The aim is to maintain the credit ratings at sovereign equivalent levels at all times. But the recent uncertainty around the implementation of electronic tolling on the GFIP has caused nervousness among investors. The rating agency has placed SANRAL‟s ratings on review for a possible downgrade.”

Not all of the extensive road network, for which the agency is responsible, is suitable for tolling, due to the lack of sufficient traffic to cover even the costs of collecting the tolls. But the costs of maintaining and extending the road network are formidable and for meeting this responsibility, the revenue from tolls (where they do cover their costs of collection) are for SANRAL a more helpful alternative source of finance than grants from the National Treasury.

The Toll Budget proposed in 2012-13 illustrates the financial objectives for SANRAL, presuming it got its way with tolls. Income from tolls were proposed to increase from R3.69bn in 2012-13 to R6.34bn in 2014-15. Expenditure on operations was to rise much more slowly, from R2.42bn to 2.84bn over the same period. That is to say, operating profits would rise from R1.27bn in 2012-13 to R3.5bn in 2014-15.

This improvement would go some way to meeting the growing finance charges associated with a massive increase in capital expenditure on roads to be tolled, that occurred between 2008-9 and 2011-12, as well as the extra debt associated with this capital expenditure programme. Capex of R25.37bn was incurred over these years and funded largely with debt. This burst of capex on toll roads according to the Toll Budget will slow down to R2.24bn in 2012-13, R1.45bn in 2013-14 and R1.58bn in 2015-16. This mixture of rising operating profits and declining capex and debt issues would clearly improve the SANRAL balance sheet.

The strong indication is that, with these balance sheet objectives very much in mind, the guiding principle in determining the tolls charged is based largely upon what the expected, closely monitored, traffic will bear. In other words, the tolls are set to maximise revenue. The more traffic, the more essential the route to be travelled, the stronger the demand and so the higher the tolls, would seem to be the modus operandi. In other words the tolls are set independently of the costs of building and maintaining the roads, with the most popular routes producing the largest operating surpluses.

The transport engineers might call this a pure congestion charge. It is not a user charge system but a system for cross subsidising users.

It is good economics to apply user charges as an alternative to general taxation, from which the taxpayer may receive very little benefit. The Gauteng commuter, not the Cape Town commuter, should pay for Gauteng roads. Nor should the Cape Town or Gauteng motorist be expected to pay for the costs of using the little used road from Calvinia to Upington.

But then how much should the Gauteng commuter be expected to pay? Not surely as much as the Gauteng traffic could bear. Given the lack of alternative routes and transport this could be a very high price indeed – as SANRAL originally intended.

The right price for a new toll road would be a toll that could be expected to generate enough revenue and operating surplus to cover all costs of building the road, including the opportunity cost of the capital employed. It would be inflation protected. If, in applying this principle, the right price can be expected to be generated over the estimated life of the asset (say 20 years), providing revenues sufficient to cover all costs, including a (low) risk adjusted return on capital, then the road should be built. If this condition cannot be met, either the road should not be constructed at all, or some explicit subsidy from the taxpayer would have to be in the budget for the road, using the same pricing principles. This economically sensible “right price” for a new road, for which there would be good demand, as for example an improved Gauteng road network, would surely be far lower than a “what the traffic can bear” charge.

It is essentially this pricing principle that the energy regulator has used to determine the price that Eskom, with its monopoly power, is allowed to charge its customers. Nor did NERSA allow debt management considerations to influence its price determination. As with a new power station, a new road, bridge or flyover is fully justified when the price charged is sufficient to generate enough revenue to cover all costs and to provide an appropriate return on capital. And using debt to fund infrastructure also makes sense, providing the returns justify the capital expenditure. Debt management should not be allowed to influence prices.

Roads are highly productive. Building new roads or access to them can make every economic sense when the right price is charged to their users. An active road building programme for the SA economy is urgently called for, especially where demand for roads is most intense, as it is around Gauteng or Cape Town. Yet the right price to be charged to justify this programme should not be seen as a congestion charge designed to force the use of alternative transport – or as a way of cross subsidising the building of roads that cannot cover their costs.

It calls for a user charge sufficient to cover costs of building and maintaining roads, wherever possible and no more; or for an explicit subsidy that the tax payer will be called upon to supplement user charges when revenues from practically feasible user charges would fall short of the requirement to cover all costs.

These – economic return on capital – pricing principles have not guided SANRAL. That the originally intended Gauteng toll charges proved politically impossible has unfortunately made sensible toll charging of the right kind indicated less likely. It is likely to have a negative impact on productive road building in SA.

The Hard Number Index: The current state of the SA economy

Information for September 2013 on new vehicle sales and the supply and demand for notes issued by the Reserve Bank has been released. These two very up-to-date hard numbers make up our Hard Number Index (HNI) of the immediate state of the SA business cycle.

These indicate that the pace of the economy is little changed from that of the previous month. The SA economy, according to the HNI, is still growing but the pace of its forward momentum, modest enough as it is, has stalled.

Vehicle sales of 54 281 new units in September were nearly 2000 units fewer than those of August 2013; but when measured on a seasonally adjusted basis sales declined by a lesser 700 units. A time series forecast indicates that by this time next year, the industry will be supplying units to the SA market at an annual rate of 632 390 units, slightly down on the current annualised rate of 649 400 units. The strike action in the motor industry in September appears to have affected export volumes – these were down sharply from the previous month, more than sales made at retail level. No doubt inventories, supplemented by imports, kept sales going with the influence of any supply disruptions postponed.

Given the recent stability of the rand, though at lower levels, it may be presumed that sales aimed at pre-empting expected price increases would have been less of an influence. Low financial charges by banks eager to lend, secured by the vehicles themselves, no doubt remained a positive influence on sales volumes.

The most important influence on sales over the next 12 months will be the direction of interest rates. Clearly the showrooms, as much as all retailers, would appreciate lower, not higher, interest rates that the weak state of the economy surely justifies. As somebody told me many years ago when asked about the determination of the price of a new car: “How long is a piece of string?” What you pay for a new vehicle is a mixture of financing charges, estimated residual values as well as the prices on the lists in car magazines. The pricing of a cell phone call and the telephones used to make them – subject to regulation of some of the charges cell phone companies levy on each other – are as difficult to understand and predict. The presumption that a reduction in some regulated charge made by cell phone companies will lead to an equivalent reduction in company revenue, is much too simplified a view of price-setting behaviour.

The supply and demand for Reserve Bank cash (the other half of the HNI) continues to grow at a strong but also declining growth rate, as we show below. This demand for cash reflects in part informal economic activity. The forecast of real growth of slightly below year on year 4% this time next year is again consistent with stable, but unsatisfactorily slow growth in household spending. On this evidence there is no case at all for an interest rate increase in SA. An increase would slow down growth further and would have no discernable influence on the inflation rate that will take its cue from the exchange rate that, as we have often argued, is beyond the control of the Reserve Bank. Rather, an interest rate cut is called for to sustain growth in spending and such growth is likely to attract foreign capital to support the rand and improve the outlook for inflation.

 

The SA economy needs help – and not just from foreign investors

In 2003 the SA economy took off and the current account deficit of the balance of payments (exports minus imports of goods and services plus the difference between interest and dividends earned from offshore investments and paid out for them) increased very significantly.

From an unsatisfactory period of slow growth and a minimal current account between 1995 and 2002, after 2003 faster growth in SA was understandably financed in greater measure with the foreign savings the economy was able to attract to help fund economic growth. Given the low rate of domestic savings, the limits to SA growth are set in part by the willingness of foreigners to invest in SA debt and SA business. Without these foreign savings, the growth potential of the economy would be seriously constrained. Foreign capital makes the difference between a rate of capital formation of an unsatisfactory 14% to 15% of GDP to a more helpful possible 20% rate of additional investment in plant and equipment.

Growth, or rather expected growth (of a business, or an economy that is the aggregation of business and government activity) attracts extra capital and the failure to grow repels capital and investment. Economic growth, supported by capital inflows, is much to be welcomed. The current account deficit indicates the supply of foreign capital, to which a highly positive connotation can be given. It also measures the demand for foreign capital by domestic economic agents – a demand that indicates vulnerability to the possibility that such demands may not be met.

As we show below, the pace of economic growth in SA was disrupted by the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and the deficits fell away. However since 2011, the growth rates have been very subdued and yet the deficit has remained very large. Clearly economic growth rates have remained unsatisfactorily low, as has the domestic savings rate, itself in part a casualty of slower growth in incomes and higher taxes on them, while the dependence on foreign capital (represented by the current account deficits) has remained very large.

The ability of SA to continue to attract foreign capital is welcome. Without it the economy could not grow even as slowly as it has done. Without it, the exchange rate would be weaker still, the outlook for inflation worse and the danger of higher interest rates greater – all of which would further diminish growth rates and the prospects for growth.

But attracting foreign capital is no free lunch for the economy. It is equivalent to having to sell the family silver to keep food on the table. The family silver sold is measured by the difference between income paid to foreigners in the form of dividends, interest and income received from them. The deficit on the debt and asset service account of the balance of payments has been widening as more of SA business is owned by foreigners and more debt issued to them. Income from capital invested abroad by South Africans made abroad has also increased but not nearly as rapidly as income paid out. This foreign income deficit is responsible for a large proportion of the current account deficit: about a third of it, or 2% of GDP in 2013, which is down marginally on recent years because of less profitable SA business paying out less in the form of dividends to offshore owners.

The objective for SA economic policy in these unsatisfactory circumstances of slow growth and higher inflation should be to make every effort to increase output, employment and savings. Two obvious initiatives would make a very large difference. The urgent call is for reforms that would encourage the demand for and supply of potentially abundant less skilled labour by repealing closed shop and minimum wage laws. Imposing secret ballots on strike proposals by union leaders would surely help sustain production in the factories and mines, which has been so disrupted recently.

The other clear route to higher savings and investment output and employment is to reduce income taxes on all business in exchange for more capital invested and more jobs created. A bias towards taxes on consumption rather than income is as urgently called for as labour market reforms.

Takeaways from the SA Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin, September 2013

The Reserve Bank has filled in the picture of the SA economy in Q2 2013 adding expenditure, balance of payments accounts as well as money, credit and financial statistics to numbers released earlier by Stats SA for domestic output (GDP). Growth in GDP at a seasonally adjusted rate of 3% in Q2, picked up momentum from the 0.9% rate recorded in Q1 2013. GDP grew by a pedestrian 2.5% in 2012. The modest acceleration in output (GDP) growth in Q2 was attributable almost entirely to a strong recovery in manufacturing output, that grew at an annual equivalent rate 11.5%, having declined the quarter before at a 7.9% p.a. rate. Mining output, by contrast, having grown by a robust 14.8% in Q1, declined at a 5.6% rate in Q2. Agricultural output declined further in Q2 at a 3.7% rate. Growth rates of the tertiary sector measuring activity in services, retail government and financial services, for example, are far more stable than those of manufacturing, mining and agriculture. But growth in service activity has been disappointingly slow of late growing by a mere 2.4% p.a. in Q1 and 2.3% p.a. in Q2 2013, having grown by an only slightly higher rate of 3% in 2012. (see below)

It should be appreciated that the SA economy is dominated by the supply of and demand for services that now accounts for 69% of all value added (the primary sector, mining and agriculture delivers but 11.85% of the economy while and manufacturing has a 12.5% share when measured in current prices. Outcomes in both the trade sector (wholesale and retail and catering activity) with a 16% share of the economy and financial services with a 21.5% share are far more significant for GDP and its growth than trends in manufacturing and mining

 

It could be said that the currently depressed growth rates are the result of a lack of demand for goods and especially services rather than a lack of potential supply of them. Final demands for goods and services from households firms and the government grew by only 2.5% in Q2 2013, well down from the 4% pace of 2012. Gross Domestic Expenditure that adds changes in inventories to final demands grew at a marginally faster rate of 2.7% in Q2 also well down on the 4.1% increase recorded in 2012. (See below)

Real gross domestic expenditure

Clearly the growth in aggregate spending is slowing down markedly though not all categories of spending were so negatively affected. Household spending on durable goods (cars, appliances etc) grew at a remarkable 11.8% annual rate in Q2 while growth in demand for semi-durables (shoes and clothes) also grew very strongly in Q2 at an 8.2% rate, sustaining the extraordinary growth rates of the past few years. By contrast a decline in the demand for the all important service sectors was recorded in Q2 – again continuing the very weak growth trends of the past few years. (see below)

The explanation for such dramatically divergent trends is in the very different prices being charged. The prices of services(largely influenced by administrative action and regulation) have risen much faster than the prices of clothing and durable goods the services of which are consumed by households. The table below makes this very clear. In the year to date the prices of consumer goods on average rose by 6.3% – the prices of clothing by 3.3% and that described as (durable household content and equipment at an even lower 2.9% while the prices of ‘communication” – telephones and calls rose by a well below average by 1.8%. Clearly prices, relative prices matter for these demand trends.

The weaker rand threatens the relative price trends that have been so favorable for the consumers and retailers of durables and semi -durables. A strong rand is good for consumption generally because it helps makes consumption goods cheaper and lowers the costs of finance, though some forms of consumption benefit more than others. Vice versa a weak rand drives consumption growth lower prices and interest rates higher. Indeed lower levels of consumption and higher levels of production for export and as competition with imports is a necessary part of the adjustment process to a weaker real rand.

The rand weakened because supplies of foreign capital so essential to fund even sub-par 3% growth in SA were made available on less favorable terms. Partly for SA specific reasons- especially the strike action on the mines and partly in recent weeks for global reasons- higher interest rates in the US.

In recent days the SA specifics in the form of a threatened disruption of mining output- so important in the export basket- have seemed less threatening. The threat and reality of higher interest rates in the US has also become less damaging to EM currencies including the ZAR. The recovery in the ZAR especially Vs emerging and commodity currencies reflects some of this. The hope must be that a stronger rand – the result of more favorable global investor sentiment towards SA- will allow lower interest rates that are so badly needed to stimulate domestic demand. Without stronger demands for services, supported as it would have to be by more favorable terms on which foreign capital is made available to SA borrowers, that in turn leads to lower interest rates and more freely available credit, the economy cannot hope to escape any time soon from its current slow growth phase.

All tables and figures included are taken from the SA Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin, September 2013

The Hard Number Index: Looking to export prices and volumes to revive the SA economy – held up by domestic spending

By Brian Kantor

There are at least two strong features of the SA economy, notably domestic unit vehicle sales and the supply of notes. Domestic vehicle sales in the 12 months to July are being sustained at 66 2000 units, close to the record sales of over 700 000 units in 2006-7 terms. The growth rate in vehicle sales has declined but remains positive at about 5%, helped by low financing costs and low rates of inflation of the prices of new vehicles.

The Reserve Bank note issue has grown by more than 12% over the past 12 months. Growth has held up strongly over the past three months to July, though the trend would appear to be in decline to about a 9% rate over 12 months.

 

The demand for new vehicle sales of all sizes comes largely from the formal sector of the economy – those with access to bank credit – while the growth in the note issue reflects less formal economic activity of those who prefer cash to credit or debit cards. Both sources of demand have been very welcome to an economy under pressure.

We combine both of these very up to date series to form our Hard Number Index (HNI) of the current state of the SA economy with the note issue, deflated by consumer prices. The results are shown below. The Hard Number Index has moved higher but appears to be peaking. Growth in economic activity, while still positive, is slowing down.

This latest indicator of the state of the SA economy, of sub-par growth subsiding, will not come as much of a surprise to economy watchers. Growth in domestic spending has probably held up better than many would have predicted and meant the economy could maintain some forward momentum, despite the weakness of exports and export prices. But the economy could do with all the further help it can get from stronger demands from world markets to boost local production and incomes.

Sustained output of minerals and metals, less disrupted by strikes and walkouts, would be a big plus for growth. Higher prices for commodities coupled with better export volumes and revenues would also help the rand. A stronger rand would mean less inflation to come and lead to lower interest rates that could help sustain domestic spending. The problems in mining have not only damaged output and employment in mining and manufacturing; they have kept up interest rates. The domestic economy has deserved the lower interest rates that an improved foreign trade account and better than expected labour relations could help deliver.

Economic policy: The solution for poor project management in SA is private ownership

When a private company grossly mismanages a project designed to add revenues and profits or mismanages the project such that its capital costs grossly exceed budget, the management takes the blame. They may lose their jobs as well as their reputations, and the shareholders who appointed them have to bear the burden of a lower return on the extra plant and equipment created. In extreme cases the overruns and the waste of capital incurred may bring the company down, causing shareholders to lose all and debt holders to salvage what they can out of the loss making wreck.

In the case of a government-owned and regulated monopoly the outcomes for the management and the company may not be so severe. Unlike the private company, the regulator may be persuaded to allow the company to charge more to maintain a regulated return on the extra capital employed. Unlike the private company facing competition and market determined prices, largely beyond its control, the public monopoly may be able to cover its cost overruns with higher prices. With little alternative, the consumer will have to pay up and hope to economise on the more expensive essential service. The consumers, not the company, then have to bear the consequences of what might well be very poor project management. And the international competitiveness of all those who use the now more expensive service suffers accordingly. Factories and mines will then become less profitable, especially in export markets, because they will not be able to pass on higher costs, so discouraging further investment in their enterprises. And households will see their real disposable incomes taxed further, discouraging consumption of other goods and services.

Making customers rather than owners carry the proverbial can for poor project management is not only unfair – it covers up for poor management so encouraging managers to become less responsible and efficient.

Price and return on capital-regulated state owned enterprises play a critical role in supplying the SA economy with essential infrastructure, such as new power stations (Medupi) and new pipelines (Transnet’s new pipeline from Durban to Gauteng). The problem is that the managers of these state owned enterprises are not making a very good fist of project management. These important projects are well behind time and well over original budget.

Fortunately for the consumers of electricity or pipelines, the regulator is adopting a more critical approach to the costs, both capital and operating, claimed by Eskom and Transnet to justify higher prices. A report (Businessday/BDlive, Razina Munshi, 2 August 2013) commented:

“The National Energy Regulator of South Africa (Nersa) is investigating the near doubling of the costs of Transnet’s new multiproduct fuel pipeline from Durban to Gauteng, in a move that could herald closer scrutiny of big cost overruns on state infrastructure projects. The outcome of the probe could also have implications for petroleum pipeline tariff hike requests in the future……. Transnet originally budgeted R12.7bn for the project, but this soon rose to R15.4bn, and it quickly became clear that even that was conservative. The final price tag of R23.4bn includes the cost of pump stations in Durban and Heidelberg, still under construction….”

Commenting on Eskom’s claim for higher prices, Business Report (12 July 2013 ) said: “The failure to push through big-enough price increases has created a 225 billion-rand cash-flow shortfall as the company struggles to meet the continent’s biggest economy’s electricity demands.”

This cash flow shortfall – the difference for Eskom revenues between a 16% per annum price increase over five years and the 8% per annum increase granted by Nersa – helps reinforce the important point. If the consumers cannot be forced to pay up for management failure, then the owners have to.

The owner of Eskom and Transnet is of course the Republic of South Africa, ie the citizens whom the government represents. To overcome the huge cost overruns they, the people, have to come up with the extra cash, that is the extra capital required to keep Eskom and Transnet going. They have to borrow the money and pay the extra interest on the additional debt, and/or impose additional taxes on themselves to cover up for poor project management. Even if some of the people believe that others, not themselves, will be stumping up it is clear that the funds so raised and the taxes paid could be put to better alternative uses, for example building homes, schools or hospitals.

It is not at all clear why the people of SA would wish to take on these risks of poor project management that they need not have to do. The assets and activities of Eskom and Transnet could be privatised, as they are in many economies, with the current plant and equipment sold off at market determined prices. The pipeline would fetch a pretty penny at current regulated prices. In this way not only would the debt levels and interest expense of the Republic be reduced significantly, the exposure of the SA citizen to huge cost overruns would be eliminated. Shareholders in privately owned utilities with highly predictable revenue streams would willingly bear those risks, especially if the regulator offers them a fair risk-adjusted return on capital. And the Republic would also collect its normal share (28%) of the profits earned by a privately owned utility and the dividends paid out.

Little sympathy should be accorded to Eskom having to raise the extra debt to cover their cost overruns. A recent positive response by a private company, Exxaro/GDF Suez Energy to a Department of Energy call for participation in electricity generation (13 June 2013);if accepted, will allow this private company to build a new coal fired power station producing a respectable 680MW of electricity, to be delivered to the grid at presumably current wholesale prices set by the regulator for Eskom – plus inflation.

This indicates that the price of electricity in SA is now more than high enough to encourage private owners to risk their capital to supply additional electricity. No doubt the company has built in high enough returns on the capital it intends to employ to make the project viable. Should it succeed SARS will be looking to its normal share of profits. And should it fail to produce a profit, or even go out of business, the shareholders will have to stand up and bear the loss. Some other group of owners would then take over the plant at what will be a distressed price and hope to manage it better.

SA citizens would surely find this a better prospect than having to bear the risks of owning assets over which they have very little control and their managers do not appear to do a very good job of managing.

The Hard Number Index: The demand side of the economy has held up – but the economy is under pressure from the failures on the supply side

By Brian Kantor


Hard Number Index updated – economy still growing but at a slower pace

We have updated our SA economic activity indicator, the Hard Number Index (HNI) for May 2013 with the release of vehicle sales and notes in circulation data. The HNI indicates that economic activity in May was still growing at an improved rate. The forward momentum however (the speed of the economy) is slowing down and is predicted to slow down further over the next 12 months. The change in the HNI may be regarded as the second derivative of the economy with the HNI or the business cycle as its rate of change – positive or sometimes negative when the economy shrinks.

The HNI and the Reserve Bank Indicator are both well above the 100 level

Our index is an equally weighted combination of new unit vehicle sales and the notes in circulation issued by the Reserve Bank – adjusted for the CPI – that we call the Real Money Base (RMB). These two hard numbers provide a very up to date view of the state of the economy, being released within a week of any month end. We show a comparison of the Coinciding Indicator of the Business Cycle as calculated by the Reserve Bank. This indicator is based upon seven or more time series mostly using sample surveys rather than hard numbers that are released with variable time lags. The latest estimate made by the Reserve Bank is only for February 2013.

As the chart shows, our HNI has identified rather accurately recent turning points in the Reserve Bank indicator. The Reserve Bank recently rebased this indicator to December 2010 and we have done the same. Numbers above 100 in these diffusion indexes indicate that the economy is growing and numbers below that the economy is shrinking. Both the HNI and the Coinciding Business Cycle Indicator are recording numbers well above the 100 of December 2010, implying still strong growth momentum. Our indicator predicts that this forward speed has slowed and will slow further in the months to come.

Vehicle Sales remain a strong feature of the economy – real money base growth slowing

The most encouraging feature of the SA economy is the strength of new vehicles sold domestically. Export volumes have also gathered momentum, accounting for about half of domestic sales volumes. While the growth in unit vehicle sales has slowed down it has remained close to an 8% annual rate and is predicted, via a time series forecast, to maintain this rate. The supply of central bank cash, adjusted for higher consumer prices, peaked recently at about an 8% real rate and is currently growing at about a 4% rate – held back by more inflation and a slowdown in the growth in cash held by the public and banks. It is forecast to slow further.

Money supply (M3) and Bank Credit Growth have picked up

The bank credit and broader measures of the money supply have been updated to April 2013. As we show, the growth in M3 and in credit supplied to the private sector has gathered momentum despite consistent weakness in demands for mortgage finance. Bank credit could not be regarded as a drag on growth.

The drag on the economy is coming from the rand

The drag on growth in domestic spending is now coming from offshore. The limits to this growth are set by the willingness of foreign suppliers of capital in one form or another to fund our spending. This willingness is revealed in the foreign exchange value of the rand. This has deteriorated significantly in recent months, putting upward pressure on the prices consumers and firms have to pay for their goods and services, especially those with high import content. These higher prices might also be accompanied by higher interest rates.

Our view is that, given the weaker predicted state of the economy, the Reserve Bank will wisely resist increasing short term interest rates. Relief for the economy will however not come from lower interest rates. The source of recovery will have to come from increased exports, especially of metals and minerals. The rand is weaker because it is expected that the mining sector, which accounts for 60% of exports, will be further disrupted by strike action. Were the mines able to operate at a better than expected rate, the rand would benefit and the chances of lower interest rates, well justified by slower growth in domestic demand, would greatly improve.